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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
May 17, 1982, Conference
List 1, Sheet 3
Cert to Ct. of Claims
(Friedman, Cowen, Davis,
Nichols (diss. in part), Kunzig
Bennett, Smith) (en bane)

No. 81-1748

United States

v.

'[)/::...

~\

Mitchell~

Federal/Civil Timely (w/ extn)
1. SUMMARY:

erred
~~Jhen

in permitting
the

relevant

6 1'-a "'T.

a

Petr argues that the Court of Claims

suit

for

damages against

statutes

did

not

r;,~
4..
-{', c1 t<C ( ~ ~
r~
fJ,, ,, ~ r.-ov ·£~

expressly

the United States

provide

for

such

a

tjUt'S ht~~

IQ

I~ wht t~t r s fa fuft! (. ,..eaf, ~s
f'to-i1~~~f :bt fw, ( Y1 1 -th~ jov '-t Y. In~'"' ~.s~ L~ "Uf.t-.!:.~~~ ti)i '""'' The
c.

s:v:

~.

remedy.

This case is straightlined with #81-1747, United States v.

---------:7

Duncan.
2.

FACTS

AND

DECISION

BELOW:

Resps

seek

to

recover damages from the United States for the alleged mismanagement
of timber resources on lands allotted to individual Indians from the
Quinault Reservation.

Resps are 1,465 individuals owning interests

in allotments, the Quinault tribe, and an unincorporated association
of Quinault Reservation allottees.
Between 1905 and 1935 the entire reservation was
allotted to individual Indians under the General Allotment Act of
However,

1887.

under

the

Allotment

and

Act

the

Indian

Reorganization Act of 1934, the United States holds the allotted

-

land in trust for the benefit of the Indian to whom the allotment
has been made.

Other statutes direct the Secretary of Interior to

manage the timber resources on these lands for the benefit of the
Indians.

Under 25

u.s.c. 406 the Secretary is authorized to approve

the sale of timber.
to adhere
Indian

to

forest

required

the

Under 25
principles

lands.

to consider

And

u.s.c. 466, the Secretary is directed
of

under

sustained-yield
25

forestry

on

all

u.s.c. 406, the Secretary is

the state of growth of the timber and

the

present and furture financial needs of the allottee and his heirs in
making decisions respecting timber sales.

Finally, the Secretary is

authorized to deduct an administrative fee for his serviced from the
timber

revenues.

25

u.s.c. 406(a), 413.

On the basis of these

statutes, the Secretary has developed a detailed set of regulations
governing sale and harvesting of Indian timber.

25 C.F.R. Part 141.

Resps filed
the Secretary:
sold;

(2)

(1)

failed

failed

their claims in 1971, alleging that

to obtain

fair

market value for

timber

to manage timber on a sustained yield basis;

failed to obtain payment for some merchantable timber;

(3)

(4) failed to

develop a proper system of roads and easements, and exacted improper
charges

from

allottees

certain funds;

for

roads;

(5)

failed

to pay

interest on

(6) paid insufficient interest on certain funds;

exacted excessive administrative fees.

(7)

Resps sought money damages,

u.s.c.

and premised jurisdiction on the Tucker Act, 28

§1491, and,

in the case of the tribal claimant, on the Indian Claims Commission

u.s.c.

Act, 28

§1505.
In 1977, petr moved to dismiss on the basis that

the

u.s.

had not consented to suit with respect to these claims.

Mitchell

I,

the Court of

Claims,

en bane,

held

that

In

the General

Allotment Act provided Indian allottees with a cause of action for
money damages.

This Court reversed,

445

u.s.

535

(1980),

holding

that

the Allotment Act could not be understood to place upon the

u.s.

full fiduciary responsibilities with respect to the management

of allotted lands.
Claims

could

However, the Court indicated that the Court of

consider

on

remand

whether

any

of

the

additional

legislation governing management of allotted lands would support a
claim for money damages under the Tucker Act or its equivalent in
§1505 for tribal claimants.
On
found

the

statutes
66)

u.s.

remand,

subject

providing

for

to

the Court of Claims,

suit,

this

time

timber management

and governing rights of way

(25

(25

u.s.c.

on

en bane,

the

u.s.c.

basis
§§

again
of

406,

§§318a, 323-325).

the
407,
In

order

to

find

a

waiver

of

sovereign

immunity,

the

statute

or

regulation providing the basis for a claim must be capable of being
fairly

"interpreted

Government."
was

not

as

mandating

compensation

United States v. Testan, 424

necessary,

however,

for

the

by

the

Federal

u.s. 392, 400 (1976).

statute

or

regulation

It
to

specifically direct that a claim could be brought in the Court of
Claims or

federal district court.

Nor was it necessary that the

statute or regulation specifically authorize the payment of money;
"non-express" indications of a right to compensation may serve as
well.

Thus, the right to compensation need not be explicitly stated

although

the

"statute

should

fairly

be

read

as

mandating

compensation" and that "reading should be strong and clear."

For

these principles, the court relied upon Testan and Mitchell.
The

'-

(timber
§318a,
between

sales),
323-25
the

25

court

concluded

that

25

u.s.c. §466 (sustained yield), and 25 u.s.c.

(rights
allottees

of

way)

and

the

created

a

fiduciary

relationship

and

resps

government

recover for breach of these fiduciary obligations.
of Indian timber is comprehensive.
v.

Bracker,

448

u.s.c. §§406-407

u.s.

136

that

could

Federal control

See White Mountain Apache Tribe

(1980).

These

statutes

reflect

a

congressional intent to maximize Indian revenues. The court defined
the nature of the damages resps might seek as follows:

"any fall-

off from the income they would have received from their forests and
lands if the Government had properly complied with the directives of
the statutes and regulations,
value)
~hrough

of thier

property which

and

(b)

the value

is lost

improper actions of Interior.

(or decrease

(or diminished

in

in value)

But there can be no recovery

for other, consequential,
might

possibly

recover

indirect damages which a private cestui
because

of

his

trustee's

derelictions."

Further, the court found a right to recover damages for payment of a

u.s.c.

less than optimal interest rate under 25

§ 162a.

In dissent, Judge Nichols argued that the United
States had not consented to be sued for mismanagement of

forest

resources and rights-of-way.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr argues that the Court of

Claims' finding of liability marks a significant departure from the
rule in Testan and Mitchell.

Under Testan and Mitchell waivers of

immunity must be unequivocal.

None of the statutes relied upon by

the Court of Claims expressly provides for maintenance of a damage
suit.

'--

Although the allottees could sue for the proceeds of timber

sales or the sales of rights-of-way under the statutes, there is no
statutory basis for a suit to recover proceeds that arguably should
have been, but were not captured by the Secretary.

Admittedly, the

question is closer as to a right to recover damages for less payment
of a less than optimal interest rate under 25

u.s.c.

statute

particular

does

compensation.
interest

not

appear

to

compel

The allot tees could sue

actually

earned,

but

the

a

§162a.

Yet the
level

of

if the secretary retained

statute

provides

no

right

to

recover a shortfall.
Petr

suggests

that

resp may

seek

injunctive or mandamus relief against the Secretary.

declaratory,
The mere fact

that the statutes in this case place duties upon the Secretary does
not provide the basis for a damages claim.

The statute at issue in

estan placed duties upon the government as well,

but no damage

claim was allowed.

Moreover, it is relevant that when the statutes

at issue in this case were adopted, Indian claimants were generally
denied

any

monetary

remedy

against

the

United

States.

Finally,

although the relationship between the Indian tribes and the United
States is special,
against

the

the requirement of unequivocal consent to suit

u.s.

is

fully

applicable

u.s.

Klamath Indians v. United States, 296
Resps

track

to

Indian

claimants.

See

244 (1935).

the Court of Claims opinion.

They

argue that the statutory scheme requires the Secretary to pay the
proceeds

of

context,

"cannot

payment

of

management
that

timber

the

sales

the

allot tees.

be

read

otherwise

proceeds

that

fairly

those

to

in accordance with
Secretary

inconceivable

has

that

a

will

than

to

mandate

produced

by

statutory guidelines."

duty

Congress

be

This obligation,

of

did

prudent

not

It

a

Moreover, Testan does not dictate a different result.
situation

in Testan or

Mitchell

I

is

damages

in this acase a

the

prudent
clear

management.

intend

in

It

is

remedy.

Unlike the

special

trust

relationship has been created.
4.
the

~ecial

trust

DISCUSSION:

relationship,

inconsistent with Testan.

makes

decision

Sheehan,

below

may

80-1437, Testan is said to

the explicit authorization of damages awards.

clear,

premised

the

Because of

not be
/
Yet in the circulating opinion in Army &

Air Force Exchange Service v.
require

I tend to a grant.

on

specifically

jurisdiction
the

asserted

authorize

over

respondent's

violation

awards

of

of

money

("As Tes tan

complaint

regulations
damages."

cannot

that

Page

do

11.)

be
not
The

tatutes here do not expressly authorize damages awards.
There is a response.
05/20/82
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81-1748 United States v. Mitchell
MEMO TO FILE:
This is the second time this case has been here.
In 19 8 0 ,

4 4 5 U• S .

This litigation,
suit

by

some

5 3 5 , we rever sed the Co u r t
conducted since 1971,

1,400

-

Indians

~--~--~

who

own

of C1 aims .

is a consolidated
in

interests

land

allotments on the former reservation of the Quiault tribe
(Pacific Northwest) •
each

and

allottee

heavily

These

timbered

received

a

-

allotments

-

about 80 acres

commenced

deed containing

in

the

1905.

promise

Each
of

the

U.S.

that it would hold the allotment "in trust for the

sole

use and

~cu./=:i-

~s

benefit of

the

Indian" or

his heirs.

The

were so heavily timbered that farming or grazing was

rarely possible.

As a result of sales and large families,

the reservation today is a "complex checkerboard of trust

----

"""'-"

.._,

...

allotments and former trust allotments".
In 1920,

the government was authorized to sell

timber from the allotted lands on long term, large volume
contracts.

There have been 14 such contracts, embracing

many allotments in each.
The

Secretary

of

the

Interior

has

exercised

continuous control over the management and disposition of

the lands and timber.

Indeed, few of the Indians actually
Nor may an allotment owner

live on the allotted lands.

-

cut and sell timber without the prior permission of the
Bureau of Indian Lands.
It
trust,
over

is

alleged

that,

far

from

being

a

passive

the BIA has exercised pervasive and total control

the mangement and disposition of the allotted land

and timber, and has done so for a fee.

_\

~~(~)

This suit, that has involved extensive discover
~

.--.,..

depositions over many years, alleges various failures and
neglects

by

the

federal

including

government,

-------------------

mismanagement of the timber resources,

failure to obtain

fair market value for timber sold, etc.

(See p. 5 of SG's

brief) .

"S ~ ~"/
for
and
the

T~ !J. n

breach of trust.
.

regulation~

setting

individual

-

as ide

the Court of Claims seeks damages
The suit is based on the statutes

-

dating back to 1873 of

Indians on

these
the

lands

and

reservation.

that provide for
allotment
The

to

the

~

respondents

also rely on the Indian Tucker Act and on the Tucker Act
itself.

Question Presented

c-J-1 ~

The sole question - though framed differently by
the parties -

~-~· damages
~
~ its
~~

~~

v1

is whether the

u.s.

is accountable in money

al~ed b~es ~~rust

for

in connection with

management of the timber on these allotted lands.

case

The Court of Claims,
in

1980,

again

to which we remanded this

answered

this

question

in

the

affirmative.
The SG's Argument
In a long and repetitive brief,
as I

view it now It

reversal.

jurisdiction,
provisions
enforceable

do

.

to make an overwhelming argument for

concedes
but
not

against

jurisdiction for

the SG fails -

that

says

the

the

"create
the

u.s.

Court

statutory
any

of

Claims

jurisdictional
right

substantive

They

has

merely

the Court to hear such claims.

provide

u.s.

v.

Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 and the earlier decision in this
case,

u.s.

v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 538-540.

The SG says:

"The applicable rule is that where a claim for
money damages is predicated upon an alleged
statutory violation, a suit for damages may not
be maintained against the U.S.
unless the
statute in question 'in itself . . . can fairly
be interpreted as mandating compensation by the
federal government for the damages sustained'".
Testan, at 402.

The

~

SG

argues

that none

of

the

statutes
....__
relied on justifies the "inferring of a right of action"
~--------------

-------

-------

to recover damages

...__.

for mismanagement.

Then,

emphasizing

that surrender of sovereignty may not be implied and must
be

'

expressly

declared

by

Congress,

the

SG

relies

on

several implied cause of action cases (e.g., Touche, Ross

& Co.) for the settled proposition that absent an express
damages

remedy,

Congress.

courts

Since

none

must
of

look

the

to

the

statutes

intention

relied

upon

of
by

plaintiffs expressly provide for a damages remedy, the SG
says none may be inferred or implied.
the

Indians

declaratory

remedyless,
relief

as

This will not leave

they may have

though

neither

injunctive or
of

these

is

specifically authorized.

The Respondents' Brief
My first reading leaves me under the impression
that

respondents

least,

they

may have

have

a

the

stronger

better of
brief

in

opinion of the Court of Claims en bane.
rely on

u.s. v.v Testan,
•

this case.
addition

to

At
the

..

Respondents also

424 U.S. 392, 401-402 in which we

'

said that' a cause of action for money damages does not lie
unless

its

basis

"in

itself

can

fairly

be

interpreted

as

mandating

compensation

government for the damages sustained".
Thus,

according

to

by

the

federal

(Br., p. 11)

respondent

"a

waiver

of

federal sovereign immunity will be deemd to have occurred
where the constitutional, statutory or regulatory basis of
a

claim

against

the

United

States

'can

fairly

be

interpreted as mandating compensation • . • for the damage
sustained'".
Relying
regulations

of

governing

the

"many

federal

the management and

timber trusts resources",

statutes
sale of

for

Indian

it is argued that they must be

construed as "mandating compensation for damages incurred
as a result of the government's mismanagement and waste of
such trust resources".
Testan is thus relied upon as making clear that
an

express

authorization

of

a

damage

remedy

is

not

required where the statutory framework may be construed as
"mandating compensation".

This is said to be appropriate

in this case because of the statutes and regulations that
impose such positive duties upon the government as trustee
for the Indian owners.
In our

1980 Mitchell

ruling of the Court of Claims

I

decison we

favorable

reversed

a

to the Indians,

holding (i) that the General Allotment Act "created only a
limited

trust

relationship

between

u.s.

the

and

the

allottee that does not impose any duty upon the government
to manage timber resources";

(ii) that the Act should not

be

much

read

as

authorizing,

less

requiring,

the

government to manage timber resources for the benefit of
the Indian allottees",
respondents

to

and

recover

(iii)

money

that "any right of the
damages

for

government

mismanage of timber resources must therefore be found in
some

source other

respondents

than the General Allotment Act".

brief,

p.

9,

10.

Brennan,

Marshall

See
and

Stevens dissented.
Subject to reading Mitchell I
all clear in my memory),
the

General

Allotment

I

(that is not at

judge that it focused on what

Act

required,

rather

broader question presented in this case.
remand,
the

Indian

timber

management

the

In any event, on

the Court of Claims by a 6-1 vote held

federal

than

(a)

that

statutes

and

regulations imposed specific fiduciary duties on the U.S.
in connection with the sale and management of Indian land,
timber of funds held in trust; and (b) that those statute
and regulations mandate compensation for damages sustained
as a result of the government's breach of its prescribed

duties;

and

that

under

the

Tucker

Act,

the

Court

of

Tucker

Act

Claims

and

had

the

Indian

jurisdiction

to

adjudicate these claims.

* * *
The foregoing is dictated in our apartment with
only

the briefs

Mitchell I,

I

before me.

need

to

read Testan and

and perhaps other decisions.

Nor do I

have

clearly in mind the provisions of all of the statutes and
regulations
however,

relied

that

the

upon.
United

I

do

States

have

the

certainly

impression,
occupied

a

substantial position of trust, that the individual Indians
~--------------

'

- apart from their lack of sophistication and education could

not

scattered

manage
about

successfully

the

these

reservation.

80-acre

Thus,

not

parcels
only

the

statutes but the practical situation seem to require that
the government exercise reasonable care
property

of

these

individual

Indians.

in managing
A

failure

the
to

exercise such care normally gives rise to a damage remedy,
particularly where no other remedy seems available.

L.F.P., Jr.
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~~ z.-jzff 4~ ~,
~~:a.~~~~

job 02/28/83

rL

~ ~ ~ ~~

~~~~~j-t>rvv
~~~~~~a~

k~~~~t;-f~
~· ~~~,

1AA_;

13ur-~~~~
Cf/~~~~~
~ ~: &J 4 ~..vp~

~"' ~) ,1-eJ ~ ~

"'

tiX-~~~.iiJF~'S6-~, ~
~ bt--~~JLD~~
~/zAlv~,Lo~,
i
?<
'It
~

~~~~~~

tUCr~~~~~
~

"§ 4LD?C:,rc)
72L.--tA/, ~A~~//~ '
BOBTAIL l3E'NdH MEMORANDUM
~

k -

No. 81-1748

~~

United States v. Mitchell
Jim

March 1,1983

I.

Question Presented

Is the U.S. accountable in money damages for alleged breaches
of trust in connection with its management of forest resources situated on allotted lands of the Quinault Indian Reservation?

L. •

I I.

.Facts

The Quinault Reservation was established in 1873.
tion is heavily forested.

The Reserva-

In 1905, the federal government began to

allot the Reservation to individual Indians.
a deed, signed in t ,he name of the President,

Each allottee received
c~mise

that the United States would hold the allotment "in trust for the
sole use and benefit of the Indian .•. or, in the case of his decease,
of his heirs ...• "
The Secretary of the Interior was first authorized to approve
the sale by the allottee of timber on any Indian land "held under a
trust or other patent containing restrictions on alienations."
Since 1934, Congress has required the Interior Department to adhere
to the principles of sustained-yield forestry on all Indian forest
lands under its supervision.

And since 1964, Congress has directed

ID to consider the state of growth of the timber and the present and
future financial needs of the allottee and his heirs in making his
decisions respecting timber sales.

The ID is authorized to deduct

an administrative fee for his services from the timber revenues paid
out to the Indian allottees, and under this statutory authority, the
ID has developed a detailed set of regulations governing sale and
harvesting of Indian timber, and has the power to exercise day-today supervision over the harvesting and management of timber.
, j

III.

Proceedings Below

In \.._.._...:
1971, resps, individual Indians owning interests in the
allottments, brought actions for damages from the

u.s.

for the al-

leged mismanagement of timber resources on the allottments.
ically, resps claim that the U.S. has:

Specif-

(i) failed to obtain fair

,,
t.

·.

.j.

sold~

market value for timber
sustained-yield
chantable

basis~

timber~

{iii)

{ii) failed to manage timber on a
failed to obtain payment for some mer-

{iv) failed to develop a proper system of roads

and easements, and exacted improper charges from allottees for

roads~ ~

failed to pay interest on certain

ficient interest on certain

funds~

ministrative fees from allottees.

and

~

funds~ ~

paid insuf-

exacted excessive ad-

In 1979, the Ct. of Claims ruled
·~

that the General Allotment Act of 1887, by itself, was a sufficient

-

basis to warrant its exercise of jurisdiction over r e sps' money damages claims for breach of trust.

ftv-N

14 SD

This Court reversed, holding { i) that .• th :_
~

4e~neral

Allotment

Ac~ )

v...

"created only a limited trust relationship between the United States

~nd

the allottee that does not impose any duty upon the Government

to manage timber resources," 445

u.s.,

at

542~

{ii) that the Act

"should not be read as authorizing, much less requiring, the Government to manage timber resources for the benefit of Indian
allottees," id., at

545~

and {iii) that "[a]ny right of the respond-

ents to recover money damages for Government mismanagement of timber
resources must [therefore] be found in some source other than that
Act," id., at 546.

The Court expressly declined to address the

issue whether the Government, as trustee, is accountable in damages
for breaches of trust.

Id., at 542.

On remand, in its 1981 Mitch-

C:f-

ell decision, the Ct. of Claims, held {i) that the federal Indian

- --

timber management statutes, and regulations promulgated pursuant
thereto, impose specific fiduciary duties upon the

u.s.

~

in connec-

tion with the management of Indian land, timber, and funds held in
trust by the

U.S.~

{ii) that those statutes and regulations mandate

4.

compensation for damages sustained as a result of the Government's
breach of those duties; and (iii) that, under the Tucker Act and the
Indian Tucker Act, the Ct. of Claims has jurisdiction to adjudicate
such claims.
IV.

1.

Petr.

Summary of the Parties' Contentions

The Ct. of Claims has jurisdiction under the Tucker

Acts over individual claims for money damages founded upon an "Act
of Congress.

II

. 1 provisions d o not, h owever, ereThese rr-:~~
A]urisdictiona

••

ate any substantive right enforceable against the U.S.

They merely
~

provide jurisdictibn for the court to hear such claims "whenever the

______________.

substantive right exists."

Mitchell, 445 U.S., at 538-540; United

States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976).

The applicable rule is

that where a claim for money damages is predicated upon an alleged
statutory violation, a suit for damages may not be maintained
against the

u.s.

unless the statute in question "in itself ... can
'--

by the Federal Government for the damage sustained."

424

u.s.,

at 402.

None of the statues from which the Ct. of Claims inferred a
right of action to recover against the

u.s.

for alleged mismanage-

ment of Indian forest resources and their proceeds reflects the neeessary legislative mandate for the availability of the damages remedy.

It may be correct that a statute vesting an individual with an

absolute right to recieve a sum certain from the

u.s.

grounds an

action for at least the sum withheld in the event of nonpayment.
Resps' claims, however, do not rest upon any such statute, and the
Ct. of Claims' decision rests upon the novel proposition that a

•·.

-.

~

0

statute that does not in terms create any right to payment of money
nonetheless may support a damage action against the U.S.

5

/~

Nothing in this Court's decisions respecting the special rela-

~--------------

(?

~ tionship.between

the

u.s.

and the Indian tribes supports creating a

presumpt1ve monetary liability for statutory violations in Indian
cases.

The Court has on many occasions characterized the special

relationship as a "fiduciary" or "trust" relationship, but nothing
in this trust relationship can constitute the "affirmative statutory
authority" necessary to maintain an action against the U.S. for the
recovery of damages.

See United States v. United States Fidelity &

Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514 (1940).
this doctrine to suggest that the

u.s.

The Court has never invoked
is answerable in money dam-

ages for breaches of the standards applicable to a private fiduciary.

--~

;;;Z)
/
B. ~ I~estan,
r

l
424 U.S., at 401-402, the Court stated:

"Where the Unrted States is the defendant and the plaintiff is not suing for money improperly exacted or retained, the basis of the federal claim--whether it be the
Constitution, a statute, or a regulation--does not create
a cause of action for money damages nunless,'-\T" as the Court
of Clai~ ha~ sta£ed, that 6as1s '1n 1tse!Y ... can fairly
be !nterg ~eted as mandating compensation by the Federal
Gover~Ht==tor tne damages susfa1ned. '"
""
----~

Thus, a waiver of federal sovereign immunity will be deemed to have
occurred where the statutory basis of a claim against the U.S. "can
fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for damage sustained."

The many federal statutes and regu-

lations governing the management and sale of Indian timber trust
resources--which expressly mandate that such management and sale be
conducted so as to convert the Indians' trust property into its full
monetary equivalent for the benefit of the Indians and that the pro-

tl •

ceeds of such sales be paid to them or used for their benefit-cannot fairly be construed otherwise than as "mandating compensation" for damages incurred as a result of the Government's mismanagement and waste of such trust resources.
It is not required, as the Government suggests, that Congress
have specifically contemplated and approved a suit for damages.

It

is enough that Congress intended that the beneficiaries be entitled
to the payment of money.

Given that, a suit for damages lies under

the Tucker Act.
Moreover, consistent with this Court's rulings in Testan and
Mitchell I, the Court of Claims has jurisdiction to entertain and
rule upon resps' claims because of the express trust relationships
that the Congress has established between the

u.s.

and resps.

Con-

gressional establishment of those relationships and the imposition,
by statute and by regulation, of specific management responsibilities upon the

u.s.

as trustee constituted a waiver of federal sov-

ereign immunity from suit for money damages in the event of the Government's breach of its trust responsibilities.

The court below

also had jurisdiction over these claims by virtue of (i) the fact
that resps' claims are equivalent to claims for "money improperly
exacted or retained," or (ii) the express and implied contractual

u.s.

relationships that the

has entered into with resps concerning

the timber resources.
~ IV.

Mitchell and

.

~

Discussion

make clear that

§~1

does not waive the

.

U.S.'s sovere1gn 1mmun1ty and that §1505 "no more confers a substan---------------------~
tive
right against the United States to recover money damages than

• • I~.

•_/1

I •

does 28

u.s.c.

1491."

Mitchell I, 445 U.S., at 538-540.

Therefore,

the Tucker Acts do not create any rights, but only provide jurisdiction for other statutes that create the substantive right against
the U.S. for "actual, presently due money damages."
v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 3 (1969).

United States

The principle that governs claims

for damages resting upon an alleged statutory violation was stated
in Testan: No waiver of immunity will be found unless the particular
statute "in itself ... can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained."

424

U.S., at 402.
The SG seeks to add a third requirement: ,• whether Congress intended to permit suits to secure "compensation ••• for the damage sustained."

There is some basis for this.

Some statutes mandating

compensation expressly bar judicial review.
(veterans' benefits).
tive remedies.
(1868).

See 38

u.s.c.

§2ll(a)

In other cases, Congress may provide alterna-

See Nichols v. United States, 74

u.s.

(7 Wall.) 122

But, contrary to the SG's argument, the strong presumption
'---

--

has to be that, where the statute mandates compensation, the claimant has an action against the

u.s.

for nonpayment, even if the stat-

ute does not expressly provide for the institution of litigation.
The issue here is whether resps have a statutory right to payment of
money by the U.S.
A.

Timber Management Statutes.

The monetary character of a

statutory right is a strong indication that a statute "in
itself ..• can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation ... for
the damages sustained."

Ibid.

Where the duties imposed by a stat-

ute are not essentially monetary in character, but require implemen-

tl •

tation through conduct by federal officials, the contrary inference
arises: that Congress, by its silence as to a damages remedy, created only a substantive right enforceable through injunctive relief.
Id., at 403.

This distinction is reflected in Testan in the Court's

recognition that where suit is maintained to require the

u.s.

to

disgorge a claimant's "money improperly exacted or retained," the
statutory predicate need not specify that a right of action for damages is created.

424 U.S., at 401.

It should be emphasized, howev-

er, that the inquiry is not whether the ultimate value to resps of
the duties imposed is financial, but whether Congress imposed a duty
to pay money upon the

u.s.

,.,
The Ittimber sale'' and '"management statutes,
25

,.,

,,

466 are monetary in character.

--

~

~

u.s.c.

L:":'\

~

407 &

Although nothing in these provisions

----;.

expressly consents to maintenance of suits against the

u.s.

for re-

covery of damages incurred through improvident federal management on
Indian timber lands, §406 does authorize the sale of timber on allotted Indian lands by the allottee, and §407 provides that the pro
ceeds of such sales shall be used for the benefit of resps.

It

seems clear that these provisions would ground an action to compel

theJ.rt· ~sgorge

unlawfully retained proceeds.

See Testan, 424

U.S., at 401 ("money wrongfully exacted or retained").

-

There is

........

little basis, however, for extending that remedy to proceeds that
arguably could have been captured, but were not, by the ID.

There

------------------------

is no--.:::::;:::•
indic ~tion in the legislative history of the Act of June 25,
~

1910 that Congress meant to consent to suit for mismanagement of
:::::::c::
.......
c: -::: Indian timber resources by enacting these provisions.

':1.

In 1964, the timber sale statutes were amended so as to direct
~

the Secretary to adhere to principles of sustained-yield management
on tribal lands, to permit the deduction of administrative fees by
the ID from the proceeds of timber sales, and to prescribe a generalized standard to guide the Secretary in determining whether to
authorize sale of timber on allotted lands.
imposed certain duties on

u.s.

officials, the statutes do not man-

--~------~------

c=c

While Congress clearly

date compensation for violation of those duties.

-----------------

~

1292, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964)

See H.R. Resp. No.

(stating that "[n]o additional

expenditure of Federal funds" was expected to be incurred by reason
of the enactment of the legislation).
Section 466 merely requires the ID to "make rules and regulations for the operation and management of Indian forestry units on
the principle of sustained-yield management."

Here, there is simply

no statutory directive to pay compensation.
B.

Road Building Statutes.

Section 318a merely authorizes

appropriations for building of roads on Indian reservations.

Sec-

tions 323 through 325 empower the ID to grant rights-of-way over
tribal and individual lands subject to the requirement that there be
paid to the Secretary "such compensation as the Secretary .•. shall
determine to be just," with the proceeds to be disposed of under the
Secretary's regs.

This provision would ground an action

reco~er J'~

to
proceeds of a right-of-way sale wrongfully withheld from the Ind1ans
l I

~·

(}-

over whose lands it was granted, but it does not permit damages for ~
failure to secure more generous compensation, particularly given
that the Secretary determines the amount of statutory compensation.
And there is even less basis for inferring from those statutes, as

.LU.

did the Ct. of Claims, a right to recover damages for the
Secretary's alleged failure to plan and build an optimal road network, or properly to maintain rights of way.
C.

Interest Statute.

Section 162a does not compel a particu-

lar level of compensation, but rather affords the Secretary substantial discretion respecting the investments to be made with individual Indian funds.

There is nothing in the statute that requires

payment of a particular rate of interest.

It is difficult to con-

elude that Congress has consented to pay damages for any amount

by ~

which the revenues earned fall short of a standard of "reasonable

/

for the Indians the best rate."
Resps argue that congressional establishment
of an

· st relationship constitutes a waiver of sovereign

immunity from suit for money damages when the U.S. breaches its
trust duties.

It is true that the relationship between the U.S. and

Indians can be viewed as a trust relationship, but it is more difficult to argue that the duties imposed by the statutes are trust du~

ties.

~

Section 406 and 407, for example, apply to more than Indian

lands held in trust.

In any case, the inquiry remains whether the

statutes setting up any trust each "in itself ..• can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation."

~ .J-utes,

supra, shows that the

u.s.

A review of the individual stat-

has not consented to suit for dam-

~- ages in its mismanagement of the trust.

~

'- E.

~complete

Tucker

A~Resps

also argue that, when the U.S. assumes

control over an Indian's trust property and, in the exer-

cise of such control, sells the property for less than its value, or
otherwise wastes the property, the occurrence of the loss is the

- -----

t.

,..

.I...L.

equivalent of the U.S. improperly 'taking from" the cestui, and the
U.S. may be sued under the Tucker Act for such loss.

For many of

resps' claims, the retention or exaction would be of property, not
of money, and again, resps' claims fail for lack of a statutory
basis that establishes the wrongfulness of an exaction or nonpayment
of money.

'

The allegation of a violation of a non-monetary duty is

-----------~~====~

insufficient to render all of resps' claims ones for money improperly exacted or retained.

Resps might ~ allege an unconstitution-

al taking, and thus come within the Fifth Amendment's self-executing
right to recover damages against the U.S. under the Tucker Act.
Jacobs v. United States, 290

u.s.

13, 16 (1933).

See

Resps have not

suggested, however, that they could make such a demonstration, and
thus their statutory "taking" theory for the most part has little

meri~/f">'/ ~

~ There are, however, a couple of claims that fit squarely within

C
_,

this theory.
res~ ~llege

\Y

In addition to alleging certain breaches of duty,
tha<I{he

u.s.

failed to pay interest on certain funds

.

~ and exacted excessive administrative fees

~e

-

assume that an

a~tion

from allottees.

The SG

to recover unlawfully high ad-

ministrative fees may be maintained against the United States as one
seeking recovery of 'money improperly exacted or retained.'"

He

also concedes that "failure to apply to the resps' account interest
f(

monies actually

\~

earned ~ would

likely give rise to a right to redress

in damages on the theory respondents' fund had been 'wrongfully retained. '"

I think these claims must be recognized.

~

The SG concedes ~

the va ~y ;:._.t~l ~ !<;.g fee ::J, but disputes the one for interest.

It appears to me that the SG understands resps to be making

.LL: •

./

only a claim for inadequate ~~terest; I understand them to making

the additional argument of/
F.

Express Contract.

o

interes~

/3!/1

'I-~~

The contracti authorize the BIA "to per-

form every act necessary and requisite to the consummation of [the
sale of timber on resps' lands]."

The resps also agreed that the

proceeds would be disposed of in accordance with ID regulations,
"including those providing for the payment of the cost of administration."

These grants of power impose some duty, not only to enter

into the contract, but to administer it.

The Ct. of Claims dis~

ll

missed this argument, stating that the powers of attorney do not

-------=---

contain any express commitments against mismanagement in exercising
-- -r

the powers.

I have some problem saying that there are not commit-

ments against mismanagement implied in an agency relationship, and
once there is a contractual duty, it may be necessary to say that
damages are av-ailable.

This conclusion might follow from the fact

that damages from contracts are different from damages grounded on a
statute.

More likely, it follows from the fact that the statutes

that permit the BIA to receive the powers of attorney from resps
contemplate the payment of money.

In that case, it would be helpful

to know whether the U.S. is authorized in this case to sell the timber pursuant to

I am unable to tell from the

briefs, the authorization, or Mitchell I.

If under (c), I think

resps probably have an action for failure to obtain a fair market
value for timber sold and for failure to
merchantable timber.
doe;

obt~in

""-7 :;z.

\

V

payment for some

Otherwise, I think the express contract theory

~Jt hel~~p.

''

.L.).

The timber sales contracts run between resps and the loggers,
hence they are not enforceable against the · U.S. in the Ct. of
Claims.
G.

Implied Contract.

Resps argue that the express contracts,

the trust relationship, and the statutory duties impose a impliedin-fact contract, but I think their argument is more that there is
an implied-in-law contract.

Such a contract may not be inferred

from the terms of the pertinent statutes and regulations.

See Army

& Air Force Exchange Service v. Sheehan, 50 U.S.L.W. 4563, 4565
(June 1, 1982).

Statutes and regulations also do not create an

implied-in-fact contract.

Ibid.
VI.

Summary

I think this is a hard case.
not be supported under Testan.

The implied causes of action can-

The trust theory is harder to re-

fute, but Testan and Sheehan make clear that there is no cause of
action except where the regulations or law "specifically authorize
awards of money damages."
the case here.

The

Ibid.

I am unable to say that this is

~ tract theories~ e

without merit, unless it

--::::::::::

can be determined that the powers of attorney were granted to the
Secr~taj y

under §406 (c), in which case I would be ~-!-~_l in~~ ay
i~
tnat resps could collect for mismanagement in the sale of merchant-

. .

.

,~4~.--------------~~~----------~,

able timber · and for failure to obtain fair market value for timber
~

sold.

Resps also should be able to sue under the Tucker Acts for

fL) excessive :

~

anag =

t fees and

f:;-~Jlterest
A

under the theory that

such money is unlawfully retained.
~----------------------

I recommend affirming in part and reversing in part.

:?

~
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
81-1748

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v.
HELEN MITCHELL ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
[June-, 1983]

JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The principal question in this case is whether the United
States is accountable in money damages for alleged breaches
of trust in connection with its management of forest resources on allotted lands of the Quinault Indian Reservation.
I
A
In the 1850s, the United States undertook a policy of removing Indian tribes from large areas of the Pacific Northwest in order to facilitate the settlement of non-Indians. 1
Pursuant to this policy, the first Governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs of the Washington Territory began negotiations in 1855 with various tribes living on the west coast
of t~e Territory. The negotiations culminated in a treaty
bet\Veen the United States and the Quinault and Quileute
Tribes, 12 Stat. 971 (Treaty of Olympia). In the Treaty the
Indians ceded to the United States a vast tract of land on the
Olympic Peninsula in the State of Washington, and the
'See Act of June 5, 1850, 9 Stat. 437; Appropriation Act of March 3,
1853, 10 Stat. 226, 238; Quinault Allottee Association v. United States, 202
Ct. Cl. 625, 62S-269, 485 F. 2d 1391, 1392 (1973), cert. denied 416 U. S. 961
(1974).
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United States agreed to set aside a reservation for the
Indians.
In 1861 a reservation of about 10,000 acres was provisionally chosen for the tribes. 2 This tract proved undesirable
because of its limited size and heavy forestation. The Quinault Agency superintendent subsequently recommended
that since the coastal tribes drew their subsistence almost entirely from the water, 3 they should be collected on a reservation suitable for their fishing needs. Acting on this suggestion, President Grant issued an order on November 4, 1873,
designating about 200,000 acres along the Washington coast
as an Indian reservation. 4 The vast bulk of this land consisted of rain forest covered with huge, coniferous trees.
In 1905 the Federal Government began to allot the Quinault Reservation in trust to individual Indians under the
General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, as
amended, 25 U. S. C. § 331 et seq. 5 See also the Quinault
Allotment Act of March 4, 1911, 36 Stat. 1345. The Government initially determined that the forested areas of the Reservation were not to be alloted because they were not suitable for agriculture or grazing. In 1924, however, this
Court concluded that the character of lands to be set apart for
See Halbert v. United States, 283 U. S. 753, 757 (1931).
See generally United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 350-353
(WD Wash. 1974), affd, 520 F. 2d 676 (CA91975), cert. denied, 423 U. S.
1086 (1976) (describing pre-Treaty role of fishing among Northwest
Indians).
• Executive Order, I C. Kappler, Indian Affairs 923 (2d ed. 1904). The
Order declared that the reservation would be held for the use of the Quinault, Quileute, Hoh, Queets, "and other tribes of fish-eating Indians on
the Pacific Coast." Ibid.
• Section 5 of the Act provided that the United States would hold the
allotted land for 25 years "in trust for the sole use and benefit of the Indian
to whom such allotment shall have been made." The period during which
the United States was to hold the allotted land was extended indefinitely
by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, § 2, 48 Stat. 984, 25
u. s. c. § 462.
2

3
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the Indians was not restricted by the General Allotment Act.
United States v. Payne, 264 U. S. 446, 449 (1924). Thereafter, the forested lands of the Reservation were allotted.
By 1935 the entire Reservation had been divided into 2,340
trust allotments, most of which were 80 acres of heavily timbered land. About a third of the Reservation has since gone
out of trust, but the bulk of the land has remained in trust
status. 6
The forest resources on the allotted lands have long been
managed by the Department of the Interior, which exercises
"comprehensive" control over the harvesting of Indian timber. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S.
136, 145 (1980). The Secretary of the Interior has broad
statutory authority over the sale of timber on reservations.
See 25 U. S. C. §§ 405--407. Sales of timber "must be based
upon a consideration of the needs and best interests of the Indian owner and his heirs," §406(a), and the proceeds from
such sales are to be used for the benefit of the Indians or
transferred to the Indian owner, §§ 406(a), 407. Congress
has directed the Secretary to adhere to principles of sustained-yield forestry on all Indian forest lands under his supervision. 25 U. S. C. § 466.
Under these statutes, the
Secretary has promulgated detailed regulations governing
the management of Indian timber. 25 CFR Part 163 (1982).
The Secretary is authorized to deduct an administrative fee
for his services from the timber revenues paid to Indian allottees. 25 U. S. C. §§ 406(a), 413.
B

The respondents are 1,465 individuals owning interests in
allotments on the Quinault Reservation, an unincorporated
association of Quinault Reservation allottees, and the Quinault Tribe, which now holds some portions of the allotted
6
See Mitchell v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 95, 97, 591 F . 2d 1300,
1300-1301 (1979).
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lands. In 1971 respondents filed four actions that were consolidated in the Court of Claims. Jurisdiction was based on
28 U. S. C. §§ 1491 and 1505. Respondents sought to recover damages from the United States based on allegations of
pervasive waste and mismanagement of timber lands on the
Quinault Reservation.
More specifically, respondents
claimed that the Government (1) failed to obtain a fair market
value for timber sold; (2) failed to manage timber on a sustained-yield basis; (3) failed to obtain any payment at all for
some merchantable timber; (4) failed to develop a proper
system of roads and easements for timber operations and exacted improper charges from allottees for maintenance of
roads; (5) failed to pay any interest on certain funds from timber sales held by the Government and paid insufficient interest on other funds; and (6) exacted excessive administrative
fees from allottees. Respondents assert that the alleged
misconduct constitutes a breach of the fiduciary duty owed
them by the United States as trustee under various statutes.
Six years after the suits were filed, the United States
moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the
Court of Claims had no authority over claims based on a
breach of trust. The court denied the motion, holding that
the General Allotment Act created a fiduciary duty on the
United States' part to manage the timber resources properly
and thereby provided the necessary authority for recovery of
damages against the United States. 219 Ct. Cl. 95, 591
F. 2d 1300 (1979) (en bane).
In United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535 (1980), this
Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Claims, stating that
the General Allotment Act "created only a limited trust relationship between the United States and the allottees that
does not impose any duty upon the Government to manage
timber resources." Id., at 542. We concluded that "[a]ny
right of the respondents to recover money damages for Government mismanagement of timber resources must be found
in some source other than [the General Allotment] Act."
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I d., at 546. Since the Court of Claims had not considered
respondents' assertion that other statutes render the United
States answerable in money damages for the alleged mismanagement in this case, we remanded the case for consideration
of these alternative grounds for liability. See id., at 546,
n. 7.
On remand, the Court of Claims once again held the United
States subject to suit for money damages on most of respondents' claims. - - Ct. Cl. - - , 664 F. 2d 265 (1981) (en
bane). The court ruled that the timber management statutes, 25 U. S. C. §§406, 407, and 466, various federal statutes governing road building and rights of way, §§ 318 and
323-325, statutes governing Indian funds and government
fees, §§ 162a and 413, and regulations promulgated under
these statutes imposed fiduciary duties upon the United
States in its management of forested allotted lands. The
court concluded that the statutes and regulations implicitly
required compensation for damages sustained as a result of
the Government's breach of its duties. Thus, the Court held
that respondents could proceed on their claims.
Because the decision of the Court of Claims raises issues of
substantial importance concerning the liability of the United
States, 7 we granted the Government's petition for certiorari.
U. S. (1982). We affirm.
II

Respondents have invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491, and its
counterpart for claims brought by Indian tribes, 28 U. S. C.
§ 1505, known as the Indian Tucker Act. 8 The Tucker Act
states in pertinent part:
7
The Government has informed us that the damages claimed in this suit
alone may amount to $100 million. Pet. for Cert. 24.
8
Section 24 of the Indian Claims Commission Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1505,
provides tribal claimants the same access to the Court of Claims provided
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"The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render
judgment upon any claim against the United States
founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or
upon any express or implied contract with the United
States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in
cases not sounding in tort." 28 U. S. C. § 1491.
It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued
without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction. 9 The terminology employed in
some of our prior decisions has unfortunately generated some
confusion as to whether the Tucker Act constitutes a waiver
of sovereign immunity. The time has come to resolve this
confusion. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude
that by giving the Court of Claims jurisdiction over specified
types of claims against the United States, 10 the Tucker Act
constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to
those claims.
A

Before 1855 no general statute gave the consent of the
United States to suit on claims for money damages; the only
recourse available to private claimants was to petition Congress for relief. 11 In order to relieve the pressure caused by
the volume of private bills and to avoid the delays and inequities of the private bill procedure, Congress created the
to individual claimants by 28 U. S. C. § 1491. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535, 538-540 (1980).
9
See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 586 (1941); 14 C.
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice And Procedure§ 3654, at
156-157 (1976).
10
The Tucker Act provided concurrent jurisdiction in the district courts
over claims not exceeding $10,000. See 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(2).
11
See P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, The Federal
Courts and the Federal System 98 (2d ed. 1973); Richardson, History, Jurisdiction, and Practice of the Court of Claims, 17 Ct. Cl. 3, 3-4 (1882).

81-1748-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. MITCHELL

7

Court of Claims. Act of February 24, 1855, c. 122, 10 Stat.
612. The 1855 Act empowered that court to hear claims and
report its findings to Congress and to submit a draft of a private bill in each case which received a favorable decision.
§ 7, 10 Stat. 613. The limited powers initially conferred upon
the court failed to relieve Congress from "the laborious necessity of examining the merits of private bills." Glidden
Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, 553 (1962) (opinion of Harlan,
J.). Thus, in his State of the Union Message of 1861, President Lincoln recommended that the court be authorized to
render final judgments. He declared that it is "as much the
duty of Government to render prompt justice against itself,
in favor of citizens, as it is to administer the same between
private individuals." Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess.,
app. 2 (1862). Congress adopted the President Lincoln's recommendation and made the court's judgments final. Act of
March 3, 1863, ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765. 12
In 1886 Representative John Randolph Tucker introduced
a bill to revise in several respects the jurisdiction and procedures of the Court of Claims and to replace most provisions of
the 1855 and 1863 Acts. H. R. 6974, 59th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1886). The House Judiciary Committee reported that the
bill was a "comprehensive measure by which claims against
the United States may be heard and determined." H. R.
Rep. No. 1077, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1886). The measure
was designed "to give the people of the United States what
I

Section 14 of the 1863 Act provided that "no money shall be paid out of
the treasury for any claim passed upon by the court of claims till after an
appropriation therefor shall be estimated for by the Secretary of the Treasury." 12 Stat. 768. In Gordon v. United States, 2 Wall. 561 (1864), this
Court dismissed an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims for want
of jurisdiction, holding that § 14 gave the Secretary a revisory authority
over the court inconsistent with its exercise of judicial power. Congress
promptly repealed the provision, Act of March 17, 1866, c. 19, § 1, 14 Stat.
9. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, 554 (1962) (opinion of Harlan, J.).
12
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every civilized nation of the world has already done-the
right to go into the courts to seek redress against the Government for their grievances." 18 Cong. Rec. 2680 (1887) (remarks of Rep. Bayne). See id., at 622 (remarks of Rep.
Tucker); id., at 2679 (colloquy between Reps. Tucker and
Townshend); id., at 2680 (remarks of Rep. Holman). The
eventual enactment thus "provide[d] for the bringing of suits
against the Government of the United States." Act of
M~ch 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505.
/ The Indian Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1505, has a similar
history. An early amendment to the original enactment
creating the Court of Claims had excluded claims by Indian
tribes. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 9, 12 Stat. 767. As a
result, Congress eventually confronted a "vast and growing
burden" resulting from the large number of tribes seeking
special jurisdictional acts. H. R. Rep. No. 1466, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. 6 (1945). Congress responded by conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to hear any tribal claim "of a
character which would be cognizable in the Court of Claims if
the claimant were not an Indian tribe." Id., at 13. As the
House sponsor of the Act stated, an important goal of the Act
was to ensure that it would "never again be necessary to pass
special Indian jurisdictional acts in order to permit the Indians to secure a court adjudication on any misappropriation of
Indian funds or of any other Indian property by Federal officials that might occur in the future." 92 Cong. Rec. 5313
(1946) (statement of Rep. Jackson). Indians were to be
given "their fair day in court so that they can call the various
Government agencies to account on the obligations that the
Federal government assumed." Id., at 5312. 13 The House
See 92 Cong. Rec. 5312 (statement of Rep. Jackson) ("The Interior Department itself suggested that it ought not be in a position where its employees can mishandle funds and lands of a national trusteeship without
complete accountability.") See also Hearings on H. R. 1198 and H. R.
1341 before the House Committee on Indian Affairs, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.
18
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Report stressed the same point: "If we fail to meet these obligations by denying access to the courts when trust funds
have been improperly dissipated or other fiduciary duties
have been violated, we compromise the national honor of the
United States." H. R. Rep. No. 1466, at 4.
For decades this Court consistently interpreted the Tucker
Act as having provided the consent of United States to be
sued eo nomine for the classes of claims described in the Act.
See, e. g., Shillinger v. United States, 155 U. S. 163, 16~167
(1894); Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10, 17 (1896); Dooley v.
United States, 182 U. S. 222, 227-228 (1901); Reid v. United
States, 211 U. S. 529, 538 (1909); United States v. Sherwood,
312 U. S. 584, 590 (1940); Dalehite v. United States, 346
U. S. 15, 25, n. 10 (1953); Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S.
270, 273 (1957). In at least two recent decisions this Court
explicitly stated that the Tucker Act effects a waiver of sovereign immunity. Army & Air Force Exchange Service v.
Sheehan,-- U. S. - , - - (1982); Hatzlachh Supply Co.
v. United States, 444 U. S. 460, 466 (1980) (per curiam).
These decisions confirm the umabiguous thrust of the history
of the Act.
The existence of a waiver is readily apparent in claims
founded upon "any express or implied contract with the
United States." 28 U. S. C. § 1491. The Court of Claims'
jurisdiction over contract claims against the government has
long been recognized, and government liability in contract is
viewed as perhaps "the widest and most unequivocal waiver
of federal immunity from suit." Developments in the LawRemedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70
Harv. L. Rev. 827, 876 (1957). See also 14 C. Wright, A.
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3656,
at 202 (1976). The source of consent for such suits unmistakably lies in the Tucker Act. Otherwise, it is doubtful that
any consent would exist, for no contracting officer or other
130 (1945) (statement of Assistant Solicitor Cohen).
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official is empowered to consent to suit against the United
States. 14 The same is true for claims founded upon executive ~
regulations. Indeed, the Act makes absolutely no distinction between claims founded upon contracts and claims
founded upon other specified sources of law.
In United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 398, 400 (1976),
and in United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S., at 538, this Court
employed language suggesting that the Tucker Act does not
effect a waiver of sovereign immunity. Such language was
not necessary to the decision in either case. See infra, at
11-12. Without in any way questioning the result in either
case, we conclude that this isolated language should be disregarded. If a claim falls within the terms of the Tucker Act;l /
the United States has presumptively consented to sui!J
B
It nonetheless remains true that the Tucker Act "'does not
create any substantive right enforceable against the United
States for money damages.'" United States v. Mitchell, 445
U. S., at 538, quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U. S., at
398. A substantive right must be found in some other source
of law, such as "the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or
any regulation of an executive department." 28 U. S. C.
§ 1491. Not every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal
statute, or a regulation is cognizable under the Tucker Act.
The claim must be one for money damages against the United /
States, see United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1, 2-3 (1969),
and the claimant must demonstrate that the source of substantive law he relies upon "'can fairly be interpreted as
mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the
damages sustained."' United States v. Testan, 424 U. S., at
"See United States v. New York Rayon Importing Co., 329 U.S. 654,
660 (1957); United States, v. Shaw, 309 U. S. 495, 501 (1940); Carr v.
United States, 98 U. S. 433, 438 (1879).
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400, quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct.
Cl. 599, 607, 372 F. 2d 1002, 1009 (1967). 16
For example, in United States v. Testan, supra, two government attorneys contended that they were entitled to a
higher salary grade under the Classification Act, 16 and to an
award of back pay under the Back Pay Act 17 for the period
during which they were classified at a lower grade. This
Court concluded that neither the Classification Act nor the
Back Pay Act could fairly be interpreted as requiring compensation for wrongful classifications. See 424 U. S., at
39~07.
Particularly in light of the "established rule that
one is not entitled to the benefit of a position until he has
been appointed to it," id., at 402, 18 the Classification Act does
not support a claim for money damages. While the Back Pay
Act does provide a basis for money damages as a remedy "in
carefully limited circumstances" such as wrongful reductions
in grade, id., at 404, it does not apply to wrongful classifications. I d., at 405.
Similarly, in United States v. Mitchell, supra, this Court
concluded that the General Allotment Act does not confer a
right to recover money damages against the United States.
While § 5 of the Act provided that the United States would
hold land "in trust" for Indian allottees, 25 U. S. C. § 348, we
held that the Act creates only a limited trust relationship.
445 U. S., at 542. The trust language of the Act does not
impose !ny fiduciary management duties or render the
United States answerable for breach thereof, but only prevents improvident alienation of the allotted lands and assures
15
As the Eastport decision recognized, the substantive source of law
may grant the claimant a right to recover damages either "expressly or by
implication.'1 I d., at 605; 372 F. 2d, at 1007. See also Ralston Steel Corp.
v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 119, 125, 340 F. 2d 663, 667, cert. denied, 381
u. s. 950 (1965).
16
5 u. s. c. § 5101.
17
5 u. s. c. § 5596.
18
Citing United States v. McLean, 95 U. S. 750 (1878); Ganse v. United
States, 180 Ct. Cl. 183, 186, 376 F. 2d 900, 902 (1967).

l
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thefr immunity from state taxation. I d., at 544.
/ Thus, for claims against the United States "founded either
upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department," 28 U. S. C. § 1491, a court
must inquire whether the source of substantive law can fairly
be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal
Government for the damages sustained. In undertaking this
inquiry, ~court need not find a separate waiver of sovereign
immunity in the substantive rovision ·ust as a court need
no n consent to suit in "any express or implied contract
with the United States." Ibid. The Tucker Act itself proVid¢ the necessary consent.
v6f course, in determining the general scope of the Tucker
Act, this Court has not lightly inferred the United States'
consent to suit. See United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1, 4-5
(1969) (Court of Claims lacks authority to issue declaratory
judgment); Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270, 276
(1957) (non-tolling of limitations beyond statutory provisions). For example, although the Tucker Act refers to
claims founded upon any implied contract with the United
States, we have held that the Act does not reach claims based
on contracts implied in law, as opposed to those implied in
fact. Merritt v. United States, 267 U. S. 338, 341 (1925).
In this case, however, there is simply no question that the
Tucker Act provides the United States' consent to suit for
claims founded upon statutes or regulations that create substantive rights to money damages. If a claim falls within
this category, the existence of a waiver of sovereign immunity is clear. The question in this case is thus analytically
distinct: whether the statutes or regulations at issue can be
interpreted as requiring compensation. Because the Tucker
Act supplies a waiver of immunity for claims of this nature,
the separate statutes and regulations need not provide a second waiver of sovereign immunity, nor need they be construed in the manner appropriate to waivers of sovereign immunity. See United States v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Realty

v

/
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Co., 237 U.S. 28,32 (1915). "'The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough where consent has
been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement
of construction where consent has been announced.' "
United States v. Aetna Surety Co., 338 U. S. 366, 383 (1949),
quoting Anderson v. John L. Hayes Constr. Co., 243 N. Y.
140, 147, 153 N. E. 28, 29--30 (1926) (Cardozo, J.). 19

III
Respondents have based their money claims against the
United States on various Acts of Congress and executive department regulations. We begin by describing these sources
of substantive law. We then examine whether they can
fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation for damages
sustained as a result of a breach of the duties they impose.
A

The Secretary of the Interior's pervasive role in the sales
of timber from Indian lands began with the Act of June 25,
1910, ch. 431, §§ 7-8, 36 Stat. 855, 857, as amended, 25
U. S. C. §§ 406-407. Prior to that time, Indians had no right
to sell timber on reservation land, 20 and there existed "'no
general law under which authority for sale of timber on Indian lands, whether allotted or unallotted, can be granted."'
H. R. Rep. No. 1135, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1910) (quoting
letter of the Secretary of the Interior). Congress recognized
that this situation was undesirable " 'because in many instances the timber is the only valuable part of the allotment
or is the only source from which funds can be obtained for the
support of the Indian or the improvement of his allotment.' "
Ibid. The 1910 Act empowered the Secretary to sell timber
19
Cf. Block v. Neal,- U . S . - , - (1983); Indian Towing Co . v.
United States, 350 U. S. 61, 69 (1955).
00
See United States v. Cook, 19 Wall. 591 (1874); Pine River Logging
Co. v. United States, 186 U. S. 279 (1902); 19 Op. Atty. Gen. 194 (1888).
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on unallotted lands and apply the proceeds of the sales for the
benefit of the Indians, § 7, and authorized the Secretary to
consent to sales by allottees, with the proceeds to be paid to
the allottees or disposed of for their benefit, § 8. Congress
thus sought to provide for harvesting timber "in such a manner as to conserve the interests of the people on the reservations, namely, the Indians." 45 Cong. Rec. 6087 (1910) (remarks of Rep. Saunders).
From the outset, the Interior Department recognized its
obligation to supervise the cutting of Indian timber. In
1911, the Department's Office of Indian Affairs promulgated
detailed regulations covering its responsibilities in "managing the Indian forests so as to obtain the greatest revenue for
the Indians consistent with a proper protection and improvement of the forests." Office of Indian Affairs, Regulations
and Instructions for Officers in Charge of Forests on Indian
Reservations 4 (1911). The regulations addressed virtually
every aspect of forest management, including the size of
sales, contract procedures, advertisements and methods of
billing, deposits and bonding requirements, administrative
fee deductions, procedures for sales by minors, allowable
heights of stumps, tree marking and scaling rules, base and
top diameters of trees for cutting, and the percentage of
trees to be left as a seed source. I d., at S-28. The regulations applied to allotted as well as tribal lands, and the Secretary's approval of timber sales on allotted lands was explicitly
conditioned upon compliance with the regulations. !d., at 9.
Over time, deficiencies in the Interior Department's performance of its responsibilities became apparent. Accordingly, as part of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, c.
576, 484 Stat. 984, Congress imposed even stricter du ·
upon the Government with respect to Indian timber
ment. In § 6 of the Act, now codified as 25 U. S.
Congress expressly directed that the Interior DeparNllt!Ilr..manage Indian forest resources "on the principle of sustained-yield management." Representative Howard, co-
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sponsor of the Act and Chairman of the House Committee on
Indian Affairs, explained that the purpose of the provision
was "to assure a proper and permanent management of the
Indian Forest" under modern sustained-yield methods so as
to "assure that the Indian forests will be permanently productive and will yield continuous revenues to the tribes." 78
Cong. Rec. 11730 (1934). See United States v. Anderson,
625 F. 2d 910, 915 (CA9 1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 920
(1981). Referrin to the
en the In i
and the Government as
e1r governmental
Howard stated t a
t e a1 ure o
guardian to conserve the Indians' land and assets and the
consequent loss of income or earning power, has been the
principal cause of the present plight of the Indian." 78
Cong. Rec., at 11726. 21
Regulations promulgated under the Act required the preservation of Indian forest lands in a perpetually productive
state, forbade the clear-cutting of large contiguous areas,
called for the development of long-term working plans for all
major reservations, required adequate provision for new
growth when mature timber was removed, and required the
regulation of run-off and the minimization of erosion.22 The
regulatory scheme was designed to assure that the Indians
receive "the benefit of whatever profit [the forest] is capable
of yielding." White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448
U. S., at 149 (quoting 25 CFR § 141.3(a)(3) (1979)).
21
John Collier, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and a principal author
of the Act, had testified that
"there must be a constructive handling of Indian timber. We have got to
stop the slaughtering of Indian timber lands, to operate them on a perpetual yield basis and the bill expressly directs that this principle of conservation shall be applied throughout."
Hearings on H. R. 7902 Before the House Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 35 (1934).
22
The Bureau of Indian Affair's 1936 General Forest Regulations remain
essentially unchanged within 25 CFR Part 163 (1982).
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In 1964 Congress amended the timber provisions of the
1910 Act, again emphasizing the Secretary of the Interior's
management duties. Act of April30, 1964, 78 Stat. 186. As
to sales of timber on allotted lands, the Secretary was directed to consider "the needs and best interests of the Indian
owner and his heirs." 25 U. S. C. § 406(a). In performing
this duty, the Secretary was specifically required to take into
account:
"(1) the state of growth of the timber and the need for
maintaining the productive capacity of the land for the
benefit of the owner and his heirs, (2) the highest and
best use of the land, including the advisability and practicality of devoting it to other uses for the benefit of the
owner and his heirs, and (3) the present and future financial needs of the owner and his heirs." Ibid. See also
§ 407 (timber sales on unallotted trust lands).
The timber management statutes, 25 U. S. C. §§406--407,
466, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, 25 CFR
Part 163 (1982), establish the "comprehensive" responsibilities of the Federal Government in managing the harvesting of Indian timber. White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker, 448 U. S., at 145. The Department of the Interior-through the Bureau of Indian Affairs~xercises liter- /
ally daily supervision over the harvesting and management of
tribal timber." ld., at 147. 23 Virtually every stage of the
process is under federal control. 24

I/

By virtue of the Act of February 14, 1920, ch. 75, § 1, 41 Stat. 415, as
amended by the Act of March 1, 1933, ch. 158, 47 Stat. 1417, the Secretary
of the Interior is authorized to collect "reasonable fees" from Indian timber
sale proceeds to cover the cost of the management and sale of the Indians'
timber. 25 U. S. C. § 413. Sections 406 and 407, as amended in 1964,
both provide for deductions of administrative expenses "to the extent permissible under section 413." See also 25 CFR § 163.18 (1982). Respondents have asserted that administrative fee deductions were excessive or
improper in several respects. The Court of Claims concluded that there is
23
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flhe Department exercises comparable control over grants
of rights-of-way on Indian lands held in trust. 25 The Secretary is empowered to grant rights-of-way for all purposes
across trust land, 25 U. S. C. § 323, :Q!Ovided that he obtains
the consent of the tribal or individual Indian landowner,
§ 324, 26 and that the Indian owners are paid appropriate compensation, § 325. Regulations detail the scope of federal supervision. 25 CFR Part 169 (1982). 2:1 For example, an applicant for a right-of-way must deposit with the Secretary an
amount not less than the fair market value of the rights
granted, plus an amount to cover potential damages associated with activity on the right-of-way. The Secretary must
determine the adequacy of the compensation, and the
amounts deposited must be held in a special account for distribution to Indian landowners. See 25 CFR §§ 169.12,
169.14 (1982). 26
"undoubted consent-to-suit from such claims that the Government illegally
kept some of the Indians' own money or property." --Ct. Cl. - - ,
- - , 664 F. 2d 265, 274, citing United States v. Testan, 424 U. S., at
400-401; Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 598, 60~,
372 F. 2d 1002, 1007-1008 (1967). The Government does not appear to dispute this conclusion. Brief for the United States 33, n. 27.
24
The Secretary even has authority to invest tribal and individual Indian
funds held in trust in banks, bonds, notes, or other public debt obligations
of the United States if deemed advisable and for the best interest of the
Indians. Act of June 24, 1938, 52 Stat. 1037, 25 U. S. C. § 162a. In this
case the funds maintained on behalf of individual allottees were derived
primarily from timber sales.
25
See Act of February 5, 1948, 62 Stat. 17, codified in part at 25 U. S. C.
§§ 323--325. See also Act of May 26, 1928, 45 Stat. 750, 25 U. S. C. § 318a
(road building).
211
Rights-of-way over lands of individual Indians may be granted without
the consent of the owners under certain specific circumstances. § 324.
27
Such regulations have a long history. See 25 CFR Part 256 (1949).
28
See also § 169.3 (consent of Indian landowners to grants of rights-ofway); § 169.5 (specifying required elements of agreements between Secretary and applicants, including stipulation that upon termination of the
right-of-way the applicant will restore land to its original condition so far as
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In United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S., at 542, this Court
recognized that the General Allotment Act creates a trust
relationship between the United States and Indian allottees
but concluded that the trust relationship was limited. We
held that the Act could not be read "as establishing that the
United States has a fiduciary responsibility for management
of allotted forest lands." Id., at 546. In contrast to the
bare trust created by the General Allotment Act, the statutes and regulations now before us clearl 've the Federal
Governmen
res
to manage Indian resources
an an for the bene t o e n ~ans.
ey ere y esta Ifsh a fiduciary relationship and define the contours of the
United States' fiduciary responsibilities.
The language of these statutory and regulatory provisions
directly supports the existence of a fiduciary relationship.
For example, § 8 of the 1910 Act, as amended, expressly
mandates that sales of timber from Indian trust lands be
based upon the Secretary's consideration of "the needs and
best interests of the Indian owner and his heirs" and that proceeds from such sales be paid to owners "or disposed of for
their benefit." 25 U. S. C. § 406(a). Similarly, even in its
earliest regulations, the Government recognized its duties in
"managing the Indian forests so as to obtain the greatest revenue for the Indians consistent with a proper protection and
improvement of the forests." Office of Indian Affairs, Regulations and Instructions for Officers in Charge of Forests on
Indian Reservations 4 (1911). Thus, the Government has
"expressed a firm desire that the Tribe should retain the
benefits derived from the harvesting and sale of reservation
timber." White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448
U. S., at 149. 29
is reasonably possible). As to roads on Indian reservations, responden~
s
have alleged improper deduction of road maintenance costs as a charge against the allottees' timber payments.
29
The pattern of pervasive federal control evident in the area of timber

'l
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Moreover, a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises when
the Government assumes such elaborate control over forests ~pro"Qerty belQpging to Indians. All of the necessary elements of a common-law trust are present: a trustee (the
United States), a beneficiary (the Indian allottees), and a
trust corpus (Indian timber, lands, and funds). 30 "[W]here
the Federal Government takes on or has control or supervision over tribal monies or properties, the fiduciary relationship normally exists with respect to such monies or properties (unless Congress has provided otherwise) even though
nothing is said expressly in the authorizing or underlying
statute (or other fundamental document) about a trust fund,
or a trust or fiduciary connection." Navajo Tribe of Indians
v. United States, 224 Ct. Cl. 171, 183, 624 F. 2d 981, 987
(1980).
Our construction of these statutes and regulations is reinforced by the undisputed existence of a general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian people.
This Court has previously emphasized "the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings
with these dependent and sometimes exploited people."
Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S. 286, 296 (1942).
This principle has long dominated the Government's dealings
with Indians. United States v. Mason, 412 U. S. 391, 398
(1973); Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382, 386 (1939);
United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U. S. 111, 117-118
(1938); United States v. Candelaria, 271 U. S. 432, 442
(1926); McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U. S. 458, 469 (1907); Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 396 (1902); United States v.
Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 382-384 (1886); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 17 (1831).
Because the statutes and regulations at issue in this case
sales and timber management applies equally to grants of rights-of-way
and to management of Indian funds. See supra, at 17, and n. 24.
30
See Restatement (Second) of the Law of Trusts § 2, Comment h, at 10
(1959).
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clearly establish fiduciary obli~tions of the Government in ~
' the management and operation of Indian lands and resources, /
they can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by
the Federal Government for damages sustained. Given the
existence of a trust relationship, it naturall~ follo}Y_s that the /
Government should be liable in damages for the breach of its
fiduciary duties. It is well established that a trustee is ac- ~ \
c:tF
countable in damages for breaches of trust. See Restatement (Second) of the Law of Trusts §§ 205-212 (1959); G.
Bogert, The Law of Trusts & Trustees § 862 (2d ed. 1965); 3
A. Scott, The Law of Trusts § 205 (3d ed. 1967). This Court
and several other federal courts have consistently recognized
that the existence of a trust relationship between the United
States and an Indian or Indian tribe includes as a fundamental incident the right of an injured beneficiary to sue the
trustee for damages resulting from a breach of the trust. 31
The recognition of a damages remedy also furthers the pur- ~
poses of the statutes and regulations, which clearly require ./
that the Secretary manage Indian resources so as to generate
proceeds for the Indians. It would be"anomalous\ o conclude
that these enactments create a right to the value of certain
/
resources when the Secretary lives up to his duties, but no
See, e. g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S. 286, 295-300 l
(1942); United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U. S. 103, 109-110 (1935); I
Moose v. United States, 674 F. 2d 1277, 1281 (CA9 1982); Whiskers v.
United States, 600 F. 2d 1332, 1335 (CAlO (1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S.
1078 (1980); Coast Indian Community v. United States, 213 Ct. Cl. 129,
152-156, 550 F. 2d 639, 652-654 (1977); Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes v.
United States, 206 Ct. Cl. 340, 345, 512 F. 2d 1390, 1392 (1975); Mason v.
United States, 198 Ct. Cl. 599, 613-616, 461 F. 2d 1364, 1372-1373 (1972),
rev'd on other grounds, 412 U. S. 391 (1973); Navajo Tribe v. United
States, 176 Ct. Cl. 502, 507, 364 F. 2d 320, 322 (1966); Klamath & Modoc
Tribes, v. United States, 174 Ct. Cl. 483, 490-491 (1966); Menominee Tribe
v. United States, 102 Ct. Cl. 555, 562 (1945); Menominee Tribe v. United
States, 101 Ct. Cl. 10, 18-20 (1944); Smith v. United States, 515 F. Supp.
56, 60 (ND Cal. 1978); Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc . v. United
States, 363 F. Supp. 1238, 1243-1248 (ND Cal. 1973).
81
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right to the value of the resources if the Secretary's duties
are not performed. "Absent a retrospective damages remedy, there would be little to deter federal officials from violating their trust duties, at least until the allottees managed
to obtain a judicial decree against future breaches of trust."
United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S., at 550 (WHITE, J., dis- ~
senting). Cf. H. R. Rep. No. 1466, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1945).
The Government ·contends that violations of duties imposed
by the various statutes may be cured by actions for declaratory, injunctive or mandamus relief against the Secretary,
although it concedes that sovereign immunity might have
barred such suits before 1976. 32 Brief of the United States at
40. In this context, however, prospective equitable remedies are totally inadequate. To begin with, the Indian allottees are in no position to monitor federal management of
their lands on a consistent basis. Many are poorly educated,
most are absentee owners, and many do not even know the
exact physical location of their allotments. Indeed, it was
the very recognition of the inability of the Indians to oversee
their interests that led to federal management in the first
place. A trusteeship would mean little if the beneficiaries
were required to supervise the da -to-day management of
their estate
err rus ee or else be preclu e om recovery for mismanagement.
In addition, by the time government mismanagement becomes apparent, the damage to Indian resources may be so
severe that a prospective remedy may be next to worthless.
For example, if timber on an allotment has been destroyed
through Government mismanagement, it will take many
years for nature to restore the timber. As this Court has
observed,
32

See Naganab v. Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 473, 475-476 (1906). In 1976
Congress enacted a general consent to such suits. See 5 U. S. C. § 702.
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"Once logged off, the land is of little value. The land no
longer serves the purpose for which it was by treaty set
aside to [the allottee's] ancestors, and for which it was
allotted to him. It can no longer be adequate to his
needs and serve the purpose of bringing him finally to a
state of competency and independence."

Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U. S. 1, 10 (1956).
We thus conclude that the statutes and regulations at issue
here can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by
the Federal Government for violations of Its fiduciary responsibilities in the management of Indian property. The Court
of Claims therefore has jurisdiction over respondents' claims
for alleged breaches of trusts.
IV
The judgment of the Court of Claims is affirmed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
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JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The principal question in this case is whether the United
States is accountable in money damages for alleged breaches
of trust in connection with its management of forest resources on allotted lands of the Quinault Indian Reservation.
I

A
In the 1850s, the United States undertook a policy of removing Indian tribes from large areas of the Pacific Northwest in order to facilitate the settlement of non-Indians. 1
Pursuant to this policy, the first Governor and Superintendent of Indian Mfairs of the Washington Territory began negotiations in 1855 with various tribes living on the west coast
of the Territory. The negotiations culminated in a treaty
between the United States and the Quinault and Quileute
Tribes, 12 Stat. 971 (Treaty of Olympia). In the Treaty the
Indians ceded to the United States a vast tract of land on the
Olympic Peninsula in the State of Washington, and the
See Act of June 5, 1850, 9 Stat. 437; Appropriation Act of March 3,
1853, 10 Stat. 226, 238; Quinault Allottee Association v. United States, 202
Ct. Cl. 625, 628-269, 485 F . 2d 1391, 1392 (1973), cert. denied 416 U. S. 961
(1974).
1

)
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United States agreed to set aside a reservation for the
Indians.
In 1861 a reservation of about 10,000 acres was provisionally chosen for the tribes. 2 This tract proved undesirable
because of its limited size and heavy forestation. The Quinault Agency superintendent subsequently recommended
that since the coastal tribes drew their subsistence almost entirely from the water, 3 they should be collected on a reservation suitable for their fishing needs. Acting on this suggestion, President Grant issued an order on November 4, 1873,
designating about 200,000 acres along the Washington coast
as an Indian reservation. 4 The vast bulk of this land consisted of rain forest covered with huge, coniferous trees.
In 1905 the Federal Government began to allot the Quinault Reservation in trust to individual Indians under the
General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, as
amended, 25 U. S. C. §331 et seq. 5 See also the Quinault
Allotment Act of March 4, 1911, 36 Stat. 1345. The Government initially determined that the forested areas of the Reservation were not to be alloted because they were not suitable for agriculture or grazing. In 1924, however, this
Court concluded that the character of lands to be set apart for
See Halbert v. United States, 283 U.S. 753, 757 (1931).
See generally United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 350--353
(WD Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F . 2d 676 (CA9 1975), cert. denied, 423 U. S.
1086 (1976) (describing pre-Treaty role of fishing among Northwest
Indians).
• Executive Order, I C. Kappler, Indian Affairs 923 (2d ed. 1904). The
Order declared that the reservation would be held for the use of the Quinault, Quileute, Hoh, Queets, "and other tribes of fish-eating Indians on
the Pacific Coast." Ibid.
6
Section 5 of the Act provided that the United States would hold the
allotted land for 25 years "in trust for the sole use and benefit of the Indian
to whom such allotment shall have been made." The period during which
the United States was to hold the allotted land was extended indefinitely
by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, § 2, 48 Stat. 984, 25
u. s. c. § 462.
2

3
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the Indians was not restricted by the General Allotment Act.
United States v. Payne, 264 U. S. 446, 449 (1924). Thereafter, the forested lands of the Reservation were allotted.
By 1935 the entire Reservation had been divided into 2,340
trust allotments, most of which were 80 acres of heavily timbered land. About a third of the Reservation has since gone
out of trust, but the bulk of the land has remained in trust
status. 6
The forest resources on the allotted lands have long been
managed by the Department of the Interior, which exercises
"comprehensive" control over the harvesting of Indian timber. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S.
136, 145 (1980). The Secretary of the Interior has broad
statutory authority over the sale of timber on reservations.
See 25 U.S. C. §§405-407. Sales of timber "must be based
upon a consideration of the needs and best interests of the Indian owner and his heirs," § 406(a), and the proceeds from
such sales are to be used for the benefit of the Indians or
transferred to the Indian owner, §§ 406(a), 407. Congress
has directed the Secretary to adhere to principles of sustained-yield forestry on all Indian forest lands under his supervision. 25 U. S. C. §466.
Under these statutes, the
Secretary has promulgated detailed regulations governing
the management of Indian timber. 25 CFR Part 163 (1982).
The Secretary is authorized to deduct an administrative fee
for his services from the timber revenues paid to Indian allottees. 25 U. S. C. §§ 406(a), 413.
B
The respondents are 1,465 individuals owning interests in
allotments on the Quinault Reservation, an unincorporated
association of Quinault Reservation allottees, and the Quinault Tribe, which now holds some portions of the allotted
6
See Mitchell v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 95, 97, 591 F . 2d 1300,
1300-1301 (1979).
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lands. In 1971 respondents filed four actions that were consolidated in the Court of Claims. Jurisdiction was based on
28 U. S. C. §§ 1491 and 1505. Respondents sought to recover damages from the United States based on allegations of
pervasive waste and mismanagement of timber lands on the
More specifically, respondents
Quinault Reservation.
claimed that the Government (1) failed to obtain a fair market
value for timber sold; (2) failed to manage timber on a sustained-yield basis; (3) failed to obtain any payment at all for
some merchantable timber; (4) failed to develop a proper
system of roads and easements for timber operations and exacted improper charges from allottees for maintenance of
roads; (5) failed to pay any interest on certain funds from timber sales held by the Government and paid insufficient interest on other funds; and (6) exacted excessive administrative
fees from allottees. Respondents assert that the alleged
misconduct constitutes a breach of the fiduciary duty owed
them by the United States as trustee under various statutes.
Six years after the suits were filed, the United States
moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the
Court of Claims had no authority over claims based on a
breach of trust. The court denied the motion, holding that
the General Allotment Act created a fiduciary duty on the
United States' part to manage the timber resources properly
and thereby provided the necessary authority for recovery of
damages against the United States. 219 Ct. Cl. 95, 591
F. 2d 1300 (1979) (en bane).
In United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535 (1980), this
Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Claims, stating that
the General Allotment Act "created only a limited trust relationship between the United States and the allottees that
does not impose any duty upon the Government to manage
timber resources." I d., at 542. We concluded that "[a]ny
right of the respondents to recover money damages for Government mismanagement of timber resources must be found
in some source other than [the General Allotment] Act."
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I d., at 546. Since the Court of Claims had not considered
respondents' assertion that other statutes render the United
States answerable in money damages for the alleged mismanagement in this case, we remanded the case for consideration
of these alternative grounds for liability. See id., at 546,
n. 7.
On remand, the Court of Claims once again held the United
States subject to suit for money damages on most of respondents' claims. - - Ct. Cl. - , 664 F. 2d 265 (1981) (en
bane). The court ruled that the timber management statutes, 25 U. S. C. §§406, 407, and 466, various federal statutes governing road building and rights of way, §§ 318 and
323--325, statutes governing Indian funds and government
fees, §§ 162a and 413, and regulations promulgated under
these statutes imposed fiduciary duties upon the United
States in its management of forested allotted lands. The
court concluded that the statutes and regulations implicitly
required compensation for damages sustained as a result of
the Government's breach of its duties. Thus, the Court held
that respondents could proceed on their claims.
Because the decision of the Court of Claims raises issues of
substantial importance concerning the liability of the United
States, 7 we granted the Government's petition for certiorari.
U. S . - (1982). We affirm.
II

Respondents have invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491, and its
counterpart for claims brought by Indian tribes, 28 U. S. C.
§ 1505, known as the Indian Tucker Act. 8 The Tucker Act
states in pertinent part:
The Government has informed us that the damages claimed in this suit
alone may amount to $100 million. Pet. for Cert. 24.
8
Section 24 of the Indian Claims Commission Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1505,
provides tribal claimants the same access to the Court of Claims provided
7
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"The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render
judgment upon any claim against the United States
founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or
upon any express or implied contract with the United
States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in
cases not sounding in tort." 28 U. S. C. § 1491.
It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued
without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction. 9 The terminology employed in
some of our prior decisions has unfortunately generated some
confusion as to whether the Tucker Act constitutes a waiver
of sovereign immunity. The time has come to resolve this
confusion. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude
that by giving the Court of Claims jurisdiction over specified
types of claims against the United States, 10 the Tucker Act
constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to
those claims.
A

Before 1855 no general statute gave the consent of the
United States to suit on claims for money damages; the only
recourse available to private claimants was to petition Congress for relief. 11 In order to relieve the pressure caused by
the volume of private bills and to avoid the delays and inequities of the private bill procedure, Congress created the
to individual claimants by 28 U. S. C. § 1491. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535, 538-540 (1980).
9
See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 586 (1941); 14 C.
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice And Procedure § 3654, at
156-157 (1976).
10
The Tucker Act provided concurrent jurisdiction in the district courts
over claims not exceeding $10,000. See 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(2).
11
See P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, The Federal
Courts and the Federal System 98 (2d ed. 1973); Richardson, History, Jurisdiction, and Practice of the Court of Claims, 17 Ct. Cl. 3, 3-4 (1882).
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Court of Claims. Act of February 24, 1855, c. 122, 10 Stat.
612. The 1855 Act empowered that court to hear claims and
report its findings to Congress and to submit a draft of a private bill in each case which received a favorable decision.
§ 7, 10 Stat. 613. The limited powers initially conferred upon
the court failed to relieve Congress from "the laborious necessity of examining the merits of private bills." Glidden
Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, 553 (1962) (opinion of Harlan,
J.). Thus, in his State of the Union Message of 1861, President Lincoln recommended that the court be authorized to
render final judgments. He declared that it is "as much the
duty of Government to render prompt justice against itself,
in favor of citizens, as it is to administer the same between
private individuals." Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess.,
app. 2 (1862). Congress adopted the President Lincoln's recommendation and made the court's judgments final. Act of
March 3, 1863, ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765. 12
In 1886 Representative John Randolph Tucker introduced
a bill to revise in several respects the jurisdiction and procedures of the Court of Claims and to replace most provisions of
the 1855 and 1863 Acts. H. R. 6974, 59th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1886). The House Judiciary Committee reported that the
bill was a "comprehensive measure by which claims against
the United States may be heard and determined." H. R.
Rep. No. 1077, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1886). The measure
was designed "to give the people of the United States what
12
Section 14 of the 1863 Act provided that "no money shall be paid out of
the treasury for any claim passed upon by the court of claims till after an
appropriation therefor shall be estimated for by the Secretary of the Treasury." 12 Stat. 768. In Gordon v. United States, 2 Wall. 561 (1864), this
Court dismissed an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims for want
of jurisdiction, holding that § 14 gave the Secretary a revisory authority
over the court inconsistent with its exercise of judicial power. Congress
promptly repealed the provision, Act of March 17, 1866, c. 19, § 1, 14 Stat.
9. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok , 370 U. S. 530, 554 (1962) (opinion of Harlan, J. ).
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every civilized nation of the world has already done-the
right to go into the courts to seek redress against the Government for their grievances." 18 Cong. Rec. 2680 (1887) (remarks of Rep. Bayne). See id., at 622 (remarks of Rep.
Tucker); id., at 2679 (colloquy between Reps. Tucker and
Townshend); id., at 2680 (remarks of Rep. Holman). The
eventual enactment thus "provide[d) for the bringing of suits
against the Government of the United States." Act of
March 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505.
The Indian Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1505, has a similar
history. An early amendment to the original enactment
creating the Court of Claims had excluded claims by Indian
tribes. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 9, 12 Stat. 767. As a
result, Congress eventually confronted a "vast and growing
burden" resulting from the large number of tribes seeking
special jurisdictional acts. H. R. Rep. No. 1466, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. 6 (1945). Congress responded by conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to hear any tribal claim "of a
character which would be cognizable in the Court of Claims if
the claimant were not an Indian tribe." I d., at 13. As the
House sponsor of the Act stated, an important goal of the Act
was to ensure that it would "never again be necessary to pass
special Indian jurisdictional acts in order to permit the Indians to secure a court adjudication on any misappropriation of
Indian funds or of any other Indian property by Federal officials that might occur in the future." 92 Cong. Rec. 5313
(1946) (statement of Rep. Jackson). Indians were to be
given "their fair day in court so that they can call the various
Government agencies to account on the obligations that the
Federal government assumed." I d., at 5312. 13 The House
18

See 92 Cong. Rec. 5312 (statement of Rep. Jackson) ("The Interior Department itself suggested that it ought not be in a position where its employees can mishandle funds and lands of a national trusteeship without
complete accountability.") See also Hearings on H. R. 1198 and H. R.
1341 before the House Committee on Indian Affairs, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.

81-174~0PINION

UNITED STATES v. MITCHELL

9

Report stressed the same point: "If we fail to meet these obligations by denying access to the courts when trust funds
have been improperly dissipated or other fiduciary duties
have been violated, we compromise the national honor of the
United States." H. R. Rep. No. 1466, at 4.
For decades this Court consistently interpreted the Tucker
Act as having provided the consent of United States to be
sued eo nomine for the classes of claims described in the Act.
See, e. g., Shillinger v. United States, 155 U. S. 163, 16&-167
(1894); Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10, 17 (1896); Dooley v.
United States, 182 U. S. 222, 227-228 (1901); Reid v. United
States, 211 U. S. 529, 538 (1909); United States v. Sherwood,
312 U. S. 584, 590 (1940); Dalehite v. United States, 346
U. S. 15, 25, n. 10 (1953); Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S.
270, 273 (1957). In at least two recent decisions this Court
explicitly stated that the Tucker Act effects a waiver of sovereign immunity. Army & Air Force Exchange Service v.
Sheehan,- U. S. - , - (1982); Hatzlachh Supply Co.
v. United States, 444 U. S. 460, 466 (1980) (per curiam).
These decisions confirm the umabiguous thrust of the history
of the Act.
The existence of a waiver is readily apparent in claims
founded upon "any express or implied contract with the
United States." 28 U. S. C. § 1491. The Court of Claims'
jurisdiction over contract claims against the government has
long been recognized, and government liability in contract is
viewed as perhaps "the widest and most unequivocal waiver
of federal immunity from suit." Developments in the LawRemedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70
Harv. L. Rev. 827, 876 (1957). See also 14 C. Wright, A.
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3656,
at 202 (1976). The source of consent for such suits unmistakably lies in the Tucker Act. Otherwise, it is doubtful that
any consent would exist, for no contracting officer or other
130 (1945) (statement of Assistant Solicitor Cohen).

81-1748-0PINION
10

UNITED STATES v. MITCHELL

official is empowered to consent to suit against the United
States. 14 The same is true for claims founded upon executive
regulations. Indeed, the Act makes absolutely no distinction between claims founded upon contracts and claims
founded upon other specified sources of law.
In United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 398, 400 (1976),
and in United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S., at 538, this Court
employed language suggesting that the Tucker Act does not
effect a waiver of sovereign immunity. Such language was
not necessary to the decision in either case. See infra, at
11-12. Without in any way questioning the result in either
case, we conclude that this isolated language should be disregarded. If a claim falls within the terms of the Tucker Act,
the United States has presumptively consented to suit.
B

It nonetheless remains true that the Tucker Act "'does not
create any substantive right enforceable against the United
States for money damages.'" United States v. Mitchell, 445
U. S., at 538, quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U. S., at
398. A substantive right must be found in some other source
of law, such as "the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or
any regulation of an executive department." 28 U. S. C.
§ 1491. Not every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal
statute, or a regulation is cognizable under the Tucker Act.
The claim must be one for money damages against the United
States, see United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1, 2-3 (1969),
and the claimant must demonstrate that the source of substantive law he relies upon "'can fairly be interpreted as
mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the
damages sustained."' United States v. Testan, 424 U. S., at
14
See United States v. New York Rayon Importing Co., 329 U.S. 654,
660 (1957); United States, v. Shaw, 309 U. S. 495, 501 (1940); Carr v.
United States, 98 U. S. 433, 438 (1879).
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400, quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct.
Cl. 599, 607, 372 F. 2d 1002, 1009 (1967). 15
For example, in United States v. Testan, supra, two government attorneys contended that they were entitled to a
higher salary grade under the Classification Act, 16 and to an
award of back pay under the Back Pay Act 17 for the period
during which they were classified at a lower grade. This
Court concluded that neither the Classification Act nor the
Back Pay Act could fairly be interpreted as requiring compensation for wrongful classifications. See 424 U. S., at
398-407. Particularly in light of the "established rule that
one is not entitled to the benefit of a position until he has
been appointed to it," id., at 402, 18 the Classification Act does
not support a claim for money damages. While the Back Pay
Act does provide a basis for money damages as a remedy "in
carefully limited circumstances" such as wrongful reductions
in grade, id., at 404, it does not apply to wrongful classifications. I d., at 405.
Similarly, in United States v. Mitchell, supra, this Court
concluded that the General Allotment Act does not confer a
right to recover money damages against the United States.
While § 5 of the Act provided that the United States would
hold land "in trust" for Indian allottees, 25 U. S. C. § 348, we
held that the Act creates only a limited trust relationship.
445 U. S., at 542. The trust language of the Act does not
impose any fiduciary management duties or render the
United States answerable for breach thereof, but only prevents improvident alienation of the allotted lands and assures
16
As the Eastport decision recognized, the substantive source of law
may grant the claimant a right to recover damages either "expressly or by
implication." I d., at 605; 372 F. 2d, at 1007. See also Ralston Steel Corp.
v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 119, 125, 340 F. 2d 663, 667, cert. denied, 381
u. s. 950 (1965).
16

5

u. s. c.

§ 5101.

5 u. s. c. § 5596.
18
Citing United States v. McLean, 95 U. S. 750 (1878); Ganse v. United
States, 180 Ct. Cl. 183, 186, 376 F. 2d 900, 902 (1967).
17
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their immunity from state taxation. I d., at 544.
Thus, for claims against the United States "founded either
upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department," 28 U. S. C. § 1491, a court
must inquire whether the source of substantive law can fairly
be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal
Government for the damages sustained. In undertaking this
inquiry, a court need not find a separate waiver of sovereign
immunity in the substantive provision, just as a court need
not find consent to suit in "any express or implied contract
with the United States." Ibid. The Tucker Act itself provides the necessary consent.
Of course, in determining the general scope of the Tucker
Act, this Court has not lightly inferred the United States'
consent to suit. See United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1, 4-5
(1969) (Court of Claims lacks authority to issue declaratory
judgment); Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270, 276
(1957) (non-tolling of limitations beyond statutory provisions). For example, although the Tucker Act refers to
claims founded upon any implied contract with the United
States, we have held that the Act does not reach claims based
on contracts implied in law, as opposed to those implied in
fact. Merritt v. United States, 267 U. S. 338, 341 (1925).
In this case, however, there is simply no question that the
Tucker Act provides the United States' consent to suit for
claims founded upon statutes or regulations that create substantive rights to money damages. If a claim falls within
this category, the existence of a waiver of sovereign immunity is clear. The question in this case is thus analytically
distinct: whether the statutes or regulations at issue can be
interpreted as requiring compensation. Because the Tucker
Act supplies a waiver of immunity for claims of this nature,
the separate statutes and regulations need not provide a second waiver of sovereign immunity, nor need they be construed in the manner appropriate to waivers of sovereign immunity. See United States v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Realty
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Co., 237 U.S. 28, 32 (1915). "'The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough where consent has
been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement
of construction where consent has been announced.'"
United States v. Aetna Surety Co., 338 U. S. 366, 383 (1949),
quoting Anderson v. John L. Hayes Constr. Co., 243 N. Y.
140, 147, 153 N. E. 28, 29--30 (1926) (Cardozo, J.). 19
III
Respondents have based their money claims against the
United States on various Acts of Congress and executive department regulations. We begin by describing these sources
of substantive law. We then examine whether they can
fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation for damages
sustained as a result of a breach of the duties they impose.
A

The Secretary of the Interior's pervasive role in the sales
of timber from Indian lands began with the Act of June 25,
1910, ch. 431, §§ 7-8, 36 Stat. 855, 857, as amended, 25
U. S. C. §§ 40&-407. Prior to that time, Indians had no right
to sell timber on reservation land, 20 and there existed " 'no
general law under which authority for sale of timber on Indian lands, whether allotted or unallotted, can be granted."'
H. R. Rep. No. 1135, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1910) (quoting
letter of the Secretary of the Interior). Congress recognized
that this situation was undesirable "'because in many instances the timber is the only valuable part of the allotment
or is the only source from which funds can be obtained for the
support of the Indian or the improvement of his allotment.' "
Ibid. The 1910 Act empowered the Secretary to sell timber
19
Cf. Block v. Neal,- U . S . - , - (1983); Indian Towing Co . v.
United States , 350 U. S. 61, 69 (1955).
20
See United States v. Cook, 19 Wall. 591 (1874); Pine River Logging
Co. v. United States, 186 U. S. 279 (1902); 19 Op. Atty. Gen. 194 (1888).
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on unallotted lands and apply the proceeds of the sales for the
benefit of the Indians, § 7, and authorized the Secretary to
consent to sales by allottees, with the proceeds to be paid to
the allottees or disposed of for their benefit, § 8. Congress
thus sought to provide for harvesting timber "in such a manner as to conserve the interests of the people on the reservations, namely, the Indians." 45 Cong. Rec. 6087 (1910) (remarks of Rep. Saunders).
From the outset, the Interior Department recognized its
obligation to supervise the cutting of Indian timber. In
1911, the Department's Office of Indian Affairs promulgated
detailed regulations covering its responsibilities in "managing the Indian forests so as to obtain the greatest revenue for
the Indians consistent with a proper protection and improvement of the forests." Office of Indian Affairs, Regulations
and Instructions for Officers in Charge of Forests on Indian
Reservations 4 (1911). The regulations addressed virtually
every aspect of forest management, including the size of
sales, contract procedures, advertisements and methods of
billing, deposits and bonding requirements, administrative
fee deductions, procedures for sales by minors, allowable
heights of stumps, tree marking and scaling rules, base and
top diameters of trees for cutting, and the percentage of
trees to be left as a seed source. I d., at ~28. The regulations applied to allotted as well as tribal lands, and the Secretary's approval of timber sales on allotted lands was explicitly
conditioned upon compliance with the regulations. Id., at 9.
Over time, deficiencies in the Interior Department's performance of its responsibilities became apparent. Accordingly, as part of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, c.
576, 484 Stat. 984, Congress imposed even stricter duties
upon the Government with respect to Indian timber management. In § 6 of the Act, now codified as 25 U. S. C. § 466,
Congress expressly directed that the Interior Department
manage Indian forest resources "on the principle of sustained-yield management." Representative Howard, co-
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sponsor of the Act and Chairman of the House Committee on
Indian Mfairs, explained that the purpose of the provision
was "to assure a proper and permanent management of the
Indian Forest" under modern sustained-yield methods so as
to "assure that the Indian forests will be permanently productive and will yield continuous revenues to the tribes." 78
Cong. Rec. 11730 (1934). See United States v. Anderson,
625 F. 2d 910, 915 (CA9 1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 920
(1981). Referring to the relationship between the Indians
and the Government as a "sacred trust," Representative
Howard stated that "[t]he failure of their governmental
guardian to conserve the Indians' land and assets and the
consequent loss of income or earning power, has been the
principal cause of the present plight of the Indian." 78
Cong. Rec., at 11726. 21
Regulations promulgated under the Act required the preservation of Indian forest lands in a perpetually productive
state, forbade the clear-cutting of large contiguous areas,
called for the development of long-term working plans for all
major reservations, required adequate provision for new
growth when mature timber was removed, and required the
regulation of run-off and the minimization of erosion. 22 The
regulatory scheme was designed to assure that the Indians
receive "the benefit of whatever profit [the forest] is capable
of yielding." White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448
U. S., at 149 (quoting 25 CFR § 141.3(a)(3) (1979)).
21

John Collier, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and a principal author
of the Act, had testified that
"there must be a constructive handling of Indian timber. We have got to
stop the slaughtering of Indian timber lands, to operate them on a perpetual yield basis and the bill expressly directs that this principle of conservation shall be applied throughout."
Hearings on H. R. 7902 Before the House Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 35 (1934).
22
The Bureau of Indian Affair's 1936 General Forest Regulations remain
essentially unchanged within 25 CFR Part 163 (1982).
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In 1964 Congress amended the timber provisions of the
1910 Act, again emphasizing the Secretary of the Interior's
management duties. Act of April30, 1964, 78 Stat. 186. As
to sales of timber on allotted lands, the Secretary was directed to consider "the needs and best interests of the Indian
owner and his heirs." 25 U. S. C. § 406(a). In performing
this duty, the Secretary was specifically required to take into
account:
"(1) the state of growth of the timber and the need for
maintaining the productive capacity of the land for the
benefit of the owner and his heirs, (2) the highest and
best use of the land, including the advisability and practicality of devoting it to other uses for the benefit of the
owner and his heirs, and (3) the present and future financial needs of the owner and his heirs." Ibid. See also
§ 407 (timber sales on unallotted trust lands).
The timber management statutes, 25 U. S. C. §§406-407,
466, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, 25 CFR
Part 163 (1982), establish the "comprehensive" responsibilities of the Federal Government in managing the harvesting of Indian timber. White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker, 448 U. S., at 145. The Department of the Interior-through the Bureau of Indian Affairs-" exercises literally daily supervision over the harvesting and management of
tribal timber." ld., at 147. 23 Virtually every stage of the
process is under federal control. 24
By virtue of the Act of February 14, 1920, ch. 75, § 1, 41 Stat. 415, as
amended by the Act of March 1, 1933, ch. 158, 47 Stat. 1417, the Secretary
of the Interior is authorized to collect "reasonable fees" from Indian timber
sale proceeds to cover the cost of the management and sale of the Indians'
timber. 25 U. S. C. § 413. Sections 406 and 407, as amended in 1964,
both provide for deductions of administrative expenses "to the extent permissible under section 413." See also 25 CFR § 163.18 (1982). Respondents have asserted that administrative fee deductions were excessive or
improper in several respects. The Court of Claims concluded that there is
23

81-1748-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. MITCHELL

17

The Department exercises comparable control over grants
of rights-of-way on Indian lands held in trust. 25 The Secretary is empowered to grant rights-of-way for all purposes
across trust land, 25 U. S. C. § 323, provided that he obtains
the consent of the tribal or individual Indian landowner,
§ 324, 26 and that the Indian owners are paid appropriate compensation, § 325. Regulations detail the scope of federal supervision. 25 CFR Part 169 (1982). '1:1 For example, an applicant for a right-of-way must deposit with the Secretary an
amount not less than the fair market value of the rights
granted, plus an amount to cover potential damages associated with activity on the right-of-way. The Secretary must
determine the adequacy of the compensation, and the
amounts deposited must be held in a special account for distribution to Indian landowners. See 25 CFR §§ 169.12,
169.14 (1982). 28
"undoubted consent-to-suit from such claims that the Government illegally
kept some of the Indians' own money or property." - - Ct. Cl. - - ,
- - , 664 F. 2d 265, 274, citing United States v. Testan, 424 U. S., at
400-401; Eastport S.S . Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 598, 605-606,
372 F. 2d 1002, 1007-1008 (1967). The Government does not appear to dispute this conclusion. Brief for the United States 33, n. 27.
24
The Secretary even has authority to invest tribal and individual Indian
funds held in trust in banks, bonds, notes, or other public debt obligations
of the United States if deemed advisable and for the best interest of the
Indians. Act of June 24, 1938, 52 Stat. 1037, 25 U. S. C. § 162a. In this
case the funds maintained on behalf of individual allottees were derived
primarily from timber sales.
25
See Act of February 5, 1948,62 Stat. 17, codified in part at 25 U. S.C.
§§ 323-325. See also Act of May 26, 1928, 45 Stat. 750, 25 U. S. C. § 318a
(road building).
28
Rights-of-way over lands of individual Indians may be granted without
the consent of the owners under certain specific circumstances. § 324.
27
Such regulations have a long history. See 25 CFR Part 256 (1949).
28
See also § 169.3 (consent of Indian landowners to grants of rights-ofway); § 169.5 (specifying required elements of agreements between Secretary and applicants, including stipulation that upon termination of the
right-of-way the applicant will restore land to its original condition so far as
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In United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S., at 542, this Court
recognized that the General Allotment Act creates a trust
relationship between the United States and Indian allot tees
but concluded that the trust relationship was limited. We
held that the Act could not be read "as establishing that the
United States has a fiduciary responsibility for management
of allotted forest lands." I d., at 546. In contrast to the
bare trust created by the General Allotment Act, the statutes and regulations now before us clearly give the Federal
Government full responsibility to manage Indian resources
and land for the benefit of the Indians. They thereby establish a fiduciary relationship and define the contours of the
United States' fiduciary responsibilities.
The language of these statutory and regulatory provisions
directly supports the existence of a fiduciary relationship.
For example, § 8 of the 1910 Act, as amended, expressly
mandates that sales of timber from Indian trust lands be
based upon the Secretary's consideration of "the needs and
best interests of the Indian owner and his heirs" and that proceeds from such sales be paid to owners "or disposed of for
their benefit." 25 U. S. C. § 406(a). Similarly, even in its
earliest regulations, the Government recognized its duties in
"managing the Indian forests so as to obtain the greatest revenue for the Indians consistent with a proper protection and
improvement of the forests ." Office of Indian Affairs, Regulations and Instructions for Officers in Charge of Forests on
Indian Reservations 4 (1911). Thus, the Government has
"expressed a firm desire that the Tribe should retain the
benefits derived from the harvesting and sale of reservation
timber." White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448
U. S., at 149. 29
is reasonably possible). As to roads on Indian reservations, respondents
have alleged improper deduction of road maintenance costs as a charge
against the allottees' timber payments.
29
The pattern of pervasive federal control evident in the area of timber
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Moreover, a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises when
the Government assumes such elaborate control over forests
and property belonging to Indians. All of the necessary elements of a common-law trust are present: a trustee (the
United States), a beneficiary (the Indian allottees), and a
trust corpus (Indian timber, lands, and funds). 30 "[W]here
the Federal Government takes on or has control or supervision over tribal monies or properties, the fiduciary relationship normally exists with respect to such monies or properties (unless Congress has provided otherwise) even though
nothing is said expressly in the authorizing or underlying
statute (or other fundamental document) about a trust fund,
or a trust or fiduciary connection." Navajo Tribe of Indians
v. United States , 224 Ct. Cl. 171, 183, 624 F. 2d 981, 987
(1980).
Our construction of these statutes and regulations is reinforced by the undisputed existence of a general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian people.
This Court has previously emphasized "the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings
with these dependent and sometimes exploited people."
Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S. 286, 296 (1942).
This principle has long dominated the Government's dealings
with Indians. United States v. Mason, 412 U. S. 391, 398
(1973); Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382, 386 (1939);
United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U. S. 111, 117-118
(1938); United States v. Candelaria, 271 U. S. 432, 442
(1926); McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U. S. 458, 469 (1907); Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 396 (1902); United States v.
Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 382-384 (1886); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 17 (1831).
Because the statutes and regulations at issue in this case
sales and timber management applies equally to grants of rights-of-way
and to management of Indian funds. See supra, at 17, and n. 24.
80
See Restatement (Second) of the Law of Trusts § 2, Comment h, at 10
(1959).
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clearly establish fiduciary obligations of the Government in
the management and operation of Indian lands and resources,
they can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by
the Federal Government for damages sustained. Given the
existence of a trust relationship, it naturally follows that the
Government should be liable in damages for the breach of its
fiduciary duties. It is well established that a trustee is accountable in damages for breaches of trust. See Restatement (Second) of the Law of Trusts §§ 205-212 (1959); G.
Bogert, The Law of Trusts & Trustees § 862 (2d ed. 1965); 3
A. Scott, The Law of Trusts § 205 (3d ed. 1967). This Court
and several other federal courts have consistently recognized
that the existence of a trust relationship between the United
States and an Indian or Indian tribe includes as a fundamental incident the right of an injured beneficiary to sue the
trustee for damages resulting from a breach of the trust. 31
The recognition of a damages remedy also furthers the purposes of the statutes and regulations, which clearly require
that the Secretary manage Indian resources so as to generate
proceeds for the Indians. It would be anomalous to conclude
that these enactments create a right to the value of certain
resources when the Secretary lives up to his duties, but no
3
'

See, e. g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S. 286, 295-300
(1942); United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U. S. 103, 109-110 (1935);
Moose v. United States, 674 F. 2d 1277, 1281 (CA9 1982); Whiskers v.
United States, 600 F. 2d 1332, 1335 (CAlO (1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S.
1078 (1980); Coast Indian Community v. United States, 213 Ct. Cl. 129,
152-156, 550 F. 2d 639, 652-654 (1977); Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes v.
United States, 206 Ct. Cl. 340, 345, 512 F . 2d 1390, 1392 (1975); Mason v.
United States, 198 Ct. Cl. 599, 613-616, 461 F. 2d 1364, 1372-1373 (1972),
rev'd on other grounds, 412 U. S. 391 (1973); Navajo Tribe v. United
States, 176 Ct. Cl. 502, 507, 364 F. 2d 320, 322 (1966); Klamath & Modoc
Tribes, v. United States, 174 Ct. Cl. 483, 490-491 (1966); Menominee Tribe
v. United States, 102 Ct. Cl. 555, 562 (1945); Menominee Tribe v. United
States, 101 Ct. Cl. 10, 18-20 (1944); Smith v. United States, 515 F. Supp.
56, 60 (ND Cal. 1978); Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc. v. United
States, 363 F. Supp. 1238, 1243-1248 (ND Cal. 1973).
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right to the value of the resources if the Secretary's duties
are not performed. "Absent a retrospective damages remedy, there would be little to deter federal officials from violating their trust duties, at least until the allottees managed
to obtain a judicial decree against future breaches of trust."
United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S., at 550 (WHITE, J., dissenting). Cf. H. R. Rep. No. 1466, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1945).
The Government contends that violations of duties imposed
by the various statutes may be cured by actions for declaratory, injunctive or mandamus relief against the Secretary,
although it concedes that sovereign immunity might have
barred such suits before 1976. 32 Brief of the United States at
40. In this context, however, prospective equitable remedies are totally inadequate. To begin with, the Indian allottees are in no position to monitor federal management of
their lands on a consistent basis. Many are poorly educated,
most are absentee owners, and many do not even know the
exact physical location of their allotments. Indeed, it was
the very recognition of the inability of the Indians to oversee
their interests that led to federal management in the first
place. A trusteeship would mean little if the beneficiaries
were required to supervise the day-to-day management of
their estate by their trustee or else be precluded from recovery for mismanagement.
In addition, by the time government mismanagement becomes apparent, the damage to Indian resources may be so
severe that a prospective remedy may be next to worthless.
For example, if timber on an allotment has been destroyed
through Government mismanagement, it will take many
years for nature to restore the timber. As this Court has
observed,
32
See Naganab v. Hitchcock , 202 U. S. 473, 475-476 (1906). In 1976
Congress enacted a general consent to such suits. See 5 U. S. C. § 702.
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"Once logged off, the land is of little value. The land no
longer serves the purpose for which it was by treaty set
aside to [the allottee's] ancestors, and for which it was
allotted to him. It can no longer be adequate to his
needs and serve the purpose of bringing him finally to a
state of competency and independence."

Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U. S. 1, 10 (1956).
We thus conclude that the statutes and r%_lllations at i~~ue
here Cl!Jl f~e interRreted as mandating compensation by
the Federal Government for violations of its fiduciary responsibilities in the management of Indian property. The Court
of Claims therefore has jurisdiction over respondents' claims
for alleged breaches of trusts.
IV
The judgment of the Court of Claims is affirmed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
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My editing has been essentially stylistic.
occasionally have

I

tried

to

identify deletions.

Only
I

do

suggest, in a further review by you and your edito,r that
you

be

on

the

lookout

for

repetition

that

may

weaken

rather than strengthen the logic and flow of our analysis.

L.F.P., Jr.
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FIRST DRAFT: United States v. Mitchell, No. 81-1748
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The controlling law in this case is clear.

Speaking

for the Court in United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535
(1980)

(Mitchell

I),

general

principle

JUSTICE

that

a

MARSHALL

cause

of

reaffirmed

action

for

the

5

damages

against the United States "'cannot be implied but must be
unequivocally expressed.'"
States

v.

King,

395

Nakshian,

453

u.s.

dissenting)

~here,

Id.,

u.s.

1,

156,

4

at

538

(1969)).

170

(1981)

(quoting United
See Lehman
(BRENNAN,

v.
J. ,

as here, a claim for money damages is

predicated upon an alleged statutory violation,

the rule

is that the statute does not create a cause of action for
damages unless the statute "in itself
interpreted
Government
Testan,

as
for

424

mandating

compensation

the damage sustained."
U.S.

392,

402

(1976)

• • • can fairly be
by

the

Federal

'

'

15

United States v.
(quoting

Eastport

Steamship Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1008-1009
(Ct. Cl.

1967)).

See,

e. g., Army & Air Force Exchange

Service v. Sheehan, 456 U.S. 728, 739-7 40 (1982)

( "Testan

20 '

'"

[held]

that the Tucker Act provides a remedy only where

~.

;

2.

damages

claims

authorized

against

the

explicitly")

United

(emphasis

States

added);

have

id.,

been

at

739

(damages remedy available where the statutes "specifically
authorize

awards

of

money

damages") ;

at

id. ,

741

2

(reaffirming that an action for damages under the Tucker
Act may not be premised upon "regulations ••• which do not
explicitly authorize

damages

awards")

.'J/

In

sum,

whether

the United States has created a cause of action turns upon
the

intent
See

courts.
(1940);

of

Congress,

United

not

States

v.

Munro v. United States,

the

inclinations

Shaw,
303

309 U.S.

u.s.

36,

of

the

495,

502

41

3

(1938).

~~4.d..~

Today, the Court does net sotRQr to

ai~eev&r

Congress.

that

The

rights

of

action

the

the intent of
Court

finds

"mandated" by an amalgamation of federal statutes "is in

3

cold reality but a strong and . clear wish upon the judge's
part."
Cl.

United States v. Mitchell, 664 F.2d 265, 277

1981)

(Nichols,

J.,

concurring

and

dissenting).

(Ct.
I

The Court does not--and clearly cannot--contend that
any of the statutes standing alone reflects the necessary

.

.,..

3.

c:£,

legislative mandate
remedy.
that

for

1!-he

etYaila~-i.t.y

of

t:+t ~

damages

None of the statutes contain any "provision

expressly makes

the United States

liable"

for

its

41

alleged mismanagement of Indian forest resources and their
proceeds or that "grant [ s]
specificity."
nothing
407, 1

in

Testan,

the

466, 2 the

323-325, 3 or

the

timber

• • • a right of action • • • with

424
sale

U.S.,

at

statutes,

399-400.
25

u.s.c.

road and right-of-way statutes,
interest statute,

Indeed,
§§406,
§§318a,

§162a, 4 addresses

in

1 The only monetary obligation imposed upon the
Secretary by §406 or §407 is to pay the actual "proceeds"
of timber sales to the owners of the land. Thus, while it
may be that those sections would ground an action to
compel the Secretary to disgorge unlawfully retained
proceeds, see United States v. Testan, 424 u.s. 392, 401
(1976) , no statutory basis ex1sts for extending that
remedy to proceeds that arguably or ideally should have
been, but were not, captured by the Secretary.
On the
contrary, the statutory recognition of some right to
receive the "proceeds" of sales conducted suggests that
this is the limit of any damages action implicitly
authorized by Congress. See United States v. Erika, Inc.,
456 U.S. 201, 208
(1982); Middlesex County Sewerage
Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association, 453 U.S.
1, 14-15, 20-21 (1981).
2section 466 merely requires the Secretary to "make
rules and regulations for the operation and management of
Indian forestry units on the principle of sustained-yield
management." As the Court of Claims recognized, 664 F.2d
265, 272 (1981), there plainly is no statutory directive
to pay compensation.
Rather the duty imposed upon the
Secretary is simply to adopt appropriate regulations.
3 section 318a merely authorizes the appropriation
of funds for building of roads on Indian reservations. It
would be a ~ radical change in the law of sovereign
immunity to hold that a routine authorization statute
allows
individuals
who might be benefitted
if
the
appropriations
e made to bring an action to recover
Footnote continued on next page.
Footnote(s) 4 will appear on following pages.
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4.

any respect the institution of damages actions against the
United

States.

Nor

is

there

any

indication

in

the

legislative history of the statutes that Congress intended
to consent to damages actions for mismanagement of Indian
assets by enacting these provisions. 5

damages.

And

although

§325

may

5

The Court does not

~~ctian ~~

recove:~. ~mpensation wrongfully withheld
Ol1'~r ~~~ J...ande ie '<Ia~ 9raRt-e(l, it does

from the Indians
not follow that
damages for failure to secure more generous compensation
are available. Indeed, the explicit statutory recognition
of the Secretary's authority to determine the amount of
compensation militates J:'IQHerftli~ against any damages
remedy for insufficient compensation.
4 Rather
compensation,

than
compelling
a
particular
level
of
§162a affords the Secretary substantial
----------~~~~~~-lr~e•specting
the investments to be made with
individual In 1
unds.
There is nothing in the statute
that requires paymen
particular rate of interest. A
fortiori, Congress has not ~eftt~ ~e reRe~r the United
States accountable in damages for any amount by which the
revenues earned fall short of a standard of "reasonable
management zeal to get for the Indians the best rate."
664 F.2d 265, 274 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
5 It is especially improbable that Congress intended
to
consent
to
monetary
liability
for
forestry
mismanagement on allotted lands, because, at the time in
question, at least some, if not all, government officials
believed that heavily forested lands were not to be
allotted.
See United States v. Payne, 264 U.S. 446, 449
(1924) •
And before 1964,
§406 was
a
rather
bare
instrument, simply giving an Indian permission to sell his
timber with the Secretary's permission.
The legislative
history of the 1964 amendments to §406 also fails to
supply the necessary evidence of congressional intent.
The House Report states that "[n]o additional expenditure
of Federal funds" was expected to be incurred by reason of
the enactment of the legislation.
H.R. Rep. No. 1292,
88th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1964).
A letter from the
Interior Department to the Congress urging enactment of
the legislation explained that the standards for timber
sales on allotted lands "should help allay disputes and
avoid misunderstand~g." S. Rep. No. 672, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess., 3 (1963) • L! ~ the Court at all is interested in
~~ furthering congresssional intent, it is difficult to see
~
how litigation over damages will do i ~

J

5.

suggest otherwise.
It ordinarily. may be correct that a statute vesting
an

individual or members of a designated class with an

absolute

right

administrative
action for

at

approval

receive

office

of

a

the

sum

the

400

event

of

(reserving

Mosca

(Ct .Cl. 1969)

United

v.

"leave [s]

v.

United

Monetary

237

question"
claimants

recovery may

upon such a claim for
damages."

render

an

grounds

61

an

the

question

States,

417

See

Testan,

and

citing

with

1382,

1386

F.2d

u.s.

424

u.s.

that
by

an

be

had

1,

911 (1970)): United
10

refunds

(1915)

are

to

against

(statute

be made

administrative

to

officer).

7

the United States

"actual, presently due money money

United States v. King, 395 U.S., at 3 ("' [T]he

only judgments which the Court of Claims
to

from

(statute must create a "right to recover a

Hvoslef,
no

particular

States

nonpayment.

certain sum"), cert. denied, 399
States

certain

the recovery of damages--or at least the sum

withheld--in
U.S.,

to

against

the government

[is]

are

money found due from the government to the
(quoting United States v. Alire,

73

u.s.

authorized

judgments

for

[claimant] '")
(6 Wall.)

573,

7

6.

575 (1867}}.

But again, the Court does not rest upon any

such statute or right. 6

~~dl<.
Instead, T he Court rests upon the novel proposition
t\

8

~
that statutes w.a4-eh do not in terms create any right to

payment of money nonetheless may support a damage action
against the United States.

.tp
in.Qe.e 6-

~~~~

'!'flat prnposi tion ia eliffictll-t

~
reconcile with thia

-t-{
~

1\

""'

and Mitchell I.

f-1.--<.
-e&I:H'b

'-s decisions in Testan
"'

A nonmonetary duty, 7 without more, harely

~~~k
~

overcomef

the omni ~ sent "presumption" that Congress has

6The Government concedes that, because the 1964
amendment to §406 provided for deduction of administrative
fees from timber sale proceeds "to the extent permissible
under [25 U.S.C. §413] ," an action to recover unlawfully
high administrative fees may be maintained against the
United States as one seeking recovery of "money improperly
exacted or retained." Testan, 424 u.s., at 401. And like
claims for excessive administration fees, respondents'
claim for deduction of roadbuilding fees also may be
maintainable on the theory that recovery of funds
unlawfully retained is sought.
Finally, the Government
concedes that failure to apply to the respondents' account
interest actually earned likely would give rise to a right
to redress in damages on the theory that respondents' fund
had been "wrongfully retained." Thus, to the extent that
the judgment of the Court of Claims would permit an action
to recover withheld fees and interest, the Government
apparently does not seek review, and I have no occasion to
decide the issue.
7Although not dispositive, the monetary character
of the statutory right is a strong indication that a
statute "in itself
can fairly be interpreted as
mandating compensation." By contrast, where, as here, the
duties imposed by a statute are not essentially monetary
in character, but require implementation through conduct
by federal officials, the contrary inference arises: that
Congress, by its silence as to a damages remedy, created
only a substantive right enforceable through injunctive
relief. See Testan, 424 u.s., at 401, n. 5, 403.

8

7.

not

consented

to

suit

Transportation Co.
I-t. is

(1927).

v.

al~o

for

See Eastern

money damages.

United States,

272

U.S.

675,

686

Court ~

d-iti-ici:IJ t to sqna.r..e witl:l Th is

~ ~~------AJ~~
case~ ~n

empl:lae4s in recent

congressional intent

ae~e

~

91

ultimate standard in determing whether a private right of
action should be inferred from a statute that does not, in
terms,

provide

instructive in
question
whether

is

for

such

action. 8

an

thilit---C ORtex ~

one

of

Those

cases

are

for here, too, the "ultimate

congressional

intent,

not

one

of

9~

this Court thinks that it can improve upon the

statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law."
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442

u.s.

Touche
As the

560, 578 (1979).

vv-L-,

recognized

~

in

Testan,

courts

are

not

free

to

1\

dispense with "established principles" requiring explicit
congressional

authorization

for

maintenance

of

suits

e. g., Jackson Transit Authority v. Transit
U.S. 15, 20-23 (1982); Middlesex County, 453
13-18; Texas Industries,
Inc. v. Radcliff
~~~~~~I~n~c~., 451 u.s. 630, 639-640 (1981); California
~----~C_lu_b_,
451 u.s. 287, 292-298 (1981); Northwest

C4~1-H-w-~~ ~~
~~~~~~~~
~ ~ ~ ~ 1/.1-~~~_,

10(

8.

against

the

United

thought

that

they

States
should

simply
be

"because

responsive

to

it
a

conception of enlightened governmental policy."
at 400. 9

~r

adduc~ A ~y ~vidence
anticipated

that

there

would

California v. Sierra Club, 451

be

u.s.

be

particular
424

u.s.,

~ he Court~
'\

See Shaw, 309 U.S., at 502.
S" /.. ?t.d)

might

a

that

Congress

private

remedy."

10~

287, 298 {1981).

Thus, it is clear that "[n]othing on the face" of any
of the statutes at issue, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
436

;-<:s-- c-aaRn

u.s.

49, 59 {1978), or in their legislative histories,

c.~J
"fairly be 1\ interpreted as mandating compensation" for

the conduct alleged by respondents.

Some of the statutes

involved here, to be sure, create substantive duties that

11(

9

the Secretary must
said

of

the

fulfill.

But

Classification

Act,

9f unambiguously

wAiefl

requires

1\

ratings of

federal

this

could

equally

considered

that

pay

in

0

be

11

Testan#

classification

employees be carried out pursuant to

the principle of "equal pay for substantially equal work."

5 U.S.C. §5101(1) (A).

Although Testan alleged a violation

12

of the Act, the Court concluded that a back pay remedy was

unavailable,
'ht
r1g

rejecting

.
necessarily

400-403.

the

~~tive

~
a damages

1~parts

The Court's conclusion

remedy.

424

in this case,

u.s.,

at

however,

; t Ae&l
rests largely upon its view that an injunctive remedy is

~
inadequate

to

redress

the

violations

alleged--precisely

the inference deemed inadmissible in Testan. 10

tl.b:uJ

lOM~~significant
~~a~l~l~-~~~~sedeat
is
the
Court's
remand
for
further
0
proceedings consistent with its opinion . . The compass has
no hands.
Given the strictness with which consents to
suit by the sovereign are to be construed, United States
v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590-591 (1941), where the
------------~s
~
t~
a~
t~
u~
te upon which liability is premised creates no right
to pay nt of a sum certain, the Court of Claims will be
~bliged
o determine the extent of liability, if any, and
· the it s of damages that are cognizable • wi tbont aJ,::J.y "<1
;
Q.gis1atiJz.e --9.lli~.
This task, unlike the factual or
-~A/A~~~ egal determination whether a particular individual falls
~.,- ~.,...,-- i thin a class granted a right to payment of money by a
~ ~ statute, is not one to which courts are adapted.
Any
1
f -rules
established will
be of
"judicial cloth,
not
legislative cloth." See Weinberger v. Catholic Action of
Hawaii, 454 u.s. 139, 141 (1981). I assume, however, that
the law of trusts generally will control and that all
defenses to actions on breaches of trust, such as consent
by the beneficiary and laches, will be fully available to
Footnote continued on next page.

12

10.

It is the ordinary result of sovereign immunity that
unconsented claims for money damages are barred.
that

damages

sovereign's consent

cannot

be

recovered

~
~
R&t support the

~Q.oes

~I
COnSent has been given.

1

LAA,...-

The fact

without

the

13

conclusion that

~/

Yet the Court's reasoning

"

Js-

,_,_

RO

m~ wai~hty ~~at. If J ~s~~~~r{g
,1'

I

~~riA-~~
~ that

~

~

a remedy is necessary to redress'\ injury sustained,

~~~
the doctrine of sovereign immunity~wotlld be tob~d -ef --all -

13

~#-/~~'·
effec~.

Moreover, "many of the federal statutes ••• that

expressly provide money damages as a remedy against the
United States in carefully limited circumstances would be
rendered superfluous."

Testan, 424 U.S., at 404.

14

prece<!etrt.

Q
·~
;/-;~
,
.
-f
h
There "i'S no exam1nat1on o t e language and

1\

the legislative history of the statutes held to give rise

14

11.

to

monetary

liability, to

...w-Rether

get9rmi&:~.e

Congres~

~

inteReea to

~e

Court's

sentence:
in

"Because the statutes and regulations at issue

15(

this case clearly establish fiduciary obligations of

the Government in the management and operation of Indian
lands

and

resources,

mandating

they can fairly

compensation

by

the

be

Federal

interpreted
Government

as
for

~
damages sustained."

~

Ante, at 20.

T~

rests on two dubious assumptions.

decides

that

fiduciary

the

statutes

duties.

The

p!'ose9ds

conclusion

15~

'Phe Ceurt; h rst, ,;/

create

Court

A

or

recognize
~

reaso ~

to

that

because a private express trust normally imports a right
to

recover

Congress

;

necessarily

damages for
I - have

damages

for

breach,

must

have

and

because

authorized

injunctive

recovery

16!

of

r.-- ~A ~>~ ~
=fe:£!!r~erf0rmancf ~ the statutory duties.

-t-l:'o\f"b.l.e--~m~

-rhe

relevancy of

the

first

~~~/~

conclusio~ , ~ thh1~ the second is simply wrong.

The Court
~npulsion

be

;:1<:.:: ~~ ~!;:;' 11r
p't"'educe .,...

&fty

evidence

that

the

statutory

16~

77'

12.

.t.be
duties Congress imposed 9¥ enae 4!: l. R g
~

at ieetle were intended to impose

?t.ur-do

A of

the

.

. .

var1~ ~ov1ero~

~~
~

.

duties.

¥et none

~

timber

sale

management

or

upon

statutes

which

17(

~

respondents rely makf ' any reference wn~oeve-r to trust
duties.

Rather, the Court simply holds that the statutes

here "clearly establish fiduciary obligations."
20.

See

also

id.,

at

necessarily arises").

("a

19

fiduciary

relationship

J(CrJ

I--..ac;L<m
~~afHou
..........a.-.Ei-0

AKh ere

Ante, at

is kind of a

175

bootstrap quality of reasoning in saying that [the United
States'] duties expressed by law are those of a trustee,
and,

therefore,

we may look at Scott on Trusts or

the

Restatement of Trusts and impose on [the Government] all
the

other

consequences

authorities,

derives

the
from

nongovernmental trustee."

.,

d~dy

--1-

that 4!!-1te 1 ederal

the

as

stated

status

-"'\

~

an

those

180

erring

(Nichols, J.,

-f'or Indians overlooks

tae

-fcrct

.

over Indian lands is so different

in nature and origin from that of a private

l:ilSi~

the

~~~~~
reaeins ef Scott on Trusts

to

cautionj is warranted/\ i"i'l

by

'l"ft.Q.._Conrt in its eagerness to

~~
~r

of

664 F.2d, at 283

concurring and dissenting).
create a

law,

-me~>e

1 aheJ

impose

trus~

that

"tru&t" and a-

liability

where

18~

13.

~~

~~~~~~
.

d.

~

trusteeship to which the Court has
.tl

Ibid.

11J1'The

referred in the past

ha~manifested

more the view that pervasive control over

Indian

is

life

such

a

high

attribute

of

federal

sovereignty that states cannot infringe upon that control.
Ibid. 12

~

The Cou~ ~

~ft.Je

ll"There
a
number
of
widely
varying
relationships
more or less closely resemble trusts,
but which are not trusts, although the term 1 trust 1 is
sometimes used loosely to cover such relationships. It is
important
to differentiate
trusts
from
these
other
relationships, since many of the rules applicable to
trusts are not applicable to them." Restatement {Second)
of Trusts §4, at 15 {1959). For example, the Court often
has described the fiduciary relationship between the
United States and Indians as one between a guardian and a
ward.
But "[a] guardianship is not a trust."
Id., §8.
There is no explanation, however, why the Court--chooses
one analogy and not another.
I can only conclude that the
choice was influenced by the fact that "[t]he duties of a
trustee are more intensive than the duties of other
fiduciaries." Id., §2, comment b.
The Court-asserts that "[a]ll of the necessary
elements of a common-law trust are present"--a trustee, a
beneficiary, and a trust corpus.
Ante, at 19.
But
~ two persons and a parcel of real property, without
more, do not create a trust.
Rather, "[a] trust
arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to
create it."
Id., §2.
See id., §23 {"A trust is created
only if the settlor properry-manifests an intention to
create a trust."); id., §25 {"No trust is created unless
the settlor manifest"S an intention to impose enforceable
duties.").
This is the element that is missing in this
case, and the Court does not, and cannot, find that
Congress has manifested its intent to make the statutory
duties upon which respondents rely trust duties. Cf. id.,
§95 {"The United States ••• has capacity to take and hold
property in trust, but in the absence of a statute
otherwise providing the trust is unenforceable against the
United
States
•.•• ").
Futhermore,
a
trustee
can
"reserv [ e] powers with respect to the administration of
the trust." Id., §37. Unless the United States agrees to
be held liable 1n damages, I der~ ~ae ho~
~ the existence
of a trust automatiG~Y means that the Gove nment ~as ROt
~d
ts immunity from damages.
~
Footnote{s) 12 will appear on following pages.

191

14.

sword.

It

Indian
than
Ibid.
15

is I'ft&i!e

lands

it

is

~
that mismanagement

-thii-R- a.c~\:labl-e
1\

r

more

analogous

of

19

to misgovernment

is to the misfeasance of a h fstamenLMy trust.

Cf. Nevada v. United States,

{1983)

U.S • __, __ , n.

{breach of fiduciary duty to Indians "reflects

the nature of a democratic government that is charged with

12 The

Court has invoked the fiduciary relation
primarily {i) to preclude unauthorized state interference
in the relations between the United States and the Indian
tribes
or
other
unauthorized
exercise
of
state
jurisdiction on Indian lands, see e. g., United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382-384 {1886); {ii) to bar or
nullify exercises of state court jurisdiction in matters
affecting Indian property rights, in which the United
States was not properly joined or represented, see, e. g.,
Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 386 {1939);
United States v. Candelaria, 271 u.s. 432, 442 {1926);
{iii) to interpret doubtful or ambiguous treaty language
in favor of the Indians, see, e. g., United States v.
Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 117-118 {1938); Minnesota v.
Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 396 {1902); {iv) to limit the
liability of the United States for damages under the Just
Compensation Clause where, acting as a fiduciary manager,
it has converted the form of Indian property, see, e. g.,
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 u.s. 371,
415-416 {1980); cf. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 u.s. 553,
568 {1903); and {v) to emphasize the high standard of care
that the United States is obliged to exercise in carrying
out its duties respecting the Indians, see, e. g., United
States v. Mason, 412 u.s. 391, 398 {1973); Seminole Nation
v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-297 {1942). But the
Court has never, until today, invoked the doctrine to
.auggeat that the United States is answerable in money
damages for breaches of the standards applicable to a
p r iva t e f i d u cia r •
Tli
ur t a
eM-l-v.---'t'-e-a-:l:-h~r----.tlh'!:t
act, an
a es that the existence of
relationship between the United States
people merely "reinforces"
its
nstruction of
statutes upon which the Indi
specifically rely. There
is no indication in the~ urt's opinion, however, why this
special relationship----should "reinforce" its conclusio
at there are implied private rights of action. While I
agree with the Court that the doctrine alone cannot groun
ny righ
of action for damages, I disagree with th
ourt'
assumption that the doctrine remains relevant t
Inquiry.

201

15.

more

than one

responsibility"} .

In my view,

the

Court

today substantially retreats from JUSTICE BLACKMUN's words
for

the Court in Army

&

Air Force, where we "explicitly

1\
rejected the argument that

'the violation of any statute

or regulation relating to federal employment automatically

20 1

creates a cause of action against the United States for
U.S.,

at 739

(quoting Testan,

money damages. ' "

456

u.s.,

would have thought the issue

at 401}.
remains

respondent's
themselves,

But
duties
mere

one

of

congressional

claims must

and
21

stand or

not on some judicially implied or recogni

more

remarkable

than

from statutory duties
existence

establishes

intent

424

that

of

a

trust

Congress

has

the

implication

of

trust

is the conclusion that the
of

some

kind

necessarily

~[~
to recovery

consented

of

13 I do not suggest that an express declaration of
trust embodied in a statute is without . bearing in our
inquiry. But such an explicit declaration of trust simply
is to be considered along with all other evidence of
legislative
intent,
including, most
importantly,
the
language of the statute itself, in determining whether
Congress has made the United States accountable in money
damages for a statutory violation. And any such factor is
irrelevant in this case, for there is no such declaration
of trust, and the Court does not suggest otherwise.

21

16.

damages.

We apparently are to accept the existence of a

cause of action for damages on faith: "Given the existence
of

a

trust

relationship,

it

naturally

follows

that

the

Government should be liable in damages for the breach of
its fiduciary duties."

Ante, at 20 (emphasis added).

22(

See

also id., at 20 (damages are a "fundamental incident" of a
trust relationship};
find

a

damages

support for
in

id.

(it would be "anomalous" not to

remedy).

The

Court

can

find

no

more

this proposition than the dissenting opinion

Mitchell
why

I.
it

See
is

ante,

at

especially

21.14

proper

The
to

22~

Court

infer

a

trust

rise to ~en~ ry liabilities in the absence of any
indication

that

Congress

has

consented

to

opinion, the Court has
effectively

reversed

Transportation, 272
statutory

the

u.s.,

authority,"

"presumption,"

Eastern

at 686, that absent "affirmative

United

States

v.

United

States

14 The Court tries to get support out of Seminole
Nation v. United States, supra, and United States v. Creek
Nation, 295 u.s. 103 (1935), but both actually cut against
the Court's theory in this case.
The Court's discussion
of the Government's fiduciary duty in Seminole Nation
referred
to
a
claim
to
compel
payments
expressly
prescribed by Treaty.
See 316 U.S., at 296-297.
Creek
Nation involved a taking claim.

23(

17.

Fidelity
Shaw,

Guaranty Co.,

&

309

u.s.

309

506,

514

(1940);

see

u.s.,

at

u.s.,

at 41 ("only by permission"), the United

Munro, 303

("specific

500

statutory consent");

States has not consented to be sued.

It has substituted a

contrary

the

presumption,

applicable

United States

in Indian af £.J.rs,

has

to

consented

other

be

departures

sued

from

for

the

to

conduct

of

23~

the

that the United States

statutory

rules

that

violations
govern

and

24(

private

fiduciaries.
I do not believe that the fact that respondents are
Indians

should

determine

alter

whether

United States

the

damages

for

analysis
may

recovered

statutory violations.

availability of money damages
situated

be

through

So

is concerned,

which

courts

against
far

as

the
the

Indians are

no differently than any other claimant against

the United States.

It simply does not follow that, merely

because Congress has authorized the Secretary to act in
Indian

24~

affairs,

every

act

of

Congress

constitutes

the

"affirmative statutory authority" necessary to maintain an
action for damages.
unequivocal

On the contrary, the requirement of

congressional

consent

to

suit

against

the

25(

18.

United
See,

e.

States
q. ,

is

fully

Klamath

applicable

Indians v.

to

Indian

claimants.

United States,

25~

296 U.S.

244, 250 (1935); id., at 254-255 ("Regard being had to the
nature

of

duties,

resembling

those

arising

out

of

the

relation of guardian and ward, owed by the United States
to Indian tribes,

. • • it is clear that, in the absence of

specific authorization,
payment was too small.")
v.

United States,

case,

the

invoked
mandating
against

itself

United

basis

for

368,

whether
can

compensation."

the

statutory

is

[complain]

that the

(footnote omitted); Blackfeather

190 U.S.

question

"in

they may not

26t

(1903) • 15

In each

the

particular

statute

fairly

Indians,

States,
their

376

must

be

like
be

claims.

interpreted
other

able
There

to

as

claimants
identify

has

been

a
no

attempt here.

15 Indeed, if the fact that respondents are Indians
has any bearing on the question whether the statutes upon
which the Court relies implicitly grant the right to
recover damages against the United States, it must be the
accompanying fact that the prevailing legal regime at the
time most of the statues now invoked were adopted
generally deprived Indian claimants of any monetary remedy
against the United States.
Until 1946, the Court of
Claims could not have even entertained these claims absent
a special jurisdictional act.
Ante, at 8.
Thus, it is
most unlikely that Congress intended to create a right to
recover damages against the United States in 1910 by
enacting §407, in 1928 by enacting §318a, in 1934 by
enacting §466, and in 1938 by enacting §162a.

26~

On

occasion

theoretical
action.

to

cases
play

have

of

the
implying

pract ·

This case

~

~most

and

I

.in-w~~~~~~QYLL~~~~~ewQQ~~~~~~~~n

le<Jis.l.ature ,,

I

continue

that

Court's willingness to imply causes
necessary

to

further

perceived

not only "political default
in

the

governmental

judiciary."
677'

Cannon

743-744

f

powe
v.

27!

action it sees as
policy encourages

ongress," but "an increase
exercised

niversit
OWELL,

(1979)

the

J.,

of

by

the

Chica o,

dissenting).

federal
441

U.S.

281

Any such

self-made expansion of our jurisdiction "runs contrary to
the established
federal cour

rinciple that '[t]he jurisdiction of the
is carefully guarded against expansion by

.. . ,

judicial i terpretation

u.s.

Finn,

6,

17

American Fire & Cas. Co. v •

(1951),

and

conflicts

with

the

auth rity of Congress under Art. III to set the limits of
eral jurisdiction."
The
Congress

Court

has

actually

Cannon, 441 U.S., at 747.

not

endeavored

intended

to

to

render

demonstrate
the

that

United States

29

20.

answerable
here.

in damages

upon claims of the kind presented

Nor did the Court of Claims.

As would have Judge

Davis,
"I would hold that the mere application of a
trust label to certain governmental functions
respecting Indians, whether applied expressly by
Congress
or
by
judicial
wish-fulfillment
inference
from
the statutory imposition of
trustee-like duties on the executive branch,
does not constitute unequivocal assent to suits
against the government for money damages when
these duties are badly performed.
It does not
bring into play all that Scott on Trusts
thunders against an erring testamentary trustee.
Something
more
is
required,
such
as
the
expressed duty to pay over money •.•• " 664 F.2d,
at 284.

29~

30(

30~

~-q~r-~~
J
ru~y~~
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SECOND DRAFT: United States v. Mitchell, No. 81-1748
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The controlling law in this case is clear.

Speaking

for the Court in United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S.

535

(1980)

(Mitchell

the

general

principle

I),

JUSTICE

that

a

MARSHALL

cause

of

reaffirmed

action

for

damages

against the United States "'cannot be implied but must be
unequivocally expressed.'"
States v. King, 395
v. Hopkins, 427

u.s.

u.s.

Id.,

at

538

1, 4 (1969)).

123, 128 (1976)

U.S.

Where,

156,

170

as here,

(1981)

See United States

("specific command of

statute or authorized regulations") ;
453

(quoting United

Lehman v.

(BRENNAN,

1

Nakshian,

J.,

dissenting).

a claim for money damages

is predicated

upon an alleged statutory violation, the rule is that the
statute

does

unless

the

interpreted

not

statute
as

Government for
Testan,

create

a

"'in

mandating

cause

of

action

itself

can

compensation

the damage sustained.'"

424 U.S.

392,

402

(1976)

by

for

damages

fairly
the

be

Federal

United States v.

(quoting Eastport S.S.

Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1008-1009 (Ct. Cl.
1967)).

See,~~'

1

Army & Air Force Exchange Service v.

2

-2.

Sheehan, 456 U.S. 728, 739-7 40 (1982)

( "Testan [held] that

the Tucker Act provides a remedy only where damages claims
against

the

explicitly")
available

United

States

where

action

premised

authorized

been

(emphasis added); id., at 739 (damages remedy
the

regulations

awards of money damages");
an

have

for
upon

damages

id., at 741

under

which

1

authorize

(reaffirming that

the Tucker Act may

"regulations

authorize damages awards" )

"specifically

2

do

not

not

be

explicitly

it'

In s urn, whether the United

3

States has created a cause of action turns upon the intent
of

Congress,

not

the

inclinations

of

the

courts.

United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 500 (1940)

See

("specific

statutory consent"); Munro v. United States, 303 U.S. 36,
41 (1938)

("only by permission").

3

Today, the Court appears disinterested in the intent

J;of

tAe

Congress.

Court

has

effectively

-"\
reversed

the

statutory

authority,"

Fidelity

&

presumption
United

Guaranty Co.,

309

that

absent

States

u.s.

v.

506,

"affirmative
United

514

States

(1940),

the

United States has not consented to be sued for damages.
It has substituted a contrary presumption, applicable to

4

3.

the conduct of the United States in Indian affairs, that
the United States has consented to be sued for statutory
violations and other departures from the rules that govern
private

I;zs

fiduciaries.

dissent

from

4~

the Court's

departure from long-settled principles.
I

The Court does not--and clearly cannot--contend that
any of the statutes standing alone reflects the necessary

t:UL~v(,

legislative maRdate

1\

tar

a

damages

remedy.

None

of

5C

the

statutes contains any "provision ••• that expressly makes
the United States liable" for its alleged mismanagement of
Indian

forest

resources

and

their

right of action "with specificity."
399,
25

400.

U.S.C.

Indeed,
§§406,

proceeds or

grants

a

Testan, 424 u.s., at

nothing in the timber-sales statutes,
407, 1

466, 2

the

road

and

right-of-way

{J-~~
1 The only monetary obligation imposed upon the
Secretary by §406 or §407
the actual "proceeds"
of timber sales to the owne s of the land. Thus, while it
r..---:m
=-a::-:y;:--'1 be that those sectio s would permit an action to
compel the Secretary to eie~o~~e unlawfully retained
proceeds, see United States v. Testan, 424 u.S. 392, 401
~
(1976
no statutory basis exists for extending that
1
,~k remed
that arguably or ideally should have
~ een,
but were no , oap~!'-eO by the Secretary.
On the
contrary, the statutory recognition of a right to receive
the "proceeds" of sales conducted suggests that this is
the limit of any damages action implicitly authorized by
Congress.
See Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v.
Footnote continued on next page.
Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages.

r·

J

5~

4.
-;•

statutes,
§162a, 4

§§318a,
addresses

323-325, 3
in

any

or

the

respect

interest
the

statute,

institution

damages actions against the United States.

of

Nor is there

any indication in the legislative history of the statutes
that Congress intended to consent to damages actions for
mismanagement
provisions. 5

of

Indian

assets

by

enacting

these

The Court does not suggest otherwise.

National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 u.s. 1, 14-15' 20-21
( 1981) • Cf. United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 u.s. 201,
208 (1982)
0

2 section 466 merely requires the Secretary to "make
rules and regulations for the operation and management of
Indian forestry units on the principle of sustained-yield
management."
3 section 318a ~ authorizes the appropriation
of funds for building of roads on Indian reservations. It
would be a radical change in the law of sovereign immunity
to hold that a routine authorization statute allows
individuals who might benefit from appropriations to bring
an action to recover damages. And although §325 requires
"the payment of such compensation as the Secretary of the
Interior shall determine to be just," it does not follow
that
damages
for
failure
to
secure
more
generous
compensation
are
available.
Indeed,
the
explicit
statutory recognition of the Secretary's authority to
determine the amount of compensation militates against any
damages
remedy
for
insufficient
compensation.
See
Plumbers & Pipefitters v. Plumbers & Pipefitters, 452 u.s.
615, 630 (1981) (BURGER, C.J., dissenting).
4section 162a affords the Secretary substantial
discretion
respecting
investments
to
be
made
with
individual Indian funds.
There is nothing in the statute
that requires payment of a particular rate of interest,
much less that makes the United States accountable in
damages for any amount by which the revenues earned fall
short of a standard of "reasonable management zeal to get
for the Indians the best rate."
Mitchell v. United
States, 664 F.2d 265, 274 (Ct. Cl. 1981).

~ a:Uy

5It is
improbable that Congress intended
§406 to constitute consent to monetary liability for
forestry mismanagement on allotted lands, because, at the
Footnote continued on next page.
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5.

The Court for the most part rests its decision on the
I~
.
no~e
propos1. t 1on

1\

~

th a t

s t a t u t es

th a t

do

no t

.
1n

65

t erms

create a right to payment of money nonetheless may support
a

damage

action

against

the

United

States.

This

view

~AI~

~ be reconciled with the decisions in Testan and
.1\

Mitchell

I.

A

nonmonetary

insufficient to overcome the

duty, 6

without

"presumption"

(1927)

·11

v.

United

States,

272

is

that Congress

has not consented to suit for money damages.
Transportation Co.

more,

See Eastern

U.S.

675,

686

#

This Court has had occasion in recent cases to

time in question, it appears the Government maintained the
position that heavily forested lands were not to be
allotted.
See United States v. Payne, 264 u.s. 446, 449
(1924).
And
before
1964,
§406 was
a
rather
bare
instrument, simply giving an Indian permission to sell his
timber with the Secretary's permission. See ante, at 1314.
The legislative history of the 1964 amendments to
§406, see ante, at 16, also fails to supply the necessary
evidence of congressional intent. The House Report states
that "[n] o addi tiona! expenditure of Federal funds" was
expected to be incurred by reason of the enactment of the
legislation.
H.R. Rep. No. 1292, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1964).
A letter from the Interior Department to the
Congress urging enactment of the legislation explained
only that the standards for timber sales on allotted lands
"should help allay disputes and avoid misunderstanding."
s. Rep. No. 672, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1963).
6Although not dis~ositive, the monetary character
of the statutory right is a strong indication that a
statute "in itself
can fairly be interpreted as
mandating compensation." By contrast, where, as here, the
duties imposed by a statute are not essentially monetary
in character, but require implementation through conduct
by federal officials, the contrary inference arises: that
Congress, by its silence as to a damages remedy, created
only a substantive right enforceable through injunctive
relief. See Testan, 424 u.s., at 401, n. 5, 403.

70

6.

emphasize
standard

that

congressional

intent

in determing whether

is

the

ultimate

7

a private right of action

should be inferred from a statute that does not, in terms,
provide for such an action. 7
for

here,

too,

the

Those cases are instructive,

"ultimate

question

is

one

of

congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks
that

it

Congress

can

improve

enacted

upon

into

the

law."

statutory
Touche

Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979).

scheme

Ross

& Co.

8

that
v.

As we recognized in

Testan, courts are not free to dispense with "established
principles" requiring explicit congressional authorization

8

for maintenance of suits against the United States simply
"because
responsive

it

might
to

a

thought

particular

governmental policy."
U.S., at 502.

be

that

they

conception

424 U.S.,

at 400.

of

should

be

enlightened

See Shaw,

309

The Court today adduces no "evidence that

7see, ~ ..<l!_, Jackson Transit Authority v. Transit
Union, 457 U.S. 15, 20-23 (1982); Middlesex Count~, 453
U.S., at 13-18; Texas Industries,
Inc. v. Ra cliff
Materials, Inc., 451 u.s. 630, 639-640 (1981); California
v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 292-298 (1981); Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 91-95
(1981); Universities Research Assn., Inc. v. Coutu, 450
U.S. 754, 770-784 (1981); Transamer ica Mortgage Advisors,
Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-24 (1979) •
Against the
background of sovereign immunity, the rationale of these
cases should apply here with particular force.

9

7.

Congress

anticipated

remedy."

California

that
v.

there

would

Sierra Club,

be

a

private

451 U.S.

287,

298

(1981).
The Court defends

its departure from our precedents

on the ground that the statutes and regulations upon which
respondents

rely

need

not

be

"construed

in

the

appropriate to waivers of sovereign immunity."

v v
v

v

9

manner

Ante, at

~~-- 1,/L..~ ~)
The Court AtG6ay must b~ overruling Mitchell I, for as
/.A(;.

12.

-tt;:;..

the

Cou?t~

ante, at 10-13,
the

o~ the

discussion

th~re

1\

Tucker Act makes clear, see

t~RhJ~re {;;e:) "accepted

i:s no dottbt
claim

government's

that

a

strict

standard

10

of

construction, applicable to deciding whether Congress had
enacted a waiver of sovereign immunity, should be applied
in interpreting substantive legislation for the benefit of
Indian people."

Hughes, Can the Trustee be Sued for its

10

Breach? The Sad Saga of United States v. Mitchell, 26 S.D.
L.

Rev.

447,

473

General Allotment Act
unambiguously

We

(1981).

provide

at

issue
that

expressly

held

in Mitchell
the

United

undertaken full fiduciary responsibilities."
542

(emphasis

added) •

Cf.

Army

& Air

I

that

the

"does

not

States
445

Force

u.s.,

has
at

Exchange

11

·.
8.

Service

v.

reject[ing]

Sheehan,
the

u.s.,

456

argument

that

at

("explicitly

739

'the

violation

of

any

statute or regulation ••• automatically creates a cause of
action

against

(quoting

the

Testan,

United

424

States

for

money

u.s., at 401).

damages'")

11

~ ~ to

co!lQl_udcs that e-i-tfl.er .:rh--e- €eurt ges i.a ee= to -Foe

Mi~l. I

"unambiguously" imposing trust duties on the Government.

?
clarity of
implied dama es suits
Court makes
doctrine

little or no pretense that

th4s

8etu··L_~ ore

~...?:~~

~ ~ j a.Aal.¥Si&

-soneh:t.s-

~t~~;
1\c@ftel:u.&er:s.f sent.e.n.ee:
at

issue

obligations

in
of

this
the

..a-s

it is following

established

d't''

'ggt4~;

e-ss-eft:EiaB:: y

of

a

&iAgle

"Because the statutes and regulations
case

clearly

Government

in

establish
the

fiduciary

management

and

operation of Indian lands and resources, they can fairly
be

12

interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal

13

9.

Government for damages sustained."

Ante, at 19-20.

conclusion rests on two dubious assumptions.
Court

decides

that

fiduciary duties.

the

statutes

create

This

First, the

or

recognize

13

It then reasons that because a private

express trust normally imports a right to recover damages
for breach, and because injunctive relief is perceived to
be inadequate, Congress necessarily must have authorized
recovery of damages
statutory duties.
is

for

failure properly to perform the

14

The relevancy of the first conclusion

questionable,

and

the

other

from

departs

our

precedents, chiefly Testan and Mitchell I.

here "clearly establish fiduciary obligations."
20.

See

also

id.,

at

necessarily arises").

¢

19

I

("a

fiduciary

Ante, at

14

relationship

t:&:szzv;u(u~

agree with

the

dissent

in

the

t of Claims that "there is kind of a bootstrap quality
of

reasoning

in saying

that

[the United States']

duties

expressed by law are those of a trustee, and, therefore,
we

may

TRUSTS

look
and

consequences

at

SCOTT

impose
the

on

law,

ON

TRUSTS

[the
as

or

the

Government]

stated

by

RESTATEMENT
all

those

the

15

OF

other

authorities,

-.•

·~·

10.

derives
trustee."
(Ct. Cl.

from

the

Mitchell
1981)

status
v.

of

an

erring

United States,

nongovernmental

664

F. 2d,

at

283

155

(Nichols, J., concurring and dissenting).

"The federal power over Indian lands is so different in
nature and origin from that of a private trustee ••• that
caution is taught in using the mere label of a trust plus
a reading of SCOTT ON TRUSTS to impose liability on claims
where assent is not unequivocally expressed."

Ibid. 8

The

8 "There
are
a
of
widely
varying
relationships which more or 1 ss closely resemble trusts,
but which are not trusts, al hough the term 1 trust 1 is
sometimes used loosely to cove such relationships. It is
important
to differentiate
trusts
from
these
other
relationships, since many o
the rules applicable to
trusts are not applicable to
Restatement (Second)
of Trusts §4, Introductory
ote, at 15 (1959).
For
example, the Court often ha
described the fiduciary
relationship between the Unite States and Indians as one
between a guardian and a ward.
But "[a] guardianship is
not a trust." Id., §7. There s no explanation, however,
why the Court chooses one anal gy and not another. ~:r- cana-oH±~~ eRat lbe choice
influenced by the fact
that "[t] he duties of a trustee are more intensive than
the duties of other fiduciaries." Id., §2, comment b.
The Court asserts that "[aTir of the necessary
elements of a common-law trust are present"--a trustee, a
beneficiary, and a trust corpus.
Ante, at 19.
But two
persons and a parcel of real property, without more, do
not create a trust.
Rather, "[a] trust •.• arises as a
result of a manifestation of an intention to create it."
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §2.
See id., §23 ("A
trust is created only if the settlor properly manifests an
intention to create a trust."); id., §25 ("No trust is
created unless the settlor manifests an intention to
impose enforceable duties."). This is the element that is
missing in this case, and the Court does not, and cannot,
find that Congress has manifested its intent to make the
statutory duties upon which respondents rely trust duties.
Cf. id., §95.
Indeed, given the language of the statute
at issue in Mitchell I, the case for finding that Congress
intended to impose fiduciary obligations on the United
States was much stronger than it is here. See 445 u.s. at
547 (WHITE, J., dissenting). One of the authorities cited
Footnote continued on next page.
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11.

trusteeships to which the Court has referred in the past
have manifested more the view that pervasive control over
Indian

life

is

such

a

high

attribute

of

federal

sovereignty that States cannot infringe upon that control.
Ibid. 9

The Court today turns this shield into a sword.

In my view, it is clear that "[n]othing on the face"
of

any of

the

statutes at

issue,

Santa Clara Pueblo v.

by JUSTICE WHITE, A. Scott, Law of Trusts §95 (1967),
specifically discusses the General Allotment Act as an
example of the United States acting as a trustee.
Furthermore, a trustee can "reserv[e] powers with respect
to the administration of the trust."
Id., §37.
Unless
the United States agrees to be held liable in damages,
, 11 . L even the existence of a trust does not necessarily ~
AA .~I\ that
the Government has surrendered its immunity from
__vv
damages.
9The
Court
has
invoked
the
fiduciary
relation
primarily (i) to preclude unauthorized state interference
in the relations between the United States and the Indian
tribes
or
other
unauthorized
exercise
of
state
jurisdiction on Indian lands, see~~, United States v.
Kagama, 118 u.s. 375, 382-384 (1886) ~ (11) to bar or
nullify exercises of state court jurisdiction in matters
affecting Indian property rights, in which the United
States was not properly joined or represented, see,~~,
Minnesota v. United States, 305 u.s. 382, 386 (1939) ~
United States v. Candelaria, 271 u.s. 432, 442-444 (1926) ~
(iii) to interpret doubtful or ambiguous treaty language
in favor of the Indians, see, ~ ~, United States v.
Shoshone Tribe, 304 u.s. 111, 117-118 (1938) ~ Minnesota v.
H1tchcock, 185 u.s. 373, 396 (1902) ~ (iv) to determ1ne the
liability of the United States for damages under the Just
Compensation Clause where, acting as a fiduciary manager,
it has converted the form of Indian property, see,~~,
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 u.S. 371,
415-416 (1980)~ and (v) to emphasize the high standard of
care that the United States is obliged to exercise in
carrying out its duties respecting the Indians, see, e.
~, United States v. Mason, 412 u.s. 391, 398
(1973T'i""
Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-297
(1942). But the Court has never, until today, invoked the
doctrine to hold that the United States is answerable in
money damages for breaches of the standards applicable to
a private fiduciary.

16!

12.

Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978), or in their legislative
histories,

"fairly

compensation"
Some of

the

[can]

for

the

statutes

be

interpreted

conduct

alleged

involved here,

as

by

mandating

respondents.

to be sure,

create

substantive duties that the Secretary must fulfill.
this

could

equally

be

considered in Testan.
ratings of

federal

said

of

the

But

Classification Act,

It requires that pay classification

employees

17(

17!

be carried out pursuant to

"the principle of equal pay for substantially equal work."
5

u.s.c.

§510l(l)(A).

Although the

federal

employee

in

Testan alleged a violation of the Act, the Court concluded
that

a

back

pay

remedy

was

unavailable,

rejecting

the

18(

argument that the substantive right necessarily implies a
damages remedy.

424 U.S., at 400-403.

Ignoring this holding in Testan, the Court concludes
that

the

mere

existence

of

a

trust

of

some

kind

necessarily establishes that Congress has consented to a
of

w:-a~~~ ~
dama~es

on

"Given the existence of a trust relationship, it naturally
follows

that

the Government

should be liable

in damages

18!

13.

for

the

breach

(emphasis

of

its

added) •

fiduciary

See

also

duties."

Ante,

(damages

ibid.

at

20

are

a

"fundamental incident" of a trust relationship); ibid.

(it

would be "anomalous" not to find a damages remedy).

The

19

Court can find no more support for this proposition than
the dissenting opinion in Mitchell I.

1\

{te

that

an

See ante, at 21. 10

19

';,t:s:=l::: :::;:-;_u~+':n~ ~
injunctive

remedy

is

inadequate

1%e 6&,1JI.e=ccA¢ ' ·•
violations
inadmissible

alleged--precisely
.b-

in Testan.ll

It

the

to

redress

the

""' ,

inference

deemed

is the ordinary result of
~

~

QofA~minole

lOThe Court _A
r s upp rt out
Nation v. United States, supra, and U ited States v. Creek
Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1935), but both actually cut against
the Court's theory in this case.
The Q ; 'L 'ediscussion ~
of the Government's fiduciary duty in Seminole Nation
referred
to
a
claim
to
compel
payments
expressly
prescribed by Treaty.
See 316 U.S., at 296-297.
Creek
Nation involved a taking claim.
11Also
significant
is
the
Court's
standardless
remand
for
further
proceedings
consistent with
its
op1n1on. Given the strictness with which consents to suit
by the sovereign are to be construed, United States v.
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590-591 (1941), where the statute
upon which liability is premised creates no right to
payment of a sum certain, the Court of Claims will be
required, without legislative guidance, to determine the
extent of liability, if any, and the items of damages that
are cognizable.
This task, unlike the factual or legal
determination whether a particular individual falls within
a class granted a right to payment of money by a statute,
is not one to which courts are adapted.
Any rules
established will be of "judicial cloth, not legislative
cloth." Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 454 u.s.
139, 141 (1981).
I assume, however, that the law of
trusts generally will control and that all defenses to
actions on breaches of trust, such as consent by the
beneficiary and laches, will be fully available to the
United States. Cf. 664 F.2d, at 274.

..-

14.

sovereign
damages

immunity

are

that

barred.

unconsented

The

fact

that

claims

for

money

damages

cannot

20

be

recovered without the sovereign's consent hardly supports
the conclusion that consent has been given.
substance,

is

the

Court's

If

reasoning.

Yet this, in

d-

tJre eotHt

-<I

is

saying that a remedy is necessary to redress every injury
sustained,
been

the doctrine of sovereign

drained

of

all

meaning.

';>0

immunity will have

Moreover,

"many

of

the

federal statutes ••. that expressly provide money damages
as a remedy against the United States in carefully limited
circumstances would be rendered superfluous."

u.s.,

Testan, 424

21

at 404.
--Hr

TV

7

._____,

The

Court

Congress
answerable

has

I

~~;E-Q~monstrate
intended

in damages

to

render

the

that

United States

upon claims of the kind presented

21

4A-~

here.

not

I ~hiRk:-the mere application of the label "trust"

1

constitute

United

damages

when
would

these

22

15.

judgment of the Court of Claims.

.
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1

Nflt

FIRST DRAFT: United States v. Mitchell, No. 81-1748
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
Speaking for the

The controlling law in this case is clear.
Court in United States v. Mitchell,

l> ,. JUSTICE

u.s.

445

{1980}

535

{Mitchell

MARSHALL reaffirmed the general principle that a cause

of action for damages against the United States "'cannot be implied
but must be unequivocally expressed.'"
States

v.

Hopkins,

King,

authorized
{1981}

u.s.

427

u.s.

395

1,

123, 128

regulations"};

4

Id., at 538 {quoting United

{1969}}.

{1976}

See

United

States

v.

{"specific command of statute or

Lehman

v.

{BRENNAN, J., dissenting}.

Nakshian,

u.s.

453

156,

170

Where, as here, a claim for money

damages is predicated upon an alleged statutory violation, the rule
is that the statute does not create a cause of action for damages
unless

the

mandating

statute

"'in

compensation

sustained. '"

United

itself
by

the

States

v.

can
Federal

fairly

be

Government

Test an,

424

U.S.

interpreted

as

for

the

damage

392,

40 2

{1976}

{quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 10081009 {Ct. Cl. 1967}}.
v.

Sheehan,

u.s.

456

See,~~'

728,

Army & Air Force Exchange Service

739-740

{1982}

{"Testan [held]

that the

Tucker Act provides a remedy only where damages claims against the
United States have been authorized explicitly"}
id.,

at

739

{damages

remedy

"specifically

authorize

awards

available
of

money

where

{emphasis added};
the

damages"};

regulations
id.,

at

741

{reaffirming that an action for damages under the Tucker Act may not
be premised upon "regulations .•• which do not explicitly authorize
damages awards"}.
In sum, whether the United States has created a cause of action

2.
turns

upon

the

See

courts.

intent

United

of

Congress,

States

v.

not

Shaw,

the

inclinations

u.s.

309

495,

500

("specific statutory consent"): Munro v. United States, 303
41

(1938)

("only

disinterested
reversed

in

the

by

permission").

the

intent

presumption

of

Today,

the

Congress.

that

absent

It

of

Court
has

the

(1940)

u.s.

36,

appears

effectively

"affirmative

statutory

authority," United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
309
sued

u.s.

506, 514

for

damages.

applicable
that

the

(1940), the United States has not consented to be
It

has

substituted

to the conduct of
United

States

has

a

contrary

presumption,

the United States in Indian affairs,
consented

to

be

sued

for

statutory

violations and other departures from the rules that govern private
fiduciaries.

I dissent from the Court's departure from long-settled

principles.
I

The Court does not--and clearly cannot--contend that any of the
statutes

standing

alone

authorization of a damages
any "provision
for

remedy.

the
None of

necessary

legislative

the statutes contains

• • • that expressly makes the United States liable"

its alleged mismanagement of Indian forest resources and their

proceeds or grants a
424

reflects

u.s.,

statutes,

at
25

399,
U.S.C.

right of action "with specificity."
400.
§§406,

Indeed,
407,1

nothing

466,2

the

in
road

the
and

Testan,

timber-sales
right-of-way

1 The only monetary obligation imposed upon the Secretary
by §406 or §407 is to pay the actual "proceeds" of timber sales
to the owners of the land. Thus, while it may well be that those
sections would permit an action to compel the Secretary to pay
Footnote continued on next page.
Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages.

3.

statutes,

§§318a,

323-325,3

or

the

interest

statute,

§162a, 4

addresses in any respect the institution of damages actions against
the United States.

Nor is there any indication in the legislative

history of the statutes that Congress intended to consent to damages
actions

for

provisions.5

mismanagement

of

Indian

assets

by

enacting

these

The Court does not suggest otherwise.

over unlawfully retained proceeds, see United States v. Testan,
424 u.s. 392, 401 (1976), no statutory basis ex1sts for extending
that remedy to profits that arguably or ideally should have been,
but were not, earned by the Secretary. On the contrary, the
statutory recognition of a right to receive the "proceeds" of
sales conducted suggests that this is the limit of any damages
action implicitly authorized by Congress. See Middlesex County
Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. 1,
14-15, 20-21 (1981). Cf. United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 u.s.
201, 208 (1982).
2section 466 merely requires the Secretary to "make rules
and regulations for the operation and management of Indian
forestry units on the principle of sustained-yield management."
3section 318a authorizes the appropriation of funds for
building of roads on Indian reservations. It would be a radical
change in the law of sovereign immunity to hold that a routine
authorization statute allows individuals who might benefit from
appropriations to bring an action to recover damages. And
although §325 requires "the payment of such compensation as the
Secretary of the Interior shall determine to be just," it does
not follow that damages for failure to secure more generous
compensation are available. Indeed, the explicit statutory
recognition of the Secretary's authority to determine the amount
of compensation militates against any damages remedy for
insufficient compensation. See Plumbers & Pi~efitters v.
Plumbers & Pipefitters, 452 U.S. 615, 630 (19 1) (BURGER, C.J.,
dissenting).
4section 162a affords the Secretary substantial discretion
respecting investments to be made with individual Indian funds.
There is nothing in the statute that requires payment of a
particular rate of interest, much less that makes the United
States accountable in damages for any amount by which the
revenues earned fall short of a standard of "reasonable
management zeal to get for the Indians the best rate." Mitchell
v. United States, 664 F.2d 265, 274 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
Footnote(s) 5 will appear on following pages.

4.

The

Court

for

the

most

part

rests

its

decision

on

the

implausible proposition that statutes that do not in terms create a
right to payment of money nonetheless may support a damage action
against the United States.

This view simply cannot be reconciled

with the decisions in Testan and Mitchell I.
without more,

is

A nonmonetary duty, 6

insufficient to overcome the

"presumption"

Congress has not consented to suit for money damages.
Transportation Co. v. United States, 272

u.s.

that

See Eastern

675, 686 (1927).

This Court has had occasion in recent cases to emphasize that
congressional intent is the ultimate standard in determining whether
a private right of action should be inferred from a statute that

5 It is improbable that Congress intended §406 to
constitute consent to monetary liability for forestry
mismanagement on allotted lands, because, at the time in
question, it appears the Government maintained the position that
heavily forested lands were not to be allotted. See United
States v. Payne, 264 u.s. 446, 449 (1924). And before 1964, §406
was a rather bare instrument, simply giving an Indian permission
to sell his timber with the Secretary's permission. See ante, at
13-14. The legislative history of the 1964 amendments to §406,
see ante, at 16, also fails to supply the necessary evidence of
congressional intent. The House Report states that "[n]o
additional expenditure of Federal funds" was expected to be
incurred by reason of the enactment of the legislation. H.R.
Rep. No. 1292, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964). A letter from the
Interior Department to the Congress urging enactment of the
legislation explained only that the standards for timber sales on
allotted lands "should help allay disputes and avoid
misunderstanding." S. Rep. No. 672, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 3
(1963~.

Although not dispositive, the monetary character of the
statutory right is a strong indication that a statute "in itself
... can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation." By
contrast, where, as here, the duties imposed by a statute are not
essentially monetary in character, but require implementation
through conduct by federal officials, the contrary inference
arises: that Congress, by its silence as to a damages remedy,
created only a substantive right enforceable through injunctive
relief. See Testan, 424 U.S., at 401, n. 5, 403.

5.
in terms, provide for such an · action. 7

does not,

instructive,

for

here,

too,

the

"ultimate

Those cases are

question

is

one

of

congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks that it
can

improve

the statutory scheme

that Congress

enacted

into

Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 u.s. 560, 578 (1979).

law."
we

upon

recognized

in

"established

Testan,

courts

principles"

authorization

for

are

not

requiring

maintenance

of

free

to

dispense

explicit

suits

against

As
with

congressional

the United

States

simply "because it might be thought that they should be responsive
to a particular conception of enlightened governmental policy."
U.S., at 400.

See Shaw, 309 U.S., at 502.

424

The Court today adduces

no "evidence that Congress anticipated that there would be a private
remedy."
The

California v. Sierra Club, 451 u.s. 287, 298 (1981).
Court

defends

its

departure

from

our

precedents

on

the

ground that the statutes and regulations upon which respondents rely
need

not

be

sovereign

"construed

immunity."

overruling Mitchell
Tucker

Act

"accepted

makes
the

in

the

Ante,
I

at

manner
12.

sub silentio,

clear,

see

government's

ante,

for
at

claim

appropriate

to

waivers

of

The

in

effect

is

as

Court
its

10-13,
that

a

discussion on the
we

there

strict

at

least

standard

7see, ~~'Jackson Transit Authority v. Transit Union,
457 u.s. 15, 20-23 (1982)~ Middlesex County, 453 U.S., at 13-18~
Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630,
639-640 (1981)~ California v. Sterra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 292-298
(1981)~ Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S.
77, 91-95 (1981) ~ Universities Research Assn., Inc. v. Coutu, 450
U.S. 754, 770-784 (1981)~ Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis, 444 u.s. 11, 19-24 (1979). Against the background of
sovereign immunity, the rationale of these cases should apply
here with particular force.

of

6.
construction, applicable to deciding whether Congress had enacted a
waiver

of

sovereign

immunity,

should

be

applied

in

interpreting

substantive legislation for the benefit of Indian people."
Can

the Trustee

be

Sued

for

its Breach?

The Sad

States v. Mitchell, 26 S.D. L. Rev. 447, 473

Hughes,

Saga of

{1981}.

United

We expressly

held that the General Allotment Act at issue in Mitchell I "does not
unambiguously provide
fiduciary

that

the United States

responsibilities."

u.s.,

445

at

has

542

undertaken
{emphasis

Cf. Army & Air Force Exchange Service v. Sheehan, 456
{"explicitly reject [ ing]
statute or

regulation

the

argument

that

1

at

401}.

The

added}.
at 739

violation of

any

• • • automatically creates a cause of action

against the United States for money damages 1 " }
U.S.,

the

u.s.,

full

Court

hardly

can

view

{quoting Testan, 424
the

statutes

here

as

"unambiguously" imposing trust duties on the Government.
II
The Court makes
doctrine

heretofore

simply concludes:

little

or

no

established.

pretense
Without

that

it

pertinent

is

following

analysis,

it

"Because the statutes and regulations at issue in

this case clearly establish fiduciary obligations of the Government
in the management and operation of Indian lands and resources, they
can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal
Government for damages sustained."
rests on two dubious assumptions.

Ante, at 19-20.

This conclusion

First, the Court decides that the

statutes create or recognize fiduciary duties.

It then reasons that

because a private express trust normally imports a right to recover
damages for breach, and because injunctive relief is perceived to be
inadequate,

Congress necessarily must have authorized

recovery of

7.
damages for failure properly to perform the statutory duties.
relevancy of

the

first

conclusion

is questionable,

and

The

the other

departs from our precedents, chiefly Testan and Mitchell I.
The

Court

simply

holds

that

establish fiduciary obligations."

the

statutes

Ante, at 20.

here

"clearly

See also id., at 19

{"a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises") •

I

agree with the

dissent in the Court of Claims that "there is kind of a bootstrap
quality

of

reasoning

in

saying

that

[the United States']

duties

expressed by law are those of a trustee, and, therefore, we may look
at SCOTT ON TRUSTS or the RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS and impose on [the
Government]

all the other consequences the law, as stated by those

authorities,
trustee."
1981)

derives

Mitchell

from
v.

the

status of an erring nongovernmental

United States,

664

F. 2d,

{Nichols, J., concurring and dissenting) •

at

283

{Ct.

Cl.

"The federal power

over Indian lands is so different in nature and origin from that of
a private trustee •.• that caution is taught in using the mere label
of a trust plus a reading of SCOTT ON TRUSTS to impose liability on
claims where

assent

is not unequivocally expressed."

Ibid. 8

8 "There are a number of widely varying relationships which
more or less closely resemble trusts, but which are not trusts,
although the term 'trust' is sometimes used loosely to cover such
relationships. It is important to differentiate trusts from
these other relationships, since many of the rules applicable to
trusts are not applicable to them." Restatement {Second) of
Trusts §4, Introductory Note, at 15 {1959). For example, the
Court often has described the fiduciary relationship between the
United States and Indians as one between a guardian and a ward.
But "[a] guardianship is not a trust." Id., §7. There is no
explanation, however, why the Court chooses one analogy and not
another. The choice appears to be influenced by the fact that
"[t]he duties of a trustee are more intensive than the duties of
other fiduciaries." Id., §2, comment b.
The Court assertSilthat "[a]ll of the necessary elements of · a
Footnote continued on next page.

The

J

8.

trusteeships

to

which

the

Court

has

referred

in

the

past

have

manifested more the view that pervasive control over Indian life is
such

a

infringe

high
upon

attribute of
that

federal

control.

sovereignty that States cannot

Ibid.9

The Court

today turns

this

common-law trust are present"--a trustee, a beneficiary, and a
trust corpus. Ante, at 19. But two persons and a parcel of real
property, without more, do not create a trust. Rather, "[a]
trust ••• arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention
to create it." Restatement (Second} of Trusts, §2. See id., §23
("A trust is created only if the settlor properly manifes~an
intention to create a trust."}: id., §25 ("No trust is created
unless the settlor manifests an 1ntention to impose enforceable
duties."}. This is the element that is missing in this case, and
the Court does not, and cannot, find that Congress has manifested
its intent to make the statutory duties upon which respondents
rely trust duties. Cf. id., §95: 2 A. Scott, Law of Trusts §95,
at 772 (2d ed. 1967} ("At common law it was held that a use •••
could not be enforced against the Crown •••• "}. Indeed, given
the language of the statute at issue in Mitchell I, the case for
finding that Congress intended to impose fiduciary obligations on
the United States was much stronger than it is here. See 445
u.s. at 547 (WHITE, J., dissenting}. One of the authorities
cited by JUSTICE WHITE, 2 A. Scott, supra, §95, specifically
discusses the General Allotment Act as an example of the United
States acting as a trustee. Furthermore, a trustee can
"reserv[e] powers with respect to the administration of the
trust." Id., §37. Unless the United States agrees to be held
liable in damages, even the existence of a trust does not
necessarily establish that the Government has surrendered its
immunity from damages.
9The Court has invoked the fiduciary relation primarily
(i} to preclude unauthorized state interference in the relations
between the United States and the Indian tribes or other
unauthorized exercise of state jurisdiction on Indian lands, see
~~,United States v. Kagama, 118 u.s. 375, 382-384 (1886}:
(ii} to bar or nullify exercises of state court jurisdiction in
matters affecting Indian property rights, in which the United
States was not properly joined or represented, see,~~,
Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 386 (1939}: United
States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 442-444 (1926}: (iii} to
1nterpret doubtful or ambiguous treaty language in favor of the
Indians, see,~~, United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 u.s.
111, 117-118 (1938}: Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 u.s. 373, 396
(1902}: (iv} to determ1ne the liab1l1ty of the United States for
damages under the Just Compensation Clause where, acting as a
fiduciary manager, it has converted the form of Indian property,
Footnote continued on next page.

9.
shield into a sword.
In my view, it is clear that "[n]othing on the face" of any of
the statutes at issue, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
59

or

(1978),

in

their

legislative

histories,

interpreted as mandating compensation"
respondents.

for

"fairly

u.s.

49,

[can]

be

1

the conduct alleged by

Some of the statutes involved here, to be sure, create

substantive duties that the Secretary must fulfill.

But this could

equally be said of the Classification Act, considered in Testan.

It

requires

that

pay

be

carried

out

pursuant

substantially

classification

equal

to

"the

work."

5

ratings

of

principle

U.S.C.

federal
of

employees

equal

§5101(1) (A).

pay

Although

1

for
the

federal employee in Testan alleged a violation of the Act, the Court
concluded

that

argument

that

remedy.

424

a

back

pay

remedy

the

substantive

u.s.,

at 400-403.

was

unavailable,

rejecting

the

right necessarily implies a damages

Ignoring this holding in Testan,

1

the Court concludes that the

mere existence of a trust of some kind necessarily establishes that
Congress

has

consented

to

a

recovery

of

damages.

In

language

superficially resembling rejected perceptions of "natural law," the
Court rules that, "[g]iven the existence of a trust relationship, it

see,~~,

United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S.
371, 415-416 (1980); and (v) to emphas1ze the h1gh standard of
care that the United States is obliged to exercise in carrying
out its duties respecting the Indians, see,~~, United States
v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398 (1973); Seminole Nation v. United
States, 316 u.s. 286, 296-297 (1942). But the Court has never,
until today, invoked the doctrine to hold that the United States
is answerable in money damages for breaches of the standards
applicable to a private fiduciary.

1

.

-'

10.
naturally follows
for

the

added).

that the Government should be liable

breach of

its

See also ibid.

trust relationship):
damages

remedy) •

fiduciary

Ante,

at

20

(emphasis

(damages are a "fundamental incident" of a

ibid.

The

duties."

in damages

(it would be "anomalous" not to find a

Court

can

find

no

more

support

proposition than the dissenting opinion in Mitchell I.

for

1

this

See . ante, at

21.10
It is fair to say that the Court is influenced by its view that
an

injunctive

remedy

alleged--precisely
It

is

the

the

is

inadequate

inference

to

deemed

ordinary result of sovereign

claims for money damages are barred.

redress

the

inadmissible
immunity that

violations

in Testan .11
unconsented

The fact that damages cannot

10 The Court reaches for support in Seminole Nation v.
United States, supra, and United States v. Creek Nation, 295 u.s.
103 (1935), but both cases cut against the Court's theory in this
case. The discussion of the Government's fiduciary duty in
Seminole Nation referred to a claim to compel payments expressly
prescribed by Treaty. See 316 u.s., at 296-297. Creek Nation
involved a taking claim.
11 Also significant is the Court's standardless remand for
further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Given the
strictness with which consents to suit by the sovereign are to be
construed, United States v. Sherwood, 312 u.s. 584, 590-591
(1941), where the statute upon wh1ch liability is premised
creates no right to payment of a sum certain, the Court of Claims
will be required, without legislative guidance, to determine the
extent of liability, if any, and the items of damages that are
cognizable. This task, unlike the factual or legal determination
whether a particular individual falls within a class granted a
right to payment of money by a statute, is not one to which
courts are adapted. Any rules established will be of "judicial
cloth, not legislative cloth." Weinberger v. Catholic Action of
Hawaii, 454 U.S. 139, 141 (1981).
I assume, however, that the
law of trusts generally will control and that all defenses to
actions on breaches of trust, such as consent by the beneficiary
and laches, will be fully available to the United States. Cf.
664 F.2d, at 274.

1

11.
be

recovered without

the

sovereign's

consent

conclusion that consent has been given.
the Court's reasoning.
to

redress

every

hardly supports

Yet this, in substance, is

1

If it is saying that a remedy is necessary

injury

sustained,

the

doctrine

immunity will have been drained of all meaning.
the federal statutes

the

of

sovereign

Moreover, "many of

••• that expressly provide money damages as a

remedy against the United States in carefully limited circumstances
would be rendered superfluous."

Testan, 424

u.s.,

1

at 404.

III
The
intended

Court
to

has

render

made
the

no

effort

United

the

immunity

label
from

"trust"
damages

cannot
the

demonstrate

States

claims of the kind presented here.
of

to

answerable

that

Congress

in damages

upon

The mere application by a court

properly

Government

justify

has

reverse the judgment of the Court of Claims.

never

disregard
waived.

of
I

an

would

1

SECOND DRAFT: United States v. Mitchell, No. 81-1748
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The controlling law in this case is clear.
for the Court in United States v. Mitchell, 445
(1980)

Speaking

u.s.

535

(Mitchell I), JUSTICE MARSHALL reaffirmed the

general principle that

~cause

of action for

damag ~

/
unequivocally expressed.'"
States v. King, 395

u.s.

Id., at 538 (quoting United

1, 4 (1969)).

See Lehman v.

Nakshian, 453

u.s.

dissenting).

Where, as here, a claim for money damages is

156, 170 (1981)

(BRENNAN, J. ,

predicated upon an alleged statutory violation, the rule
is that the statute does not create a cause of action for
(

damages unless the statute ~ n itself ••• can fairly be
interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal

. r•

..

2•

)

Government for the damage sustained jf

J

Testan, 424

u.s.

J3:

~mshi ~ Corp.

(Ct. Cl. 1967)).

392, 402 (1976)

United States v.

(quoting Eastport

v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1008-1009

See,

~·

Army & Air Force Exchange

Service v. Sheehan, 456 U.S. 728, 739-7 40 (1982)

( "Testan

[held] that the Tucker Act provides a remedy only where

I

damages claims against the United States have been
authorized explicitly")

(emphasis added): id., at 739

(~v/JioltS

(damages remedy available where the s.t:atYt&a "specifically
authorize awards of money damages"): id., at 741
(reaffirming that an action for damages under the Tucker

I

Act may not be premised upon "regulations •.• which do not
explicitly authorize damages awards").
In sum, whether the United States has created a cause
of action turns upon the intent of Congress, not the

/

3.

-·

inclinations of the courts.

j

309 U.S. 495, 502 (1940)
36, 41 (1938).

~

See United States v. Shaw,

Munro v. United States, 303 U.S.

Today, the Court appears disinterested in

the intent of Congress.

The right1r of action that the

Court finds "mandated" by an amalgamation of federal
statutes "is in cold reality but a strong and clear wish

j

.

~

n the judge's part."

~v~

UDJ.ted St ates v. Mi tche ll, 664

F.2d 265, 277 (Ct. Cl. 1981)
dissenting).

(Nichols, J., concurring and

I dissent from what I

~ersei•Je ~}the

Court's departure from long-settled principles.
I

The Court does not--and clearly cannot--contend that
any of the statutes standing alone reflects the necessary
legislative mandate for a damages remedy.

None of the

statutes contains any "provision •.. that expressly makes

/

4.

the United States liable" for its alleged mismanagement of
Indian forest resources and

5~~ ~

0\

.

Testan, 424

u.s.,

'(~kf
0

at

399~00.

eir proceeds or that

~

(:;ti

f)'l

11

with specificity."

Indeed, nothing in the

.j

j

/

timberA sales statutes, 25 U.S.C. §§406, 407, 1 466, 2 the

1 The only monetary obligation imposed upon the
Secretary by §406 or §407 is to pay the actual "proceeds"
of timber sales to the owners of the land. Thus, while it woJ
may be that those sections w.oul.d ~ roYAfi an action to e.r•;f
compel the Secretary to disgorgeunlawfully retained P
J proceeds, see United States v. Test an, 424 U.S. 392, 401
(1976), no statutory basis exists for extending that
remedy to proceeds that arguably or ideally should have
been, but were not, captured by the Secretary.
On the
contrary, the statutory recognition of ~ right to ~
receive the "proceeds" of sales conducted s'hggests that
this is the limit of any damages action implicitly
puthorized by Congress. See United States v. Erika, Inc.,
~ 56
u.s.
201, 208
(1982); ~iddlesex County Sewerage
~ ~uthority v. National Sea Clammers As ~ ia\ioR , 453 u.s.
1, 14-15, 20-21 (1981).
lt. " .

J

2 section 466 merely requires the S;;-retary to "make
rules and regulations for the operation and management of
Indian forestry units on the principle of sustained-yield
management." -he -efie Co1:2r ~ of Clai m!! r ecog ni zed, ti64 F. 2~
272

/

5.

j

,/ 3

road and right-of-way ~ tutes, §§318a, 323-325,

or the

interest statute, §162a, 4 addresses in any respect the
institution of damages actions against the United States.
Nor is there any indication in the legislative history of
the statutes that Congress intended to consent to damages

3section 318a merely authorizes th
appropriation
of funds for building of roads on Indian eservations. It
would be a radical change in the law of
vereign immunity
to hold that a routine authorizati
statute allows
s who might ~ benefi
appropriations
to
r 1ng a
damages.
And
2

eompeiist:tt~~ ~~:r;oR~£1:llly

'(0" ..

wi t hheld from th e !Rei a R-. , it does ("J,.,._
not follow that damages for failure to secure more ~~~(
generous compensation are available. Indeed, the explicit -~~
statutory recognition of the Secretary's authority to ~~~
determine the amount of compensation militates against any .., ..s
damages remedy for insufficient compensation.

>"'*· ~t h anf '11. compelliR~

4-Ra.ther

a par t tCI:ll:a!'" leOe"l t5f
Sl6.2.a a ~~~ s the Secretary substantial
discretion respecting
investments to be made with
individual Indian funds. There is nothing in the statute
that requires payment of a particular rate of interest. A
fortiori, Congress has not agreed to hold the UniteCf
States accountable in damages for any amount by which the
revenues earned fall short of a standard of "reasonable
management zeal to get for the Indians the best rate."
cemrJe-t'i&a~eR ....,

1::w 2:5~;;t~981).
_..;.----

--

)

actions for mismanagement of
these provisions. 5

('~ ~ ~5J

Qdian

The Court does not suggest

otherwise~

5 It is especially improbable that Congress intende
to
consent
to
monetary
liability
for
forestry
mismanagement on allotted lands, because, at the time in
question, at least some, if not all, government officials
believed that heavily forested lands were not to be
allotted.
See United States v. Payne, 264 u.s. 446, 449
(1924}.
And before 1964,
§406 was a
rather
bare
instrument, simply giving an Indian permission to sell his
timber with the Secretary's permission.
The legislative
history of the 1964 amendments to §406 also fails to
supply the necessary evidence of congressional intent.
The House Report states that "[n]o additional expenditure
of Federal funds" was expected to be incurred by reason of
the enactment of the legislation.
H.R. Rep. No. 1292,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. ~ 2 (1964}.
A letter from the
Interior Department tcf the Congress urging enactment of
the legislation explained ~t the standards for timber
sales on allotted lands "sh uld help allay disputes and
avoid ~ isunderstanding."
S. ep. \No. 672, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess ;/ 3 (1963}.
tV\)

6 It ordi
ily may
be correct
that a statute
'f"no.'" v(t~J vesting an indiv ual or me ers of a designated class
~. cy
with an absolute rl ht to r ceive a sum certain from an
'~~ ~~ administrative office of
e United States grounds an
· \c,r<"
action for the recover
o
damages--or at least the sum
1"\t
withheld-- in the event
f nonpayment.
See Test an, 424
U.S., at 400 ( reserv i
the question} •
But aga1n, the
Court does not rest
on any such statute or right. The
Government, on the ther n nd, concedes that an action to
recover unlawfull high adm"nistrative fees and to recover
for the failur
to pay an
interest may be maintained
against the
ited States as one seeking recovery of
"money impro erly exacted or etained." 'PestaR , J -;.4 u.s .,
J at 401.
us, to the exten
that the judgment of the
Footnote contin d on next page.

rJ..J

)
J

7.

~

J

;,~-

'"<f~

The Court rests its discussion on the novel

l

proposition that statutes that do not in terms create any
right to payment of money nonetheless may support a damage
action against the United States.

This view hardly can be

reconciled with the decisions in Testan and Mitchell I.

A

nonmonetary duty, 7 without more, is insufficient to
overcome the "presumption" that Congress has not consented
to suit for money damages.

J

v. United States, 272

u.s.

See Eastern Transportation Co.
675, 686 (1927).

This Court

Court of Claims would permi an action to recover withheld
fees and interest, the Go rnment apparently does not seek
review, and I have no oc asion to decide the issue.
7Although not dispositive, the monetary character
of the statutory right is a strong indication that a
statute "in itself
can fairly be interpreted as
mandating compensation." By contrast, where, as here, the
duties imposed by a statute are not essentially monetary
in character, but require implementation through conduct
by federal officials, the contrary inference arises: that
Congress, by its silence as to a damages remedy, created
only a substantive right enforceable through injunctive
relief. See Testan, 424 U.S., at 401, n. 5, 403.
~

8.

has had occasion in recent cases to emphasize that
congressional intent is the ultimate standard in determing
whether a private right of action should be inferred from
a statute that does not, in terms, provide for such an
action. 8

Those cases are instructive, for here, too, the

"ultimate question is one of congressional intent, not one
of whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon the

j

statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law."

Touche

Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 u.s. 560, 578 {1979).

As we

recognized in Testan, courts are not free to dispense with

e.t;.,

/

8see,
Jackson Transit Authority v. Transit /
Union, 45 7 U:S: 15, 20-23 {1982) : Middlesex County, 453
u.s., at 13-18: Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff V""/
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639-640 {1981): California ./ _
v. Sierra Club, 451 u.s. 287, 292-298 {1981): Northwest /
Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77L 91-95
tl
{1981): Universities Research Assn., Inc. v. C1 tu, 450
U.S.
,
-784 {1981): Transamerica Mortgage z( visors,
Inc.
v.
Lew
, 444 u.s. 11, 19-24 {1979).
Against the
/
background of sovereign immunity, the rationale of these
cases should apply here with particular force.

9.

"established principles" requiring explicit congressional
authorization for maintenance of suits against the United
States simply "because it might be thought that they
should be responsive to a particular conception of
enlightened governmental policy."

~Shaw,

309

u.s.,

at 502.

424

u.s.,

~

at 400. 9

See

The Court today adduces no

"evidence that Congress anticipated that there would be a

j

private remedy."

California v. Sierra Club, 451

u.s.

287,

9 The Court's
that injunctive relief is
insufficient to vindicate
he statutory rights of the
respondents is the kind of policy judgment that properly
should be left to the 1 gislature.
Cf. Universities
Research Assn., Inc., 450
.s., at 769, and n. 19, 776777, 782-783. Nor has th Court satisfactorily explained
why injunctive relief is thought to be inadequate.
The
Court states that a trus eship "would mean little if the
beneficiaries were requ · ed to supervise the day-to-day
management of their es te by their trustee or else be
precluded from recovery " Ante, at 21.
It is not clear
what the Court's analy is would be if it did not assume
that there was a righ
to recover damages--the issue in
this case.

l

10.

298 (1981}.

~us,

it is clear that "[n]othing on the face" of any

of the statutes at issue, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
436

u.s.

49, 59 (1978}, or in their legislative histories,

"fairly [can] be interpreted as mandating compensation"
for the conduct alleged by respondents.

Some of the

statutes involved here, to be sure, create substantive
duties that the Secretary must fulfill.

But this could

equally be said of the Classification Act, considered in
Testan.

It

~Rambigae~gl~requires

that pay classification

ratings of federal employees be carried out pursuant to
1
' the principle of /equal pay for substantially equal work • "

j

5

u.s.c.

§5101(1} (A}.

Although the federal employee in

Testan alleged a violation of the Act, the Court concluded
that a back pay remedy was unavailable, rejecting the

·.

11.

argument that the substantive right necessarily implies a
damages remedy.

424

u.s.,

at

400-403~he

Court's

conclusion in this case, however, rests largely upon its
view that an injunctive remedy is inadequate to redress
the violations alleged--precisely the inference deemed
inadmissible in Testan.10
It is the ordinary result of sovereign immunity that

10 Also
significant
is
the
Court's
standardless
remand
for
further
roceedi~ onsistent
with
its
opin10 .
he compass has
h~ Given the strictness
wi th whic
ents to suit -G--- . .
sovereign are to be
construed, United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590591 (1941), where the statute upon which liability is
premised creates no right to payment of a sum certain, the
Court of Claims will. be required, without legislative
guidance, to determine the extent of liability, if any,
and the items of damages that are cognizable. This task,
unlike the factual or legal determination whether a
particular individual falls within a class granted a right
to payment of money by a statute, is not one to which
courts are adapted.
Any rules established will be of
"judicial cloth, not legislative cloth." ~ Weinberger
v. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 454 u.s. 139, 141 (1981). I
assume, however, that the law of trusts generally will
control and that all defenses to actions on breaches of
trust, such as consent by the beneficiary and laches, will
be fully available to the United States.

J
j

.

.

no

12.

unconsented claims for money damages are barred.

The fact

that damages cannot be recovered without the sovereign's
consent hardly supports the conclusion that consent has
been given.
reasoning.

Yet this, in substance, is the Court's
If., as call he

ar~nea"r the

Court is saying that

a remedy is necessary to redress every injury sustained,
the doctrine of sovereign immunity will have been drained
of all meaning.

Moreover, "many of the federal statutes

that expressly provide money damages as a remedy
against the United States in carefully limited
circumstances would be rendered superfluous."

u.s., at

Testan, 424 /

404.

II
The Court makes little or no pretense that it is
following doctrine this Court heretofore has established.

'

.;

"

13.

Its opinion contains no examination of the language and
the legislative history of the statutes held to give rise
to monetary liability to determine whether Congress
intended to grant a cause of action for damages.

The

Court's analysis consists essentially of a single
conclusory sentence: "Because the statutes and regulations
at issue in this case clearly establish fiduciary
obligations of the Government in the management and
operation of Indian lands and resources, they can fairly
be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal

Government for damages sustained."

~~Ante, att 20. This

conclusion rests on two dubious assumptions.

First, the

Court decides that the statutes create or recognize
fiduciary duties.

It then reasons that because a private

express trust normally imports a right to recover damages

for breach, and because injunctive relief is perceived to

~ inadequate,
\

have authorized

Congress

recovery of damages for failure properly to perform the
statutory duties.

The relevancy of the f rst conclusion

is questionable, a
)

A

I

The Court points to

statutory

duties Congress imposed were intended to impose fiduciary
duties.

-

Nor do any of the timber sales or management
(\

statutes upon which respondents rely make any reference to
such duties.
/

Rather, the Court simply holds that the

statutes here "clearly establish fiduciary obligations."
Ante, at 20.

j

See also id., at 19 J:_'a

relationship necessarily arises")

fidu~y t£.t_ ~;_..

.J...•~ere ~d¥.~
is

bootstrap quality of reasoning in saying that [the United
States'] duties expressed by law are those of a trustee,

15.

and, therefore, we may look a

r the

impose on [the Government] all
the other consequences the law, as stated by those
authorities, derives from the

~ t ~~ us

Mt~ li
nongovernmental trustee."

~d,

concurring and dissenting).

at 283 (Nichols, J. '

Federal authority over Indian

lands is so different in nature and origin from that of a
private trust that caution surely is warranted before
labeling an obligation assumed by the Government a "trust"
and then relying on Scott on Trusts to impose liability
where none has been authorized.

Ibid.ll

~

11 "There
are
a
number
of
widely
varying
relationships which more or less closely resemble trusts,
but which are not trusts, although the term 1 trust 1 is
sometimes used loosely to cover such relationships. It is
important to differentiate trusts from these other
relationships, since many of the rules applicable to
trusts are not applicable to them." Restatement (Second)
of Trusts §4, at 15 (1959). For example, the Court often
Footnote continued on next page.

.,

16.

The trusteeships to which the Court has referred in
the past have manifested more the view that pervasive
control over Indian life is such a high attribute of

has described the fiduciary relationship between the
United States and Indians as one between a guardian and a
ward.
But "[a] guardianship is not a trust."
Id., §.r.-"
There is no explanation, however, why the Court-choo ~ s .I
one analogy and not another. I can only conclude that the
choice was influenced by the fact that "[t]he duties of a
trustee are more intensive than the duties of other
fiduciaries." Id., §2, comment b.
The Court---asserts that "[a] 11 of the necessary
elements of a common-law trust are present"--a trustee, a
beneficiary, and a trust corpus.
Ante, at 19.
But two
persons and a parcel of real property, without more, do
not create a trust.
Rather, "[a] trust ••• arises as a /
result of a manifestation of an intention to create it."
~, §2.
See id., §23 ("A trust is created only if the . /
~
sgttlor proper~ manifests an intention to create a
trust.");
id., §25
("No trust is created unless the
~~
t"- /(
settlor manifests an intention to impose enforceable ~
t
.,A ) 0
duties.") •
This is the element that is missing in this
cJ~
case, and the Court does not, and cannot, find that
~
Congress has manifested its intent to make the statutory
\vJ~
duties upon which respondents rely trust duties. Cf. id. ,
95 ("The United States •.. has capacity to take and hold ; ·
property in trust, but in the absence of a statute
otherwise providing the trust is unenforceable against the
United
States
F~hermore,
a
trustee
can r
'reserv [ e] powers with respe 6\: to the administration of
/.
./ the trust." Id., §37. Unless the United States agrees to/
be held liabre-ln damages, even the existence of a trust
does
not
necessarily mean
that
the Government has
surrendered its immunity from damages.

7

;I

J

'

[1

r.. .. ") .

17.

federal sovereignty that
control.

Ibid. 12

a sword. ; ( t

cannot infringe upon that

The Court today turns this shield into

i~hat

mismanagement of Indian

lands is more analogous to misgovernment than it is to the

12 The Court has
invoked the fiduciary relation
primarily (i) to preclude unauthorized state interference
in the relations between the United States and the Indian
tribes
or
other
unauthorized ran;,
ercise
of
state 4
) jurisdiction
on Indian lands, see e.
., United States v. 1
Kagama, 118 u.s. 375, 382-384 (18 6); (ii) to bar or
nullify exercises of state court jurisdiction in matters
affecting Indian property rights, in which the United
~ tates was not properly joined or represented, see, e. ~ ., ~
Minnesota v. United States, 305 u.s. 382, 386 (m-9);
/ United States v. Candelaria, 271 u.s. 432, 442~( 111) to 1nterpret doubtful or ambiguous treaty language
in
favor of the Indians, see, e. ,_q., United States v. j
)
~hoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 117~1938); Minnesota v.
itchcock, 185 u.s. 373, 396 (1902); (iv) to l1m1t the
liability of the United States for damages under the Just
Compensation Clause where, acting as a fiduciary ma~
er,
"t has converted the form of Indian property, see, e • • ,
ni ted States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371,
'? · 415-416 (1980); cf. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 u.s. 553,
/
~ 568 (1903); and (v) to emphasize the high standard of care
that the United States is obliged to exercise ~n carrying
/ out its duties respecting the Indians, see, ~, United
V States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398 (1973); Seminole Nation
v. United States, 316 u.s. 286, 296-297 (1942).
But the
Court has never, until today, invoked the doctrine to hold
that the United States is answerable in money damages for
breaches
of
the
standards
applicable
to a
private
fiduciary.

444

J

~

r

18.

misfeasance of a common-law trust.
United States,

u.s.

__, __,

Ibid.

Cf. Nevada v.

n. 15 (1983)

-------

(breach of

fiduciary duty to Indians "reflects the nature of a

democratic government that is charged with more than one
responsibility").

In my view, the Court today

substantially retreats from JUSTICE BLACKMUN's words for
{

the Court in Army & Air Force Exchange Service v.

Sheehan, ~

supra, where we "explicitly rejected the argument that
'the violation of any statute or regulation
fQ der a J

j

em[Uo~~automatically

•••

~elatiR~

~o

~\If

"

rr':L

'·.j;. ,

creates a cause of actio

~·

{//"t
against the United States for money damages.'"
at 739 (quoting Testan, 424

u.s.,

456

u.s.,

at 401).

But more remarkable than the implication of trust
duties from statutory duties is the conclusion that the
mere existence of a trust of some kind necessarily

establishes that Congress
damages.

consented to a recovery of

We apparently are

the existence of a

cause of action for damages on faith: "Given the existence
of a trust relationship, it
Government should be liable in

j

its fiduciary duties."
also

·l~,fl.
......--

~

mages for the breach of

Ante,

0 (emphasis added) •

See

/

(damages are

incident" of a

,b;l
trust

relationship)~
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find a damages remedy).

(it would be "anomalous" not to
The Court can find no more

support for this proposition than t e dissenting opinion
in Mitchell I.

..;

I

See ante, at 21. 13

opinion, the

13 The Court tries to get support out of Seminole
Nation v. United States, supra, and United States v. Creek
Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1935), but both actually cut against
the Court's theory in this case.
The Court's discussion
of the Government's fiduciary duty in Seminole Nation
referred
to
a
claim
to
compel
payments
expressly
prescribed by Treaty.
See 316 u.S., at 296-297.
Creek
~ation involved a taking claim •

J
~
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Court has effectively reversed the

4'.ransportation-~2.2-U.S.,

at

~esumption~aoto<R

6S~that

absent "affirmative

statutory authority," United States v. United States
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Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 u.s. 506,
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States has not consented to be sued.

It has substituted a

contrary presumption, applicable to the conduct of the
United States in Indian affairs, that the United States
has consented to be sued for statutory violations and
other departures from the rules that govern private
fiduciaries.

J

$

The Court has not endeavored to demonstrate that
Congress actually intended to render the United States
answerable in damages upon claims of the kind presented

/

21 •
•

here.

I think the mere application of the label "trust"

to a few governmental functions respecting Indians does
not constitute unequivocal consent to suits against the
United States for money damages when these

badly performed.
Court of Claims.
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The controlling law in this case is clear. Speaking for the
Court in United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535 (1980)
(Mitchell 1), JUSTICE MARSHALL reaffirmed the general
principle that a cause of action · for damages against the
United States " 'cannot be implied but must be unequivocally
expressed."' !d., at 538 (quoting United States v. King , 395
U. S. 1, 4 (1969)). See United States v. Hopkins, 427 U. S.
123, 128 (1976) ("specific command of statute or authorized
regulations"); Lehman v. Nakshian , 453 U. S. 156, 170
(1981) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). Where, as here, a claim
for money damages is predicated upon an alleged statutory
violation, the rule is that the statute does not create a cause
of action for damages unless the statute "'in itself . . . can
fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained."' United States
v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 402 (1976) (quoting Eastport S.S.
Corp. v. United States, 372 F. 2d 1002, 1008-1009 (Ct. Cl.
1967)). See, e. g., Army & Air Force E xchange Service v.
Sheehan, 456 U. S. 728, 739-740 (1982) ("Testan [held] that
the Tucker Act provides a remedy only where damages
claims against the United States have been authorized explicitly") (emphasis added); id., at 739 (damages remedy available where the regulations "specifically authorize awards of
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money damages"); id., at 741 (reaffirming that an action for
damages under the Tucker Act may not be premised upon
"regulations . . . which do not explicitly authorize damages
awards").
In sum, whether the United States has created a cause of
action turns upon the intent of Congress, not the inclinations
of the courts. See United States v. Shaw, 309 U. S. 495, 500
(1940) ("specific statutory consent"); Munro v. United States,
303 U. S. 36, 41 (1938) ("only by permission"). Today, the
Court appears disinterested in the intent of Congress. It
has effectively reversed the presumption that absent "affirmative statutory authority," United States v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U. S. 506, 514 (1940), the
United States has not consented to be sued for damages. It
has substituted a contrary presumption, applicable to the
conduct of the United States in Indian affairs, that the
United States has consented to be sued for statutory violations and other departures from the rules that govern private
fiduciaries. I dissent from the Court's departure from longsettled principles.
I
The Court does not-and clearly cannot-contend that any
of the statutes standing alone reflects the necessary legislative authorization of a damages remedy. None of the statutes contains any "provision . . . that expressly makes the
United States liable" for its alleged mismanagement of Indian
forest resources and their proceeds or grants a right of action
"with specificity." Testan, 424 U. S., at 399, 400. Indeed,
nothing in the timber-sales statutes, 25 U. S. C. §§ 406, 407, 1
' The only monetary obligation imposed upon the Secretary by § 406 or
§ 407 is to pay the actual "proceeds" of timber sales to the owners of the
land. Thus, while it may well be that those sections would permit an action to compel the Secretary to pay over unlawfully retained proceeds, see
United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 401 (1976), no statutory basis exists
for extending that remedy to profits that arguably or ideally should have
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466, 2 the road and right-of-way statutes, §§318a, 323-325, 3
or the interest statute, § 162a, 4 addresses in any respect the
institution of damages actions against the United States.
Nor is there any indication in the legislative history of the
statutes that Congress intended to consent to damages actions for mismanagement of Indian assets by enacting these
provisions. 5 The Court does not suggest otherwise.
been, but were not, earned by the Secretary. On the contrary, the statutory recognition of a right to receive the "proceeds" of sales conducted suggests that this is the limit of any damages action implicitly authorized by
Congress. See Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 14-15, 20-21 (1981). Cf. United States v.
Erika, Inc., 456 U. S. 201, 208 (1982).
2
Section 466 merely requires the Secretary to "make rules and regulations for the operation and management of Indian forestry units on the
principle of sustained-yield management."
3
Section 318a authorizes the appropriation of funds for building of roads
on Indian reservations. It would be a radical change in the law of sovereign immunity to hold that a routine authorization statute allows individuals who might benefit from appropriations to bring an action to recover
damages. And although § 325 requires "the payment of such compensation as the Secretary of the Interior shall determine to be just," it does not
follow that damages for failure to secure more generous compensation are
available. Indeed, the explicit statutory recognition of the Secretary's authority to determine the amount of compensation militates a a· t
damages remedy for insufficient compensation.
See Plumbers &
Pipefitters v. Plumbers & Pipefitters, 452 U. S. 615, 30 (1981) (BURGER,
C. J., dissenting).
' Section 162a affords the Secretary substantial discretion respecting investments to be made with individual Indian funds. There is nothing in
the statute that requires payment of a particular rate of interest, much less
that makes the United States accountable in damages for any amount by
which the revenues earned fall short of a standard of "reasonable management zeal to get for the Indians the best rate." Mitchell v. United States,
664 F. 2d 265, 274 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
• It is improbable that Congress intended § 406 to constitute consent to
monetary liability for forestry mismanagement on allotted lands, because,
at the time in question, it appears the Government maintained the position
that heavily forested lands were not to be allotted. See United States v.
Payne, 264 U. S. 446, 449 (1924). And before 1964, § 406 was a rather
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The Court for the most part rests its decision on the implausible proposition that statutes that do not in terms create
a right to payment of money nonetheless may support a damage action against the United States. This view simply cannot be reconciled with the decisions in Testan and Mitchell I.
A nonmonetary duty, 6 without more, is insufficient to overcome the "presumption" that Congress has not consented to
suit for money damages. See Eastern Transportation Co. v.
United States, 272 U. S. 675, 686 (1927).
This Court has had occasion in recent cases to emphasize
that congressional intent is the ultimate standard in determining whether a private right of action should be inferred
from a statute that does not, in terms, provide for such an
action. 7 Those cases are instructive, for here, too, the "ultibare instrument, simply giving an Indian permission to sell his timber with
the Secretary's permission. See ante, at 13-14. The legislative history of
the 1964 amendments to § 406, see ante, at 16, also fails to supply the necessary evidence of congressional intent. The House Report states that
"[n]o additional expenditure of Federal funds" was expected to be incurred
by reason of the enactment of the legislation. H. R. Rep. No. 1292, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964). A letter from the Interior Department to the
Congress urging enactment of the legislation explained only that the standards for timber sales on allotted lands "should help allay disputes and avoid
misunderstanding." S. Rep. No. 672, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1963).
6
Although not dispositive, the monetary character of the statutory
right is a strong indication that a statute "in itself ... can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation." By contrast, where, as here, the duties imposed by a statute are not essentially monetary in character, but require implementation through conduct by federal officials, the contrary
inference arises: that Congress, by its silence as to a damages remedy, created only a substantive right enforceable through injunctive relief. See
Testan, 424 U. S., at 401, n. 5, 403.
7
See, e. g., Jackson Transit Authority v. Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15,
20-23 (1982); Middlesex County, 453 U. S., at 13-18; Texas Industries,
Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630,639-640 (1981); California
v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287, 292-298 (1981); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Transport Workers, 451 U. S. 77, 91-95 (1981); Universities Research
Assn., Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U. S. 754, 770-784 (1981); Transamerica Mort-
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mate question is one of congressional intent, not one of
whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law." Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 578 (1979). As we recognized in Testan, courts are not free to dispense with "established principles" requiring explicit congressional authorization for maintenance of suits against the United States
simply "because it might be thought that they should be responsive to a particular conception of enlightened governmental policy." 424 U. S., at 400. See Shaw, 309 U. S., at
502. The Court today adduces no "evidence that Congress
anticipated that there would be a private remedy." California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287, 298 (1981).
The Court defends its departure from our precedents on
the ground that the statutes and regulations upon which respondents rely need not be "construed in the manner appropriate to waivers of sovereign immunity." Ante, at 12. The
Court in effect is overruling Mitchell I sub silentio, for as its
discussion on the Tucker Act makes clear, see ante, at 10-13,
we there at least "accepted the government's ... claim that a
strict standard of construction, applicable to deciding
whether Congress had enacted a waiver of sovereign immunity, should be applied in interpreting substantive legislation
for the benefit of Indian people." Hughes, Can the Trustee
be Sued for its Breach? The Sad Saga of United States v.
Mitchell, 26 S. D. L. Rev. 447, 473 (1981). We expressly
held that the General Allotment Act at issue in Mitchell I
"does not unambiguously provide that the United States has
undertaken full fiduciary responsibilities." 445 U. S., at 542
(emphasis added). Cf. Army & Air Force Exchange Service
v. Sheehan, 456 U. S., at 739 ("explicitly reject[ing] the argument that 'the violation of any statute or regulation . . . autogage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11, 19-24 (1979). Against the
background of sovereign immunity, the rationale of these cases should
apply here with particular force.
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matically creates a cause of action against the United States
for money damages'") (quoting Testan, 424 U. S., at 401).
The Court hardly can view the statutes here as "unambiguously" imposing trust duties on the Government.
II
The Court makes little or no pretense that it is following
doctrine heretofore established. Without pertinent analysis,
it simply concludes: "Because the statutes and regulations at
issue in this case clearly establish fiduciary obligations of the
Government in the management and operation of Indian
lands and resources, they can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for damages sustained." Ante, at 19-20. This conclusion rests on
two dubious assumptions. First, the Court decides that the
statutes create or recognize fiduciary duties. It then reasons that because a private express trust normally imports a
right to recover damages for breach, and because injunctive
relief is perceived to be inadequate, Congress necessarily
must have authorized recovery of damages for failure properly to perform the statutory duties. The relevancy of the
first conclusion is questionable, and the other departs from
our precedents, chiefly Testan and Mitchell I.
The Court simply holds that the statutes here "clearly establish fiduciary obligations." Ante, at 20. See also id., at
19 ("a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises"). I agree
with the dissent in the Court of Claims that "there is kind of a
bootstrap quality of reasoning in saying that [the United
States'] duties expressed by law are those of a trustee, and,
therefore, we may look at SCOTT ON TRUSTS or theRESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS and impose on [the Government] all the other consequences the law; as stated by those
authorities, derives from the status of an ~rring nongovernmental trustee." Mi6eheU v. U'l'/Jited-~64 F. 2d, at 283
(Ct. Cl. 1981) (Nichols, J., concurring and dissenting). "The
federal power over Indian lands is so different in nature and
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ongm from that of a private trustee . . . that caution is
taught in using the mere label of a trust plus a reading of
SCOTT ON TRUSTS to impose liability on claims where assent is not unequivocally expressed." Ibid. 8 · The trusteeships to which the Court has referred in the past have mani8
"There are a number of widely varying relationships which more or
less closely resemble trusts, but which are not trusts, although the term
'trust' is sometimes used loosely to cover such relationships. It is important to differentiate trusts from these other relationships, since many of
the rules applicable to trusts are not applicable to them." Restatement
(Second) of Trusts § 4, Introductory Note, at 15 (1959). For example, the
Court often has described the fiduciary relationship betw,een the__1illit.ed..
States and Indians as one between a guardian and a ward. ~~ard
ianship is not a trust." I d., § 7. There is no explanation, however, why
the Court chooses one analogy and not another. The choice appears to be
influenced by the fact that "[t]he duties of a trustee are more intensive
than the duties of other fiduciaries." I d., § 2, comment b.
The Court asserts that "[a]ll of the necessary elements of a common-law
trust are present"-a trustee, a beneficiary, and a trust corpus. Ante, at
19. But two persons and a parcel of real property, without more, do not
create a trust. Rather, "[a] trust ... arises as a result of a manifestation
of an intention to create it." Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 2. See
id., § 23 ("A trust is created only if the settlor properly manifests an intention to create a trust."); id., § 25 ("No trust is created unless the settlor
manifests an intention to impose enforceable duties."). This is the element that is missing in this case, and the Court does not, and cannot, find
that Congress has manifeste · ·
tutory duties upon
~ ~· ents rely trust duties. Cf. id., 95;
A. Scot
/.1, ..1 -1
s
5
772 (2d ed. 1967) ("At commo
·
e t at a use .. .
could n
e enforced against the Cro .... "). Indeed, gi
lan/
guage of the statute at issue in Mitchel , the case for finding that Con'7
gress intended to impose fiduciary obligations on the United States was
much strongerf han it is here. See 445 u. s. at
HITE J., dissent/'
~~ ing). One oft e authorities cited by JUSTICE HITE, 2 . cott, supra,
-:A
§ 95, specifically discusses the General Allotment Act as an ex
le of the
!"'
United States acting as a trustee. Furthermore, a trustee can "re
[e)
powers with respect to the administration of the trust." I d., § 37. Unl;-e-ss- - )
the United States agrees to be held liable in damages, even the existence of
a trust does not necessarily establish that the Government has surrendered
its immunity from damages.

'+

'llfV""'

"'

.. -#' •

-

?
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fested more the view that pervasive control over Indian life is
such a high attribute of federal sovereignty that States cannot infringe upon that control. Ibid. 9 The Court today
turns this shield into a sword.
In my view, it is clear that "[n]othing on the face" of any of
the statutes at issue, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U. S. 49, 59 (1978), or in their legislative histories, "fairly
[can] be interpreted as mandating compensation" for the conduct alleged by respondents. Some of the statutes involved
here, to be sure, create substantive duties that the Secretary
must fulfill. But this could equally be said of the Classification Act, considered in Testan. It requires that pay classification ratings of federal employees be carried out pursuant to
"the principle of equal pay for substantially equal work." 5
U. S. C. § 5101(1)(A). Although the federal employee in
Testan alleged a violation of the Act, the Court concluded
that a backf ay remedy was unavailable, rejecting the argu9 The Court has invoked the fiduciary relation primarily (i) to preclude
unauthorized state interference in the relations between the United States
and the Indian tribes or other unauthorized exercise of state jurisdiction on
Indian lands, see e. g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 382-384
(1886); (ii) to bar or nullify exercises of state court jurisdiction in matters
affecting Indian property rights, in which the United States was not properly joined or represented, see, e. g., Minnesota v. United States, 305
U. S. 382, 386 (1939); United States v. Candelaria, 271 U. S. 432, 442-444
(1926); (iii) to interpret doubtful or ambiguous treaty language in favor of
the Indians, see, e. g., United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U. S. 111,
117-118 (1938); Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 396 (1902); (iv) to
determine the liability of the United States for damages under the Just
Compensation Clause where, acting as a fiduciary manager, it has converted the form of Indian property, see, e. g., United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U. S. 371, 415-416 (1980); and (v) to emphasize the
high standard of care that the United States is obliged to exercise in carrying out its duties respecting the Indians, see, e. g., United States v. Mason, 412 U. S. 391, 398 (1973); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S.
286, 296-297 (1942). But the Court has never, until today, invoked the
doctrine to hold that the United States is answerable in money damages for
breaches of the standards applicable to a private fiduciary.
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ment that the substantive right necessarily implies a damages remedy. 424 U. S., at 400-403.
Ignoring this holding in Testan, the Court concludes that
the mere existence of a trust of some kind necessarily establishes that Congress has consented to a recovery of damages.
In language superficially resembling rejected perceptions of
"natural law," the Court rules that, "[g]iven the existence of
a trust relationship, it naturally follows that the Government
should be liable in damages for the breach of its fiduciary duties." Ante, at 20 (emphasis added). See also ibid. (damages are a "fundamental incident" of a trust relationship);
ibid. (it would be "anomalous" not to find a damages remedy).
The Court can find no more support for this proposition than
; the dissenting opinion in Mitchell I. See ante, at 21.'0
1 '~ _It is fair to say that the Court is influenced by its view that
~
an injunctive remedy is inadequate to redress the violations
L. ~
alleged-precisely the inference deemed inadmissible in
1v··"
Testan." It is the ordinary result of sovereign immunity

d

. ._

The Court reaches for support in Seminole Nation v. United States,
supra, and United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U. S. 103 (1935), but both
cases cut against the Court's theory in this case. The discussion of the
Government's fiduciary duty in Seminole Nation referred to a claim to
compel payments expressly prescribed by Treaty. See 316 U. S., at
296-297. Creek Nation involved a taking claim.
11
Also significant is the Court's standardless remand for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Given the strictness with which consents to suit by the sovereign are to be construed, United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 590-591 (1941), where the statute upon which liability
is premised creates no right to payment of a sum certain, the Court of
Claims will be required, without legislative guidance, to determine the extent of liability, if any, and the items of damages that are cognizable. This
task, unlike the factual or legal determination whether a particular individual falls within a class granted a right to payment Of money by a statute, is
not one to which courts are adapted. Any rules established will be of "judicial cloth, not legislative cloth." Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 454 U. S. 139, 141 (1981). I assume, however, that the law of trusts
generally will control and that all defenses to actions on breaches of trust,
such as consent by the beneficiary and laches, will be fully available to the
'

0
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that unconsented claims for money damages are barred.
The fact that damages cannot be recovered without the sovereign's consent hardly supports the conclusion that consent
has been given. Yet this, in substance, is the Court's reasoning. If it is saying that a remedy is necessary to redress
every injury sustained, the doctrine of sovereign immunity
will have been drained of all meaning. Moreover, "many of
the federal statutes . . . that expressly provide money damages as a remedy against the United States in carefully limited circumstances would be rendered superfluous." Testan,
424 U. S., at 404.
III
The Court has made no effort to demonstrate that Congress ·intended to render the United States answerable in
damages upon claims of the kind presented here. The mere
application by a court of the label "trust" cannot properly justify disregard of an immunity from damages the Government
has never waived. I would reverse the judgment of the
Court of Claims.

United States.

Cf. 664 F. 2d, at 274.
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JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins, '
dissenting.
The controlling law in this case is clear. Speaking for the
Court in United States v. .Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535 (1980)
(Mitchell 1), JUSTICE MARSHALL reaffirmed the general
principle that a cause of action for damages against the
United States "'cannot be implied but must be unequivocally
expressed."' !d., at 538 (quoting United States v. King, 395
U. S. 1, 4 (1969)). See United States v. Hopkins, 427 U. S.
123, 128 (1976) ("specific command of statute or authorized
regulations"); Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156, 170
(1981) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). Where, as here, a claim
for money damages is predicated upon an alleged statutory
violation, the rule is that the statute does not create a cause
of action for damages unless the statute "'in itself ... can
fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained.'" United States
v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 402 (1976) (quoting Eastport S.S.
Corp. v. United States, 372 F. 2d 1002, ·1008-1009 (Ct. Cl.
1967)). See, e. g., Army & Air Force Exchange Service v.
Sheehan, 456 U. S. 728, 739-740 (1982) ("Testan [held] that
the Tucker Act provides a remedy only where damages
claims against the United States have been authorized explicitly") (emphasis added); id., at 739 (damages remedy avail-
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able where the regulations "specifically authorize awards of
money damages"); id., at 741 (reaffirming that an action for
damages under the Tucker Act may not be premised upon
"regulations ... which do not explicitly authorize damages
awards"). In sum, whether the United States has created a
cause of action turns upon the intent of Congress, not the inclinations of the courts. See United States v. Shaw, 309
U. S. 495, 500 (1940) ("specific statutory consent"); Munro v.
United States, 303 U. S. 36, 41 (1938) ("only by permission").
Today, the Court appears disinterested in the intent of
Congress. It has effectively reversed the presumption that
absent "affirmative statutory authority," United States v.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U. S. 506, 514
(1940), the United States has not consented to be sued for
damages. It has substituted a contrary presumption, applicable to the conduct of the United States in Indian affairs,
that the United States has consented to be sued for statutory
violations and other departures from the rules that govern
private fiduciaries. I dissent from the Court's departure
from long-settled principles.
I
The Court does not-and clearly cannot-contend that any
of the statutes standing alone reflects the necessary legislative authorization of a damages remedy. None of the statutes contains any "provision ... that expressly makes the
United States liable" for its alleged mismanagement of Indian
forest resources and their proceeds or grants a right of action
"with specificity." Testan, 424 U. S., at 399, 400. Indeed,
nothing in the timber-sales statutes, 25 U. S. C. §§ 406, 407/
'The only monetary obligation imposed upon the Secretary by § 406 or
§ 407 is to pay the actual "proceeds" of timber sales to the owners of the
land. Thus, while it may well be that those sections would permit an ac. tion to compel the Secretary to pay over unlav.rfully retained proceeds, see
United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 401 (1976), no statutory basis exists
for extending that remedy to profits that arguably or ideally should have

l
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466/ the road and right-of-way statutes, §§ 318a, 323-325, 3
or the interest statute, § 162a, 4 addresses in any respect the
institution of damages actions against the United States.
Nor is there any indication in the legislative history of the
statutes that Congress intended to consent to damages actions for mismanagement of Indian assets by enacting these
provisions. 5 The Court does not suggest otherwise.
been, but were not, earned by the Secretary. On the contrary, the statutory recognition of a right to receive the "proceeds" of sales conducted suggests that this is the limit of any damages action implicitly authorized by
Congress. See Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 14-15, 20-21 (1981). Cf. United States v.
Erika, Inc., 456 U. S. 201, 208 (1982).
'Section 466 merely requires the Secretary to "make rules and regulations for the operation and management of Indian forestry units on the
principle of sustained-yield management."
3
Section 318a authorizes the appropriation of funds for building of roads
on Indian reservations. It would be a radical change in the law of sovereign immunity to hold that a routine authorization statute allows individuals who might benefit from appropriations to bring an action to recover
damages. And although § 325 requires "the payment of such· compensation as the Secretary of the Interior shall determine to be just," it does not
follow that damages for failure to secure more generous compensation are
available. Indeed, the explicit statutory recognition of the Secretary's authority to determine the amount of compensation militates against any
damages remedy for insufficient compensation. See Texas Industries,
Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 644-645 (1981); Plumbers &
Pipefitters v. Local 334, 452 U. S. 615, 630 (1981) (BURGER, C. J.,
dissenting).
• Section 162a affords the Secretary substantial discretion respecting investments to be made with individual Indian funds. There is nothing in
the statute that requires payment of a particular rate of interest, much less
that makes the United States accountable in damages for any amount by
which the revenues earned fall short of a standard of "reasonable management zeal to get for the Indians the best rate." Mitchell v. United States,
664 F. 2d 265, 274 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
5
It is improbable that Congress intended § 406 to constitute consent to
monetary liability for forestry mismanagement on allotted lands, because
before 1924, the Government maintained the position that heavily forested
lands were not to be allotted. See United States v. Payne, 264 U. S. 446;
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The Court for the most part rests its decision on the implausible proposition that statutes that do not in terms create
a right to payment of money nonetheless may support a damage action against the United States. This view simply cannot be reconciled with the decisions in Testan and Mitchell I.
A nonmonetary duty, 6 without more, is insufficient to overcome the "presumption" that Congress has not consented to
suit for money damages. See Eastern Transportation Co. v.
United States, 272 U. S. 675, 686 (1927).
This Court has had occasion in recent cases to emphasize
that congressional intent is the ultimate standard in determining whether a private right of action should be inferred
from a statute that does not, in terms, provide for such an
action. i Those cases are instructive, for here, too, the "ulti449 (1924); Brief for Petitioner 3 And before 1964, § 406 was a rather
bare instrument, simply giving an~~ian permission to sell his timber with
the Secretary's permission. See ante, at 13--14. The legislative hi story of
the 1964 amendments to § 406, see ante, at 16, also fails to supply the necessary evidence of congressional intent. The House Report states that
"[n]o additional expenditure of Federal funds" was expected to be incurred
by reason of the enactment of the legislation. H. R. Rep. No. 1292, 88th
Con g., 2d Sess. 2 (1964). A letter from the Interior Department to the
Congress urging enactment of the legislation explained only that the standards for timber sales on allotted lands "should help allay disputes and avoid
misunderstanding." S. Rep. No. 672, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1963).
6
Although not dispositive, the monetary character of a statutory right
is a strong indication that a statute "in itself ... can fairly be interpreted
as mandating compensation." By contrast, where, as here, the duties imposed by a statute are not essentially monetary in character, but require
implementation through conduct by federal officials, the contrary inference
arises: that Congress, by its silence as to a damages remedy, created only a
substantive right enforceable through injunctive relief. See Testan, 424
U. S., at 401, n. 5, 403.
'See, e. g., Jackson Transit Authority v. Transit Union, 457 U. S. 15,
20-23 (1982); Middlesex County, 453 U. S., at 13--18; Texas Industries, 451
U. S., at 639-040; California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287, 292--298 (1981);
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U. S. 77, 91-95 (1981);
Universities Research Assn. v. Coutu, 450 U. S. 754, 770-784 (1981);
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mate question is one of congressional intent, not one of
whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law." Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 578 (1979). As we recognized in Testan, courts are not free to dispense with "established principles" requiring explicit congressional authorization for maintenance of suits against the United States
simply "because it might be thought that they should be responsive to a particular conception of enlightened governmental policy." 424 U. S., at 400. See Shaw, 309 U. S., at
502. The Court today adduces no "evidence that Congress
anticipated that there would be a private remedy." California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287, 298 (1981).
The Court defends its departure from our precedents on
the ground that the statutes and regulations upon which respondents rely need not be "construed in the manner appropriate to waivers of sovereign immunity." Ante, at 12. The
Court in effect is overruling Mitchell I sub silentio, for as its
discussion on the Tucker Act makes clear, see ante, at 10-13,
we there at least "accepted the government's ... claim that a
strict standard of construction, applicable to deciding
whether Congress had enacted a waiver of sovereign immunity, should be applied in interpreting substantive legislation
for the benefit of Indian people." Hughes, Can the Trustee
be Sued for its Breach? The Sad Saga of United States v.
Mitchell, 26 S. D. L. Rev. 447, 473 (1981). We expressly
held that the General Allotment Act at issue in Mitchell I
"does not unambiguously provide that the United States has
undertaken full fiduciary responsibilities." 445 U. S., at 542
(emphasis added). Cf. Army & Air Force Exchange Service
v. Sheehan, 456 U. S., at 739 ("explicitly reject[ing] the argument that 'the violation of any statute or regulation ... autoTransamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc . v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11, 1S-24
(1979). Against the background of sovereign immunity, the rationale of
these cases should apply here with particular force.
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matically creates a cause of action against the United States
for money damages"') (quoting Testan, 424 U. S., at 401).
The Court hardly can view the statutes here as "unambiguously" imposing trust duties on the Government.
II

The Court makes little or no pretense that it is following
doctrine heretofore established. Without pertinent analysis,
it simply concludes: "Because the statutes and regulations at
issue in this case clearly establish fiduciary obligations of the
Government in the management and operation of Indian
lands and resources, they can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for damages sustained." Ante, at 19-20. This conclusion rests on
two dubious assumptions. First, the Court decides that the
statutes create or recognize fiduciary duties. It then reasons that because a private express trust normally imports a
right to recover damages for breach, and because injunctive
relief is perceived to be inadequate, Congress necessarily
must have authorized recovery of damages for failure to per-~
form the statutory duties properly. The relevancy of the
first conclusion is questionable, and the other departs from
our precedents, chiefly Testan and Mitchell I.
The Court simply asserts that the statutes here "clearly establish fiduciary obligations." Ante, at 20. See also id., at
19 ("a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises"). I agree
with the dissent in the Court of Claims that "there is kind of a
bootstrap quality of reasoning in saying that [the United
States'] duties expressed by law are those of a trustee, and,
therefore, we may look at SCOTT ON TRUSTS or theRESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS and impose on [the Government] all the other consequences the law, as stated by those
authorities, derives from the status of an erring nongovernmental trustee." 664 F. 2d 265, 283 (Nichols, J., concurring
and dissenting). "The federal power over Indian lands is so
different in nature and origin from that of a private trustee
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that caution is taught in using the mere label of a trust
plus a reading of SCOTT ON TRUSTS to impose liability on
claims where assent is not unequivocally expressed." lbid. 8
The trusteeships to which the Court has referred in the past
' "There are a number of widely varying relationships which more or
less closely resemble trusts, but which are not trusts, although the term
'trust' is sometimes used loosely to cover such relationships. It is important to differentiate trusts from these other relationships, since many of
the rules applicable to trusts are not applicable to them." Restatement
(Second) of Trusts § 4, Introductory Note, at 15 (1959). For example, the
Court often has described the fiduciary relationship between the United
States and Indians as one between a guardian and a ward. See, e. g.,
Klamath Indians v. United States, 296 U. S. 244, 254 (1935); United States
v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 383 (1886). But "[a] guardianship is not a
trust." Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 7. There is no explanation,
however, why the Court chooses one analogy and not another. The choice
appears to be influenced by the fact that "[t]he duties of a trustee are more
intensive than the duties of other fiduciaries." I d., § 2, comment b.
The Court asserts that "[a]ll of the necessary elements of a common-law
trust are present"-a trustee, a beneficiary, and a trust corpus. Ante, at
19. But two persons and a parcel of real property, without more, do not
create a trust. Rather, "[a] trust ... arises as a result of a manifestation
of an intention to create it.·~ Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 2. See
id., § 23 ("A trust is created only if the settlor properly manifests an intention to create a trust."); id., § 25 ("No trust is created unless the settlor
manifests an intention to impose enforceable duties."). This is the element that is missing in this case, and the Court does not, and cannot, find
that Congress has manifested its intent to make the statutory duties upon
which respondents rely trust duties. Cf. id., § 95; 2 A. Scott, Law of
Trusts § 95, at 772 (2d ed. 1967) ("At common law it was held that a use ...
could not be enforced against the Crown .... ").
Indeed, given the language of the statute at issue in Mitchell I, the case
for finding that Congress intended to impose fiduciary obligations on the
United States was much stronger there than it is here. See 445 U. S., at
547 (WHITE~-'J., dissenting). One of the authorities cited by JUSTICE
WHITE, 2 A.' Scott, supra, § 95, specifically discusses the General Allotment
Act as an example of the United States acting as a trustee. Furthermore,
. a trustee can "reserv[e] powers with respect to the administration of the
trust." Restatement (Second) of T-rusts, § 37. Unless the United States
agrees to be held liable in damages, even the existence of a trust does not
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have manifested more the view that pervasive control over
Indian life is such a high attribute of federal sovereignty that
States cannot infringe upon that control. Ibid. 9 The Court
today turns this shield into a sword.
In my view, it is clear that "[n]othing on the face" of any of
the statutes at issue, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U. S. 49, 59 (1978), or in their legislative histories, "fairly
[can] be interpreted as mandating compensation" for the conduct alleged by respondents. Some of the statutes involved
here, to be sure, create substantive duties that the Secretary
must fulfill. But this could equally be said of the Classification Act, considered in Testan. It requires that pay classification ratings of federal employees be carried out pursuant to
"the principle of equal pay for substantially equal work." 5
U. S. C. § 5101(1)(A). Although the federal employee in
necessarily establish that the Government has surrendered its immunity
from damages.
• The Court has invoked the fiduciary relation primarily (i) to preclude
unauthorized state interference in the relations between the United States
and the Indian tribes or other unauthorized exercise of state jurisdiction on
Indian lands, see e. g., Kagama, 118 U. S., at 382-384; (ii) to bar or nullify
exercises of state court jurisdiction in matters affecting Indian property
rights, in which the United States was not properly joined or represented,
see, e. g., Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382, 386 (1939); United
States v. Candelaria, 271 U. S. 432, 442-444 (1926); (iii) to interpret doubtful or ambiguous treaty language in favor of the Indians, see, e. g., United
States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U. S. 111, 117-118 (1938); Minnesota v.
Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 396 (1902); (iv) to determine the liability of the
United States for damages under the Just Compensation Clause where,
acting as a fiduciary manager, it has converted the form of Indian property, see, e. g., United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371,
415-416 (1980); and (v) to emphasize the high standard of care that the
United States is obliged to exercise in carrying out its duties respecting the
Indians, see, e. g., United States v. Mason, 412 U. S. 391, 398 (1973); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S. 286, 29~297 (1942). But the
Court has never, until today, invoked the doctrine to hold that the United
States is answe:r;able in money damages for breaches of the standards applicable to a private fiduciary.
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Testan alleged a violation of the Act, the Court concluded
that a back-pay remedy was unavailable, rejecting the argument that the substantive right necessarily implies a damages remedy. 424 U. S., at 400-403.
Ignoring this holding in Testan, the Court concludes that
the mere existence of a trust of some kind necessa1·ily establishes that Congress has consented to a recovery of damages.
In effect we are told to accept on faith the existence of a damages cause of action: "Given the existence of a trust relationship, it naturally follows that the Government should be liable in damages for the breach of its fiduciary duties." Ante,
at 20 (emphasis added). See also ibid. (damages are a "fundamental incident" of a trust relationship); ibid. (it would be
"anomalous" not to find a damages remedy). The Court can
find no more support for this proposition than the dissenting
opinion in Mitchell I. See ante, at 21. 10
It is fair to say that the Court is influenced by its view that
an injunctive remedy is inadequate to redress the violations
alleged- precisely the inference deemed inadmissible in
Testan. 11 It is the ordinary result of sovereign immunity
10
The Court reaches for support in Seminole Nation v. United States,
supra, and United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U. S. 103 (1935), but both
cases cut against the Court's theory in this case. The discussion of the
Government's fiduciary duty in Serni1wle Nation refelTed to a claim to
compel payments expressly prescribed by Treaty. See 316 U. S., at ·
296-297. Creek Nation involved a ta!Dng claim.
11
Also significant is the Court's standardless remand for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Where the statute upon which liability is premised creates no right to payment of a sum certain, the Court of
Claims will be required, without legislative guidance, to det.ennine the extent of liability, if any, and the items of damages that are cognizable. This
task, unlike the factual or legal determination whether a particular individual falls within a class granted a right to payment of money by a statute, is
not one to which courts are adapted. Any rules established will be of "judicial cloth, not legislative cloth." Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 454 U. S. 139, 141 (1981). I assume, however, that the law of trusts
generally will control and that all defenses to actions on breaches of tl"llst,
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that unconsented claims for money damages are barred.
The fact that damages cannot be recovered without the sovereign's consent hardly supports the conclusion that consent
has been given. Yet this, in substance, is the Court's reasoning. If it is saying that a remedy is necessary to redress
every injury sustained, the doctrine of sovereign immunity
will have been drained of all meaning. Moreover, "many of
the federal statutes . . . that expressly provide money damages as a remedy against the United States in carefully limited circumstances would be rendered superfluous." Testan,
424 U. S., at 404.
III
The Court has made no effort to demonstrate that Congress intended to render the United States answerable in
damages upon claims of the kind presented here. The mere
application by a court of the label "trust" cannot properly justify disregard of an immunity from damages the Government
has never waived. I would reverse the judgment of the
Court of Claims.

such as consent by the beneficiary and laches, will be fully available to the
United States. Cf. 664 F. 2q, at 274.

A.:.u'c:iS\~

~
~ 211983

C:A,'Cf':

230'1:2..

~4~
I

4, ~
1,£.\,

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor

1

From:

Justice Powell

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
ex)

-o Ul

cC:::
Recirculated: --.J....o.'-----<.:~,---co 0
I

c:_

3d
g.ftt'l

, )

DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-1748

c:
:z::

......

N

-

-o

r?:J
-1"11:::0
r. J:rrl

:.?• I...., rl1
('")
~

C- ..

,.

;

-::

~-<: •

·n

.r• ~:l~_i(~

.

...,

~c:
~tr.

~

-...1

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v.
HELEN MITCHELL ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
[June-, 1983]

rurcJ.. JU.:ST \C ~

JusTICE PowELL, with whom JusTICE REHNQUIS join~
l
0 •C.ON~OR
dissenting.
The controlling law in this case is clear. Speaking for the
.
.
Court in United States v. ,Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535 (1980)
(Mitchell /), JUSTICE MARSHALL reaffirmed the general
principle that a cause of action for damages against the
United States" 'cannot be implied but must be unequivocally
expressed."' /d., at 538 (quoting United States v. King, 395 ~
U. S. 1, 4 (1969)). See United States v. Hopkins, 427 U. S.
123, 128 (1976) ("specific command of statute or authorized
regulations"); Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156, 170
(1981) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). 'Where, as here, a claim
for money damages is predicated upon an alleged statutory
violation, the rule is that the statute does not create a cause
of action for damages unless the statute "'in itself ... can
fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained."' United States
v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 402 (1976) (quoting Eastport S.S.
Corp. v. United States, 372 F. 2d 1002, 1008--1009 (Ct. Cl.
1967)). See, e. g., Army & Air Force Exchange Service v.
Sheehan, 456 U. S. 728, 739-740 (1982) ("Testan [held] that
the Tucker Act provides a remedy only where damages
claims against the United States have been authorized explicitly") (emphasis added); id., at 739 (damages remedy avail-
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able where the regulations "specifically authorize awards of
money damages"); id., at 741 (reaffirming that an action for
damages under the Tucker Act may not be premised upon
"regulations ... which do not explicitly authorize damages
awards") . In sum, whether the United States has created a
cause of action turns upon the intent of Congress, not the inclinations of the courts. See United States v. Shaw, 309
U. S. 495, 500 (1940) ("specific statutory consent"); Munro v.
United States, 303 U. S. 36, 41 (1938) ("only by permission").
Today, the Court appears disinterested in the intent of
Congress. It has effectively reversed the presumption that
absent "affirmative statutory authority," United States v.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U. S. 506, 514
(1940), the United States has not consented to be sued for
damages. It has substituted a contrary presumption, applicable to the conduct of the United States in Indian affairs,
that the United States has consented to be sued for statutory
violations and other departures from the rules that govern
private fiduciaries. I dissent from the Court's departure
from long-settled principles.
I
The Court does not-and clearly cannot-contend that any
of the statutes standing alone reflects the necessary legislative authorization of a damages remedy. None of the statutes contains any "provision . . . that expressly makes the
United States liable" for its alleged mismanagement of Indian
forest resources and their proceeds or grants a right of action
"with specificity." Testan, 424 U. S., at 399, 400. Indeed,
nothing in the timber-sales statutes, 25 U.S. C. §§406, 407, 1
'The only monetary obligation imposed upon the Secretary by § 406 or
§ 407 is to pay the actual "proceeds" of timber sales to the owners of the
land. Thus, while it may well be that those sections would permit an ac. tion to compel the Secretary to pay over unlawfully retained proceeds, see
United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 401 (1976), no statutory basis exists
for extending that remedy to profits that arguably or ideally should have
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466/ the road and right-of-way statutes, §§ 318a, 323-325, 3
or the interest statute, § 162a, 4 addresses in any respect the
institution of damages actions against the United States.
Nor is there any indication in the legislative history of the
statutes that Congress intended to consent to damages actions for mismanagement of Indian assets by enacting these
provisions. 5 The Court does not suggest otherwise.
been, but were not, earned by the Secretary. On the contrary, the statutory recognition of a right to receive the "proceeds" of sales conducted suggests that this is the limit of any damages action implicitly authorized by
Congress. See Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Assn ., 453 U. S. 1, 14-15, 20-21 (1981). Cf. United States v.
Erika, Inc., 456 U. S. 201, 208 (1982).
2
Section 466 merely requires the Secretary to "make rules and regulations for the operation and management of Indian forestry units on the
principle of sustained-yield management. "
3
Section 318a authorizes the appropriation of funds for building of roads
on Indian reservations. It would be a radical change in the law of sovereign immunity to hold that a routine authorization statute allows individuals who might benefit from appropriations to bring an action to recover
damages. And although § 325 requires "the payment of such ·compensation as the Secretary of the Interior shall determine to be just," it does not
follow that damages for failure to secure more generous compensation are
available. Indeed, the explicit statutory recognition of the Secretary's authority to determine the amount of compensation militates against any
damages remedy for insufficient compensation. See Texas Industries,
Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 644-645 (1981); Plumbers &
Pipefitters v. Local 334, 452 U.S. 615, 630 (1981) (BURGER, C. J.,
dissenting).
'Section 162a affords the Secretary substantial discretion respecting investments to be made with individual Indian funds . There is nothing in
the statute that requires payment of a particular rate of interest, much less
that makes the United States accountable in damages for any amount by
which the revenues earned fall short of a standard of "reasonable management zeal to get for the Indians the best rate." Mitchell v. United States,
664 F. 2d 265, 274 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
5
It is improbable that Congress intended § 406 to constitute consent to
monetary liability for forestry mismanagement on allotted lands, because
before 1924, the Government maintained the position that heavily forested
lands were not to be allotted. See United States v. Payne, 264 U . S. 446;
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The Court for the most part rests its decision on the implausible proposition that statutes that do not in terms create
a right to payment of money nonetheless may support a damage action against the United States. This view simply cannot be reconciled with the decisions in Testan and Mitchell I.
A nonmonetary duty, 6 without more, is insufficient to overcome the "presumption" that Congress has not consented to
suit for money damages. See Eastern Transportation Co. v.
United States, 272 U. S. 675, 686 (1927).
This Court has had occasion in recent cases to emphasize
that congressional intent is the ultimate standard in determining whether a private right of action should be inferred
from a statute that does not, in terms, provide for such an
action. i Those cases are instructive, for here, too, the "ulti449 (1924); Brief for Petitioner 3,t-., ,_fnd before 1964, § 406 was a rather
bare instrument, simply giving an' Indian permission to sell his timber with
the Secretary's permission. See ante, at 13-14. The legislative history of
the 1964 amendments to § 406, see ante, at 16, also fails to supply the necessary evidence of congressional intent. The House Report states that
"[n]o additional expenditure of Fed eral funds" was expected to be incurred
by reason of the enactment of the legislation. H. R. Rep. No. 1292, 88th
Con g., 2d Sess. 2 (1964). A letter from the Interior Department to the
Congress urging enactment of the legislation explained only that the standards for timber sales on allotted lands "should help allay disputes and avoid
misunderstanding." S. Rep. No. 672, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1963).
6
Although not dispositive, the monetary character of a statutory right
is a strong indication that a statute "in itself . .. can fairly be interpreted
as mandating compensation." By contrast, where, as here, the duties imposed by a statute are not essentially monetary in character, but require
implementation through conduct by federal officials, the contrary inference
arises: that Congress, by its silence as to a damages remedy, created only a
substantive right enforceable through injunctive relief. See Testan, 424
U. S., at 401, n. 5, 403.
7
See, e. g., Jackson Transit Authority v. Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15,
2D-23 (1982); Middlesex County, 453 U. S., at 13-18; Texas Industries, 451
U. S., at 639--640; California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287, 292--298 (1981);
Northwest Airlines, Inc . v. Transport Workers, 451 U. S. 77, 91- 95 (1981);
Universities R esearch Assn. v. Coutu, 450 U. S. 754, 770-784 (1981);
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mate question is one of congressional intent, not one of
whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law." Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 578 (1979). As we recognized in Testan, courts are not free to dispense with "established principles" requiring explicit congressional authorization for maintenance of suits against the United States
simply "because it might be thought that they should be responsive to a particular conception of enlightened governmental policy." 424 U. S., at 400. See Shaw, 309 U. S., at
502. The Court today adduces no "evidence that Congress
anticipated that there would be a private remedy." California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287, 298 (1981).
The Court defends its departure from our precedents on
the ground that the statutes and regulations upon which respondents rely need not be "construed in the manner appropriate to waivers of sovereign immunity." Ante, at 12. The
Court in effect is overruling Mitchell I sub silentio, for as its
discussion on the Tucker Act makes clear, see ante, at 10-13,
we there at least "accepted the government's ... claim that a
strict standard of construction, applicable to deciding
whether Congress had enacted a waiver of sovereign immunity, should be applied in interpreting substantive legislation
for the benefit of Indian people." Hughes, Can the Trustee
be Sued for its Breach? The Sad Saga of United States v.
Mitchell, 26 S. D. L. Rev. 447, 473 (1981). We expressly
held that the General Allotment Act at issue in Mitchell I
"does not unambiguously provide that the United States has
undertaken full fiduciary responsibilities." 445 U. S., at 542
(emphasis added). Cf. Army & Air Force Exchange Service
v. Sheehan, 456 U. S., at 739 ("explicitly reject[ing] the argument that 'the violation of any statute or regulation ... autoTransamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11, 19-24
(1979). Against the background of sovereign immunity, the rationale of
these cases should apply here with particular force.
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matically creates a cause of action against the United States
for money damages"') (quoting Testan, 424 U. S., at 401).
The Court hardly can view the statutes here as "unambiguously" imposing trust duties on the Government.
II

The Court makes little or no pretense that it is following
doctrine heretofore established. Without pertinent analysis,
it simply concludes: "Because the statutes and regulations at
issue in this case clearly establish fiduciary obligations of the
Government in the management and operation of Indian
lands and resources, they can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for damages sustained." Ante, at 19-20. This conclusion rests on
two dubious assumptions. First, the Court decides that the
statutes create or recognize fiduciary duties. It then reasons that because a private express trust normally imports a
right to recover damages for breach, and because injunctive
relief is perceived to be inadequate, Congress necessarily
must have authorized recovery of damages for failure to per-~
form the statutory duties properly. The relevancy of the
first conclusion is questionable, and the other departs from
our precedents, chiefly Testan and Mitchell I.
The Court simply asserts that the statutes here "clearly establish fiduciary obligations." Ante, at 20. See also id., at
19 ("a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises"). I agree
with the dissent in the Court of Claims that "there is kind of a
bootstrap quality of reasoning in saying that [the United
States'] duties expressed by law are those of a trustee, and,
therefore, we may look at SCOTT ON TRUSTS or theRESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS and impose on [the Government] all the other consequences the law, as stated by those
authorities, derives from the status of an erring nongovernmental trustee." 664 F. 2d 265, 283 (Nichols, J., concurring
and dissenting). "The federal power over Indian lands is so
different in nature and origin from that of a private trustee
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that caution is taught in using the mere label of a trust
plus a reading of SCOTT ON TRUSTS to impose liability on
claims where assent is not unequivocally expressed." lbid. 8
The trusteeships to which the Court has referred in the past
• "There are a number of widely varying relationships which more or
less closely resemble trusts, but which are not trusts, although the term
'trust' is sometimes used loosely to cover such relationships. It is important to differentiate trusts from these other relationships, since many of
the rules applicable to trusts are not applicable to them." Restatement
(Second) of Trusts§ 4, Introductory Note, at 15 (1959). For example, the
Court often has described the fiduciary relationship between the United
States and Indians as one between a guardian and a ward. See, e. g.,
Klamath Indians v. United States, 296 U. S. 244, 254 (1935); United States
v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 383 (1886). But "[a] guardianship is not a
trust." Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 7. There is no explanation,
however, why the Court chooses one analogy and not another. The choice
appears to be influenced by the fact that "[t]he duties of a trustee are more
intensive than the duties of other fiduciaries." I d., § 2, comment b.
The Court asserts that "[a]ll of the necessary elements of a common-law
trust are present"- a trustee, a beneficiary, and a trust corpus. Ante, at
19. But two persons and a parcel of real property, v.'ithout more, do not
create a trust. Rather, "[a] trust ... arises as a result of a manifestation
of an intention to create it.'~ Re tatement (Second) of Trusts, § 2. See
id., § 23 ("A trust is created only if the settlor properly manifests an intention to create a trust."); id., § 25 ("No trust is created unless the settlor
manifests an intention to impose enforceable duties."). This is the element that is missing in this case, and the Court does not, and cannot, find
that Congress has manifested its intent to make the statutory duties upon
which respondents rely trust duties. Cf. id., § 95; 2 A. Scott, Law of
Trusts § 95, at 772 (2d ed. 1967) ("At common Jaw it was held that a use . . .
could not be enforced against the Crown .... ").
Indeed, given the language of the statute at issue in Mitchell I, the case
for finding that Congress intended to impose fiduciary obligations on the
United States was much stronger there than it is here. See 445 U. S., at
547 (WHITE/.'.J., dissenting). One of the authorities cited by JUSTICE
WHITE, 2 A.' Scott, supra, § 95, specifically discusses the General Allotment
Act as an example of the United States acting as a trustee. Furthermore,
. a trustee can "reserv[e] powers with respect to the administration of the
trust." Restatement (Second) of T-rusts, § 37. Unless the United States
agrees to be held liable in damages, even the existence of a trust does not
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have manifested more the view that pervasive control over
Indian life is such a high attribute of federal sovereignty that
States cannot infringe upon that control. Ibid. 9 The Court
today turns this shield into a sword.
In my view, it is clear that "[n]othing on the face" of any of
the statutes at issue, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U. S. 49, 59 (1978), or in their legislative histories, "fairly
[can] be interpreted as mandating compensation" for the conduct alleged by respondents. Some of the statutes involved
here, to be sure, create substantive duties that the Secretary
must fulfill. But this could equally be said of the Classification Act, considered in Testan. It requires that pay classification ratings of federal employees be carried out pursuant to
"the principle of equal pay for substantially equal work." 5
U. S. C. § 5101(1)(A). Although the federal employee in
necessarily establish that the Government has surrendered its immunity
from damages.
'The Court has invoked the fiduciary relation primarily (i) to preclude
unauthorized state interference in the relations between the United States
and the Indian tribes or other unauthorized exercise of state jurisdiction on
Indian lands, see e. g., Kagama, 118 U. S., at 382-384; (ii) to bar or nullify
exercises of state court jurisdiction in matters affecting Indian property
rights, in which the United States was not properly joined or represented,
see, e. g., Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382, 386 (1939); United
States v. Candelaria, 271 U. S. 432, 442-444 (1926); (iii) to interpret doubtful or ambiguous treaty language in favor of the Indians, see, e. g., United
States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U. S. 111, 117-118 (1938); Minnesota v.
Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 396 (1902); (iv) to determine the liability of the
United States for damages under the Just Compensation Clause where,
acting as a fiduciary manager, it has converted the form of Indian property, see, e. g., United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U. S. 371,
415-416 (1980); and (v) to emphasize the high standard of care that the
United States is obliged to exercise in carrying out its duties respecting the
Indians, see, e. g., United States v. Mason, 412 U. S. 391, 398 (1973); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S. 286, 296-297 (1942). But the
Court has never, until today, invoked the doctrine to hold that the United
States is answe~;able in money damages for breaches of the standards applicable to a private fiduciary.
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Testan alleged a violation of the Act, the Court concluded
that a back-pay remedy was unavailable, rejecting the argument that the substantive right necessarily implies a damages remedy. 424 U. S., at 400-403.
Ignoring this holding in Testan, the Court concludes that
the mere existence of a trust of some kind necessarily establishes that Congress has consented to a recovery of damages.
In effect we are told to accept on faith the existence of a damages cause of action: "Given the existence of a trust relationship, it naturally follows that the Government should be liable in damages for the breach of its fiduciary duties." Ante,
at 20 (emphasis added). See also ibid. (damages are a "fundamental incident" of a trust relationship); ibid. (it would be
"anomalous" not to find a damages remedy). The Court can
find no more support for this proposition than the dissenting
opinion in Mitchell I . See ante, at 21. 10
It is fair to say that the Court is influenced by its view that
an injunctive remedy is inadequate to redress the violations
alleged-precisely the inference deemed inadmissible in
Testan . 11 It is the ordinary result of sovereign immunity
0
' The Court reaches for support in Seminole Nation v. United States,
supra, and United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U. S. 103 (1935), but both
cases cut against the Court's th eory in this case. The discussion of the
Government's fiduciary duty in Semi1wle Nation referred to a claim to
compel payments expressly prescribed by Treaty. See 316 U. S., at ·
296-297. Creek Nation involved a taking claim.
" Also significant is the Court's standardless remand for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Where the statute upon which liability is prerrused creates no right to payment of a sum certain, the Court of
Claims will be required, -without legislative guidance, to determine the extent of liability, if any, and the items of damages that are cognizable. This
task, unlike the factual or legal determination whether a particular individual falls within a class granted a right to payment of money by a statute, is
not one to which courts are adapted. Any rules established will be of "judicial cloth, not legislative cloth." Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 454 U. S. 139, 141 (1981). I assume, however, that the law of trusts
generally will control and that all defenses to actions on breaches of trust,
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that unconsented claims for money damages are barred.
The fact that damages cannot be recovered without the sovereign's consent hardly supports the conclusion that consent
has been given. Yet this, in substance, is the Court's reasoning. If it is saying that a remedy is necessary to redress
every injury sustained, the doctrine of sovereign immunity
will have been drained of all meaning. Moreover, "many of
the federal statutes ... that expressly provide money damages as a remedy against the United States in carefully limited circumstances would be rendered superfluous." Testan,
424 U.S., at 404.
III
The Court has made no effort to demonstrate that Congress intended to render the United States answerable in
damages upon claims of the kind presented here. The mere
application by a court of the label "trust" cannot properly justify disregard of an immunity from damages the Government
has never waived. I would reverse the judgment of the
Court of Claims.

such as consent by the beneficiary and laches, will be fully available to the
United States. Cf. 664 F. 2d, at 274.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
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JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST and
JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, dissenting.
The controlling law in this case is clear. Speaking for the
Court in United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535 (1980)
(Mitchell I), JUSTICE MARSHALL reaffirmed the general
principle that a cause of action for damages against the
United States "'cannot be implied but must be unequivocally
expressed."' I d., at 538 (quoting United States v. King, 395
U. S. 1, 4 (1969)). See United States v. Hopkins, 427 U. S.
123, 128 (1976) ("specific command of statute or authorized
regulations"); Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156, 170
(1981) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). Where, as here, a claim
for money damages is predicated upon an alleged statutory
violation, the rule is that the statute does not create a cause
of action for damages unless the statute "'in itself . . . can
fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained."' United States
v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 402 (1976) (quoting Eastport S.S.
Corp. v. United States, 372 F. 2d 1002, 1008-1009 (Ct. Cl.
1967)). See, e. g., Army & Air Force Exchange Service v.
Sheehan, 456 U. S. 728, 739--740 (1982) ("Testan [held] that
the Tucker Act provides a remedy only where damages
claims against the United States have been authorized explicitly") (emphasis added); id., at 739 (damages remedy avail-
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able where the regulations "specifically authorize awards of
money damages"); id., at 741 (reaffirming that an action for
damages under the Tucker Act may not be premised upon
"regulations ... which do not explicitly authorize damages
awards"). In sum, whether the United States has created a
cause of action turns upon the intent of Congress, not the inclinations of the courts. See United States v. Shaw, 309
U. S. 495, 500 (1940) ("specific statutory consent"); Munro v.
United States, 303 U. S. 36, 41 (1938) ("only by permission").
Today, the Court appears disinterested in the intent of
Congress. It has effectively reversed the presumption that
absent "affirmative statutory authority," United States v.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U. S. 506, 514
(1940), the United States has not consented to be sued for
damages. It has substituted a contrary presumption, applicable to the conduct of the United States in Indian affairs,
that the United States has consented to be sued for statutory
violations and other departures from the rules that govern
private fiduciaries. I dissent from the Court's departure
from long-settled principles.
I
The Court does not-and clearly cannot-contend that any
of the statutes standing alone reflects the necessary legislative authorization of a damages remedy. None of the statutes contains any "provision . . . that expressly makes the
United States liable" for its alleged mismanagement of Indian
forest resources and their proceeds or grants a right of action
"with specificity." Testan, 424 U. S., at 399, 400. Indeed,
nothing in the timber-sales statutes, 25 U. S. C. §§ 406, 407, 1
1
The only monetary obligation imposed upon the Secretary by § 406 or
§ 407 is to pay the actual "proceeds" of timber sales to the owners of the

land. Thus, while it may well be that those sections would permit an action to compel the Secretary to pay over unlawfully retained proceeds, see
United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 401 (1976) , no statutory basis exists
for extending that remedy to profits that arguably or ideally should have
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466/ the road and right-of-way statutes, §§ 318a, 323-325, 3
or the interest statute, § 162a," addresses in any respect the
institution of damages actions against the United States.
Nor is there any indication in the legislative history of the
statutes that Congress intended to consent to damages actions for mismanagement of Indian assets by enacting these
provisions. 5 The Court does not suggest otherwise.
been, but were not, earned by the Secretary. On the contrary, the statutory recognition of a right to receive the "proceeds" of sales conducted suggests that this is the limit of any damages action implicitly authorized by
Congress. See Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 14-15, 20-21 (1981). Cf. United States v.
Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201, 208 (1982).
2
Section 466 merely requires the Secretary to "make rules and regulations for the operation and management of Indian forestry units on the
principle of sustained-yield management."
3
Section 318a authorizes the appropriation of funds for building of roads
on Indian reservations. It would be a radical change in the law of sovereign immunity to hold that a routine authorization statute allows individuals who might benefit from appropriations to bring an action to recover
damages. And although § 325 requires "the payment of such compensation as the Secretary of the Interior shall determine to be just," it does not
follow that damages for failure to secure more generous compensation are
available. Indeed, the explicit statutory recognition of the Secretary's authority to determine the amount of compensation militates against any
damages remedy for insufficient compensation. See Texas Industries,
Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 644--645 (1981); Plumbers &
Pipejitters v. Local 331,., 452 U. S. 615, 630 (1981) (BURGER, C. J.,
dissenting).
'Section 162a affords the Secretary substantial discretion respecting investments to be made with individual Indian funds. There is nothing in
the statute that requires payment of a particular rate of interest, much less
that makes the United States accountable in damages for any amount by
which the revenues earned fall short of a standard of "reasonable management zeal to get for the Indians the best rate." Mitchell v. United States,
664 F. 2d 265, 274 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
5
It is improbable that Congress intended § 406 to constitute consent to
monetary liability for forestry mismanagement on allotted lands, because
before 1924, the Government maintained the position that heavily forested
.lands were not to be allotted. See United States v. Payne, 264 U. S. 446,
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The Court for the most part rests its decision. on the implausible proposition that statutes that do not in terms create
a right to payment of money nonetheless may support a damage action against the United States. This view simply cannot be reconciled with the decisions in Testan and Mitchell I.
A nonmonetary duty, 6 without more, is insufficient to overcome the "presumption" that Congress has not consented to
suit for money damages. See Eastern Transportation Co. v.
United States, 272 U. S. 675, 686 (1927).
This Court has had occasion in recent cases to emphasize
that congressional intent is the ultimate standard in determining whether a private right of action should be inferred
from a statute that does not, in terms, provide for such an
action. 7 Those cases are instructive, for here, too, the "ulti449 (1924); Brief for Petitioner 3, n. 2. And before 1964, § 406 was a
rather bare instrument, simply giving an Indian permission to sell his timber with the Secretary's permission. See ante, at 13--14. The legislative
history of the 1964 amendments to§ 406, see ante, at 16, also fails to supply
the necessary evidence of congressional intent. The House Report states
that "[n]o additional expenditure of Federal funds" was expected to be incurred by reason of the enactment of the legislation. H. R. Rep. No.
1292, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964). A letter from the Interior Department to the Congress urging enactment of the legislation explained only
that the standards for timber sales on allotted lands "should help allay disputes and avoid misunderstanding." S. Rep. No. 672, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess., 3 (1963).
• Although not dispositive, the monetary character of a statutory right
is a strong indication that a statute "in itself ... can fairly be interpreted
as mandating compensation." By contrast, where, as here, the duties imposed by a statute are not essentially monetary in character, but require
implementation through conduct by federal officials, the contrary inference
arises: that Congress, by its silence as to a damages remedy, created only a
substantive right enforceable through injunctive relief. See Testan, 424
U. S., at 401, n. 5, 403.
7
See, e. g., Jackson Transit Authority v. Transit Union, 457 U. S. 15,
20-23 (1982); Middlesex County, 453 U. S., at 13--18; Texas Industries, 451
U.S., at 639-640; California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287,292-298 (1981);
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U. S. 77, 91-95 (1981);
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mate question is one of congressional intent, not one of
whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law." Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 578 (1979). As we recognized in Testan, courts are not free to dispense with "established principles" requiring explicit congressional authorization for maintenance of suits against the United States
simply "because it might be thought that they should be responsive to a particular conception of enlightened governmental policy." 424 U. S., at 400. See Shaw, 309 U. S., at
502. The Court today adduces no "evidence that Congress
anticipated that there would be a private remedy." California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287, 298 (1981).
The Court defends its departure from our precedents on
the ground that the statutes and regulations upon which respondents rely need not be "construed in the manner appropriate to waivers of sovereign immunity." Ante, at 12. The
Court in effect is overruling Mitchell I sub silentio, for as its
discussion on the Tucker Act makes clear, see ante, at 10-13,
we there at least "accepted the government's ... claim that a
strict standard of construction, applicable to deciding
whether Congress had enacted a waiver of sovereign immunity, should be applied in interpreting substantive legislation
for the benefit of Indian people." Hughes, Can the Trustee
be Sued for its Breach? The Sad Saga of United States v.
Mitchell, 26 S. D. L. Rev. 447, 473 (1981). We expressly
held that the General Allotment Act at issue in Mitchell I
"does not unambiguously provide that the United States has
undertaken full fiduciary responsibilities." 445 U. S., at 542
(emphasis added). Cf. Army & Air Force Exchange Service
v. Sheehan, 456 U. S., at 739 ("explicitly reject[ing] the arguUniversities Research Assn. v. Coutu, 450 U. S. 754, 770-784 (1981);
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11, 19-24
(1979). Against the background of sovereign immunity, the rationale of
these cases should apply here with particular force.

81-1748-DISSENT
6

UNITED STATES v. MITCHELL

ment that 'the violation of any statute or regulation . . . automatically creates a cause of action against the United States
for money damages'") (quoting Testan, 424 U. S., at 401).
The Court hardly can view the statutes here as "unambiguously" imposing trust duties on the Government.
II
The Court makes little or no pretense that it is following
doctrine heretofore established. Without pertinent analysis,
it simply concludes: "Because the statutes and regulations at
issue in this case clearly establish fiduciary obligations of the
Government in the management and operation of Indian
lands and resources, they can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for damages sustained." Ante, at 19-20. This conclusion rests on
two dubious assumptions. First, the Court decides that the
statutes create or recognize fiduciary duties. It then reasons that because a private express trust normally imports a
right to recover damages for breach, and because injunctive
relief is perceived to be inadequate, Congress necessarily
must have authorized recovery of damages for failure to perform the statutory duties properly. The relevancy of the
first conclusion is questionable, and the other departs from
our precedents, chiefly Testan and Mitchell I.
The Court simply asserts that the statutes here "clearly establish fiduciary obligations." Ante, at 20. See also id., at
19 ("a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises"). I agree
with the dissent in the Court of Claims that "there is kind of a
bootstrap quality of reasoning in saying that [the United
States'] duties expressed by law are those of a trustee, and,
therefore, we may look at SCOTT ON TRUSTS or the RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS and impose on [the Government] all the other consequences the law, as stated by those
authorities, derives from the status of an erring nongovernmental trustee." 664 F. 2d 265, 283 (Nichols, J., concurring
and dissenting). "The federal power over Indian lands is so
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different in nature and origin from that of a private trustee
. . . that caution is taught in using the mere label of a trust
plus a reading of SCOTT ON TRUSTS to impose liability on
claims where assent is not unequivocally expressed." lbid. 8
8
"There are a number of widely varying relationships which more or
less closely resemble trusts, but which are not trusts, although the term
'trust' is sometimes used loosely to cover such relationships. It is important to differentiate trusts from these other relationships, since many of
the rules applicable to trusts are not applicable to them." Restatement
(Second) of Trusts§ 4, Introductory Note, at 15 (1959). For example, the
Court often has described the fiduciary relationship between the United
States and Indians as one between a guardian and a ward. See, e. g.,
Klamath Indians v. United States, 296 U. S. 244, 254 (1935); United States
v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 383 (1886). But "[a] guardianship is not a
trust." Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 7. There is no explanation,
however, why the Court chooses one analogy and not another. The choice
appears to be influenced by the fact that "[t]he duties of a trustee are more
intensive than the duties of other fiduciaries." I d., § 2, comment b.
The Court asserts that "[a]ll of the necessary elements of a common-law
trust are present"-a trustee, a beneficiary, and a trust corpus. Ante, at
19. But two persons and a parcel of real property, without more, do not
create a trust. Rather, "[a] trust ... arises as a result of a manifestation
of an intention to create it." Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 2. See
id., § 23 ("A trust is created only if the settlor properly manifests an intention to create a trust."); id., § 25 ("No trust is created unless the settlor
manifests an intention to impose enforceable duties."). This is the element that is missing in this case, and the Court does not, and cannot, find
that Congress has manifested its intent to make the statutory duties upon
which respondents rely trust duties. Cf. id., § 95; 2 A. Scott, Law of
Trusts§ 95, at 772 (2d ed. 1967) ("At common law it was held that a use ...
could not be enforced against the Crown .... ").
Indeed, given the language of the statute at issue in Mitchell I, the case
for finding that Congress intended to impose fiduciary obligations on the
United States was much stronger there than it is here. See 445 U. S., at
547 (WHITE, J., dissenting). One of the authorities cited by JUSTICE
WHITE, 2 A. Scott, supra, § 95, specifically discusses the General Allotment
Act as an example of the United States acting as a trustee. Furthermore,
a trustee can "reserv[e] powers with respect to the administration of the
trust." Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 37. Unless the United States
agrees to be held liable in damages, even the existence of a trust does not
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The trusteeships to which the Court has referred in the past
have manifested more the view that pervasive control over
Indian life is such a high attribute of federal sovereignty that
States cannot infringe upon that control. Ibid. 9 The Court
today turns this shield into a sword.
In my view, it is clear that "[n]othing on the face" of any of
the statutes at issue, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U. S. 49, 59 (1978), or in their legislative histories, "fairly
[can] be interpreted as mandating compensation" for the conduct alleged by respondents. Some of the statutes involved
here, to be sure, create substantive duties that the Secretary
must fulfill. But this could equally be said of the Classification Act, considered in Testan. It requires that pay classification ratings of federal employees be carried out pursuant to
"the principle of equal pay for substantially equal work." 5
necessarily establish that the Government has surrendered its immunity
from damages.
9
The Court has invoked the fiduciary relation primarily (i) to preclude
unauthorized state interference in the relations between the United States
and the Indian tribes or other unauthorized exercise of state jurisdiction on
Indian lands, see e. g., Kagama, 118 U. S., at 382-384; (ii) to bar or nullify
exercises of state court jurisdiction in matters affecting Indian property
rights, in which the United States was not properly joined or represented,
see, e. g., Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382, 386 (1939); United
States v. Candelaria, 271 U. S. 432, 442-444 (1926); (iii) to interpret doubtful or ambiguous treaty language in favor of the Indians, see, e. g., United
States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U. S. 111, 117-118 (1938); Minnesota v.
Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 396 (1902); (iv) to determine the liability of the
United States for damages under the Just Compensation Clause where,
acting as a fiduciary manager, it has converted the form of Indian property, see, e. g., United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U. S. 371,
415-416 (1980); and (v) to emphasize the high standard of care that the
United States is obliged to exercise in carrying out its duties respecting the
Indians, see, e. g., United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391,398 (1973); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S. 286, 296-297 (1942). But the
Court has never, until today, invoked the doctrine to hold that the United
States is answerable in money damages for breaches of the standards applicable to a private fiduciary.
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U. S. C. § 5101(1)(A). Although the federal employee in
Testan alleged a violation of the Act, the Court concluded
that a back-pay remedy was unavailable, rejecting the argument that the substantive right necessarily implies a damages remedy. 424 U. S., at 400-403.
Ignoring this holding in Testan, the Court concludes that
the mere existence of a trust of some kind necessarily establishes that Congress has consented to a recovery of damages.
In effect we are told to accept on faith the existence of a damages cause of action: "Given the existence of a trust relationship, it naturally follows that the Government should be liable in damages for the breach of its fiduciary duties." Ante,
at 20 (emphasis added). See also ibid. (damages are a "fundamental incident" of a trust relationship); ibid. (it would be
"anomalous" not to find a damages remedy). The Court can
find no more support for this proposition than the dissenting
opinion in Mitchell /. See ante, at 21. 10
It is fair to say that the Court is influenced by its view that
an injunctive remedy is inadequate to redress the violations
alleged-precisely the inference deemed inadmissible in
Testan. 11 It is the ordinary result of sovereign immunity
0

The Court reaches for support in Seminole Nation v. United States,
supra, and United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U. S. 103 (1935), but both
cases cut against the Court's theory in this case. The discussion of the
Government's fiduciary duty in Seminole Nation referred to a claim to
compel payments expressly prescribed by Treaty. See 316 U. S., at
296-297. Creek Nation involved a taking claim.
"Also significant is the Court's standardless remand for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Where the statute upon which liability is premised creates no right to payment of a sum certain, the Court of
Claims will be required, without legislative guidance, to determine the extent of liability, if any, and the items of damages that are cognizable. This
task, unlike the factual or legal determination whether a particular individual falls within a class granted a right to payment of money by a statute, is
not one to which courts are adapted. Any rules established will be of "judicial cloth, not legislative cloth." Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 454 U. S. 139, 141 (1981). I assume, however, that the law of trusts
'

81-1748-DISSENT
10

UNITED STATES v. MITCHELL

that unconsented claims for money damages are barred.
The fact that damages cannot be recovered without the sovereign's consent hardly supports the conclusion that consent
has been given. Yet this, in substance, is the Court's reasoning. If it is saying that a remedy is necessary to redress
every injury sustained, the doctrine of sovereign immunity
will have been drained of all meaning. Moreover, "many of
the federal statutes . . . that expressly provide money damages as a remedy against the United States in carefully limited circumstances would be rendered superfluous." Testan,
424 U. S., at 404.
III
The Court has made no effort to demonstrate that Congress intended to render the United States answerable in
damages upon claims of the kind presented here. The mere
application by a court of the label "trust" cannot properly justify disregard of an immunity from damages the Government
has never waived. I would reverse the judgment of the
Court of Claims.

generally will control and that all defenses to actions on breaches of trust,
such as consent by the beneficiary and laches, will be fully available to the
United States. Cf. 664 F. 2d, at 274.

